Can AMISOM Protect Somalia’s Sovereignty?
For more than two decades, Somalia’s sovereignty has been in limbo- or in an utterly defunct status. Though there are many causes, a particular one stands out exponentially: volatile security. For no nation can claim, or (like in Somalia’s case) reclaim its sovereignty while dependent on another country, coalition, or a peace-building force for security. And though road-based security has been a top priority, it has been an objective made difficult by the many hurdles along the way!
Rebuilding the national security apparatus of a country like Somalia, which, as a result of protracted war became brain-drained and resource-drained, is not an easy task. This task is even more difficult when there is a constant struggle with certain elements within the international community that I refer to as the Ghost-lords on whether or not there is an urgent need to rebuild the Somali National Security apparatus. Since January 2007 when AMISOM (the African Union peacekeeping force to Somalia) was assembled, the international community has spent almost all of the appropriated funds to restore and sustain security in Somalia on AMISOM.
Though their record might not be entirely immaculate as some of their past tactics were rightly criticized by human rights organizations, by and large, AMISOM has done an exceptional job in helping the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) establish a strong foothold and restore security.
That said, their long-term presence inadvertently demoralizes Somali soldiers, making the rebuilding of the Somali National Army and other security apparatus a lesser priority, and undermines the case for reclaiming the sovereignty of the Somali state.
More than the huge pay and total cost disparity between AMISOM and Somali soldiers—the former’s over all per soldier per month cost being roughly 23 times the latter—the demoralizing factor comes from consistently late soldier salaries ($100 per month) that are funneled through AMISOM. Since its initial 6 months security focused mandate, AMISOM has morphed into a jack of all trades. Going back to the Somali soldiers, despite the unfair coverage they get from the media, they are the real infantry force of every AMISOM- led operation. They are the ones who suffer most of casualties. And because of the UN Arms Embargo and financial constraints, they neither possess heavy arms nor armored trucks; neither bullet-proof vests nor enough ammunition. They don’t even have appropriate communication devices as they rely on a few cell phones, and, unlike their partners, when wounded in battle, they don’t get emergency evacuation or get flown out of the country for medical care.
In a tragic irony, their foes—who often outgun them—describe their disadvantage and misfortune as being worse than “sa’abooley.” This is Somali slang which means those who rely on the palm of their hands. It is a term that developed during the lawless era of Mogadishu when groups of marauding gangs or criminals would roam around the city for a game and bring along a few of their patsies who had no guns of their own and who became de facto human shields in the hopes of inheriting the guns of those who would be killed either from their among friends or from the other side.
Every conference held, every appeal made to the international donors, and every resolution sought through the UN Security Council is mainly about strengthening AMISOM, enhancing its pay scale, and prolonging or broadening its mandate. In these meetings and conferences, Somali military officials and experts are seldom, if at all, invited to offer their own assessments. The man currently leading the Somali army, General Abdulqadir Ali Dini, has received his military trainings both in the United States and the former Soviet Union.
General Abdulqadir Ali Dini was the commander of the Commandoes Unit of the Somali National Army before the collapse of the state. He is a man held in high regard as he refused to participate in the clan-based civil strife. Since he was appointed to his current post almost two years ago, the national army has undergone a tangible transformation in terms of discipline, integration, loyalty, and clan balance.
Of course, when it comes to sustainable security, there is no quick fix; especially when rebuilding a defunct army from ground up. Sustainable security will be attained only through a highly trained and well equipped local army. Foreign forces can be of help in the short-term, when there is a strategic plan to scale them down as the local army’s competence improves. Currently, there is no apparent effort to rebuild the Somali security apparatus with the right training, equipment, and resources to gradually replace AMISOM. There is only lip-service.
A few weeks ago, the commander of the police force, General Sharif Sheekhuna Maye, threatened to resign out of frustration because the meager salaries for his force is never on time due to certain questionable bureaucratic processes set by the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and AMISOM. Is this conducive to building a police force willing to deploy and establish law and order in newly liberated areas far from their comfort zone? Instead of addressing this kind of concern, AU approves a police force contingent to join AMISOM to police liberated areas. Also the US, Britain and France have declared their commitment to provide enhanced training for AMISOM Special Forces.
Against this backdrop and a number of other issues, Somalia is trying to reclaim its sovereignty as an independent nation state. And that very desire has been the carrot that the Ghost-lords dangled in front of a nation eager to emerge out of its transitional status by August 2012. If you are a curious mind who must know to what status: it is, interim! Meanwhile, the international community is pushing a controversial draft constitution to replace the one ratified in 1961. Among other problems, this document does not define what constitutes the legal boundaries of the Somali state which could sow the seed for a perpetual inter-Somali territorial conflict.
Meanwhile, enshrined in every UN Security Council resolution on Somalia are these words: “Reaffirming its (UNSC) respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, including Somalia’s rights with respect to offshore natural resources, including fisheries, in accordance with international law.” But, at this juncture, all that Somalia has is a flag and a seat at the United Nations in New York.
Granted, no state is wholly sovereign as such sovereignty belongs only to The One who set the world in motion! However, states can, and should, have a claim to sovereignty. That is the highest political authority within certain negotiated or legally defined geographical territory accepted by the United Nation. This type of sovereignty is necessary to establish the rule of law, to govern independently, to protect the nation’s values, territorial integrity, unity, and to mobilize for defense against internal and external threats. The more the process for Somalia to reclaim its sovereignty is delayed, the more al-Shabaab, who just carried out their latest suicide bomb in Dhusa Mareeb, will be emboldened and the more the TFG and the post-August government will be discredited.