On October 26, Israel carried out Operation Days of Repentance, striking military targets in various parts of Iran. This was Israel’s response to Iran’s two-wave ballistic missile attack, launched 25 days earlier. Although Iran has yet to respond to this “limited” Israeli operation, which did not entail bombing Iranian nuclear or oil facilities, Tehran and Tel Aviv remain on a trajectory of escalation. Future direct attacks between Iran and Israel seem increasingly likely.

The crossing of old red lines and the “new rules of engagement” since the Iran-Israel “shadow war” gave way to direct confrontation in April have made the Middle East a more dangerous and unpredictable part of the world. President-elect Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January adds more uncertainty, especially given open questions about how his second administration will approach Iran and whether he will pursue a ‘maximum pressure 2.0’ campaign.

As conflict dynamics in the Middle East remain tense, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members have no choice but to balance their interests and mitigate serious risks carefully. These six Gulf Arab monarchies have taken a primarily neutral stance in the Iran-Israel tensions. They aim to avoid being caught up in any full-blown war that could engulf the wider region. Notably, no single GCC state permitted Israel to use its airspace during last month’s military strikes. They also immediately condemned that attack on Iran.

Nonetheless, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will probably continue seeking to drag Washington into a war with Iran, either before or after President Joe Biden leaves the White House. In hosting American military personnel on their soil while also seeking improved relations with Tehran, the GCC states could come under significant pressure if a potential U.S.-Iran war erupts.

No Attacking Iran from Qatar

Speaking in the middle of last month, Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdul Rahman Al Thani, declared, “The State of Qatar does not accept launching attacks on any countries or peoples from the base of Al Udeid.” The message is that the U.S. can’t bomb Iran from Qatari soil.

Located southwest of Doha, Al Udeid is United States Central Command’s main air base. The extent to which the U.S. military has “freedom of operation” out of Al Udeid greatly contributes to the value Washington has long placed on its alliance with Qatar. This base has been essential to U.S. missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, and elsewhere.

One must appreciate how political and social dynamics in other Arab countries hosting U.S. armed forces prevent those governments from granting the Americans such “freedom of operation” from those bases. This explains why the U.S. Centcom forward headquarters moved from Saudi Arabia to Qatar two decades ago.

The American military presence in Saudi Arabia had been a controversial issue that hardline jihadist groups used to rally their supporters. As Qatar is a smaller country with enormous wealth, no domestic political opposition, and no terrorist attacks within its borders in 19 years, the Al Thani royals have had little, if any, reason to worry about the Americans doing anything from Al Udeid that might fuel domestic unrest.

Qatar has permitted the U.S. military to conduct operations from its soil, including those that it did not support politically, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This speaks to how much Qatar has long prioritized excellent relations with Washington. Under the U.S. security umbrella, Doha understands the importance of its alliance with Washington, especially now mindful of the 2017-21 blockade experience.

However, by denying the U.S. permission to strike Iran from its soil, the Qataris have demonstrated that “freedom of operation” has limits, which is understandable.

Any scenario entailing a war that involves Iran can potentially pose “existential risks for Qatar,” Patrick Theros, the former U.S. ambassador to Qatar, told me in an interview. “Iran has made it clear that if the U.S. uses Qatari facilities, or any other GCC country, to launch an attack on Iran, it would strike the oil and gas export facilities of that country. GCC oil and gas export facilities are a target-rich environment, and the Iranians could do great damage even with the real improvements in GCC states’ defenses,” he added.

Such energy facilities are too extensive of a target and in such close geographic proximity to Iran to be defended in any effective manner. Tehran’s message is that if Iran can’t export its oil and gas, neither will any other country in the Gulf be able to do so.

“I suspect that if Israel targets Iranian oil and gas facilities, Tehran will present the GCC states with an ultimatum to shut down their export facilities or have Iran shut them down violently,” added Theros.

Understanding Qatari Interests and Positions

It seems doubtful that the U.S. would use Al Udeid to attack Iran without Doha’s consent. The Biden administration is aware of the need to consider Qatar’s concerns and positions and act accordingly, mindful of such sensitive dynamics.

During an interview, Gordon Gray, the former U.S. ambassador to Tunisia, expressed his belief that the U.S. would not go to war with Iran. But if Washington would, he couldn’t imagine the U.S. waging operations against Iran from Al Udeid without Qatar’s permission.

“Apart from a few extreme voices, there is no appetite in the United States for war with Iran, especially after two decades of U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq,” he said.

Gray holds that “even in the hypothetical situation in which the United States changed course and decided to strike Iran, it would not need to launch an attack from Al Udeid and would not want to expose a partner such as Qatar to Iranian retaliation.”

Doha’s energy wealth is a crucial factor. Qatar and Iran also share ownership of the South Pars/North Dome field, which always incentivizes Doha to promote dialogue, rather than confrontation, with Tehran.

The U.S. striking Iran from Al Udeid without Doha’s permission would send a message to the rest of the GCC. Saudi, Emirati and other Gulf Arab officials might struggle to understand why Washington would violate Qatar’s sovereignty in a manner that subjects Doha to Iran’s vengeance but does not similarly disregard other GCC members’ sovereignty.

U.S. Military Considerations

The extent to which Qatar is making Al Udeid off-limits would be an issue for Washington, depending on the nature of any hypothetical mission. Whether the U.S. would launch a strike, carry out a sustained military campaign, or start a full-blown war with Iran would matter.

The U.S. has other options for a single strike or several sorties, including the Aviano Air Base in Italy. Therefore, Doha not permitting Washington to use Al Udeid could make such a limited operation more logistically tricky but not impossible. Yet, for a more extensive and prolonged military campaign against Iran, being denied the right to use Al Udeid and other GCC-based installations, such as Saudi Arabia’s Prince Sultan Air Base and the UAE’s al-Dhafra Air Base, would make the logistics of such a mission far more complex.

The most that Washington could realistically hope for is to negotiate with the Qataris for Al Udeid to play a limited role in any hypothetical U.S. operation against Iran. At the end of the day, although the U.S. has leverage over Qatar, the reverse is true, too. Doha has unique cards to play, and its special approach to diplomacy has helped Washington out in Afghanistan, Gaza, the Horn of Africa, Ukraine, Venezuela, and elsewhere. Qatar and the U.S. also have deep economic, trade, investment, and commercial relations.

Ultimately, no U.S. president should completely disregard Qatar’s perspectives on Iran, regardless of how much tension heats up between Washington and Tehran.