Irina Tsukerman is a New York-registered human rights and national security lawyer, geopolitical analyst, and journalist. She earned a B.A. in International/Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006 and a J.D. from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She is president of Scarab Rising, Inc., editor-in-chief of The Washington Outsider, and fellow of the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs and the Arabian Peninsula Institute. Her work focuses on foreign policy, information warfare, security, and Middle Eastern affairs. She serves as Written Content Vice Chair of the American Bar Association’s Science and Technology Committee.

Dr. Amos Guiora is a Professor of Law (Lecturer) at the University of Utah’s S.J. Quinney College of Law. His research examines institutional complicity, bystanders, enablers, international law, and counterterrorism. He leads the Bystander Initiative and advocates accountability for individuals and institutions that enable sexual abuse and fail to protect victims.

In this interview, based on The Washington Outsider Center for Information report “Shadow Networks: A Longitudinal Investigation of Transnational Influence, Organized Crime, and Political Access in the United States,” Scott Douglas Jacobsen speaks with Amos Guiora and Irina Tsukerman about Jeffrey Epstein’s network and the institutions and individuals that enabled it. Their discussion examines elite access, professional ethics, failures of oversight, and the obstacles to accountability, while carefully separating documented misconduct from unresolved questions about blackmail, personal motives, and what Epstein’s associates knew about the abuse.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Thank you both for joining me. The phrase “elite trafficking” can describe at least two distinct phenomena: powerful people gaining access to trafficking victims, and sophisticated systems used to recruit, move, and exploit those victims. How should we understand the social hierarchies within Epstein’s network and the methods that sustained the abuse?

Dr. Amos Guiora: Thanks for having me. As I work on a co-authored law review article with one of my law students, Lizzie Maldonado, we have interacted with a number of subject matter experts on exactly what you’re asking about: what I call the “ecosystem of enabling.” We’re looking at the relationship between Epstein’s social and professional networks and his exploitation of girls and young women. The word “currency” has been offered to us as a way to describe how victims were treated within that ecosystem.

There are documented associations involving people such as Bill Gates, Bill Clinton, and Brad Karp, although the nature of those associations differs. Gates met with Jeffrey Epstein, and Clinton traveled on his aircraft. Those facts do not establish that they visited every property, witnessed abuse, or participated in trafficking. Karp was then chairman of Paul, Weiss. He resigned as chairman in February 2026 after disclosures about his communications with Epstein, while remaining at the firm.

There is also evidence of cameras inside Epstein’s home, including verified footage from a camera in the living room of his Palm Beach residence. However, that does not establish that he had cameras everywhere, that every visitor was recorded, or that everyone knew they were being recorded.

I don’t think you can assume that everybody associated with Epstein was, to use a term I dislike, a beneficiary of sexual gratification. Association alone does not establish participation in sexual abuse.

My interpretation is that some people saw opportunities for personal connections, professional advancement, and developing their networks. Epstein had what has been described to Lizzie and me as “sparkle.” Again, that’s not my word. Through that glamour and sparkle, he was able to attract the so-called rich and powerful.

Kathryn Ruemmler, who later became Goldman Sachs’s chief legal officer and general counsel, also had a documented relationship with Epstein. Her interactions with him preceded her employment at Goldman Sachs, which she joined in 2020.

In my analysis, men and women alike could see benefits in associating with Epstein, while girls and young women were treated as currency within his abusive operation. But I want to emphasize that this is an interpretation of the ecosystem, not evidence that every associate interacted sexually with victims or knew about the abuse.

Being in Epstein’s circle, or circles, may have been seen by some people as beneficial. For me, the enabling question concerns what people knew, what they witnessed, and how they responded. If someone witnessed signs of abuse or exploitation and turned a blind eye, that is the kind of conduct I am examining. We cannot assume that every visitor encountered visibly underage victims or understood what was happening.

That, to me, is how an ecosystem of enabling can operate, with devastating harm to victims.

To return to your question, there is evidence of an organized operation. The 2019 federal indictment alleged that Epstein used employees and associates to arrange encounters with underage girls and paid some victims to recruit others. Those charges were not tried because he died before trial.

That is the context in which I use the phrase “elite sex trafficking.” Again, it is not my phrase; credit belongs to others.

For me, in focusing on enabling and enablers, Epstein’s case presents an ecosystem that is critical to examine. One more comment, and then I’ll stop. My argument is for broader accountability for people who facilitate abuse. Some have already been prosecuted: Ghislaine Maxwell was convicted in 2021 and sentenced to 20 years in prison in 2022 for her role in Epstein’s abuse of minors. My concern is that enabling will continue without further accountability because they may believe they will face no consequences, and that is tragic from the victim’s perspective.

Irina Tsukerman: There is something about all of this that I have been struggling with since I started following the story, certainly by the time I began addressing Epstein’s modus operandi in the report we published. Two things. First, the sparkle that made Epstein so glamorous: what exactly made this individual with such an opaque background so desirable? Eventually, it was his access to powerful structures and individuals. But how did he gain that access, and why was he considered so successful when these powerful people could have performed similar networking functions without him?

Why was he allowed to build such an extensive network that some people appeared to regard him as indispensable? Was that really what drew people to him? Was it the perception that he was influential and knew all the right people?

Could they not have achieved the same results through other well-connected people who did not have the same baggage? The other question concerns the terms on which people interacted with Epstein. They could have communicated by email or met in professional settings, including their offices. They did not have to go to his house.

One possibility I think deserves examination is whether some people were attracted to something they perceived as illicit, exclusive, or taboo. But visiting his house does not, by itself, establish that motive or knowledge of abuse.

For others, there is the question of whether they felt pressure to accept conditions in order to obtain what they wanted from Epstein and his network. Did any of those relationships involve expectations of complicity, comparable to participating in illegal activity to demonstrate loyalty within an organized criminal group? That is a question requiring evidence, not something we can assume about his associates.

This is the element that I think has not been sufficiently established or examined. Much of the discussion has focused on powerful and influential people abusing their power and status, including through psychological and sexual abuse. But I think there may be more to examine.

Guiora: The Bill Gateses, Bill Clintons, and Brad Karps of the world have their own elite circles. So does Kathryn Ruemmler, who later became Goldman Sachs’s chief legal officer and general counsel. These are people with access to highly influential networks.

I’m not a psychologist. I’m the son of a late psychologist and the father of a psychologist, but I am not a psychologist. I wonder about this need, if that’s the right word, to be with one another in this super-exclusive, extraordinarily elite world. Irina’s question about that attraction is worth examining.

My concern is with people who witnessed abuse or warning signs and turned a blind eye. I don’t know another expression in polite English. Where that happened, it means overlooking something beyond troubling. The victims included underage girls.

Some of these people also have children. Even without getting into the extensive correspondence and other records, the question of what someone physically present witnessed and understood is, to me, extraordinary. But physical presence alone does not establish knowledge of abuse.

That’s why, for me, anyone whose conduct meets the legal requirements for criminal responsibility should be held accountable for enabling abuse. We need evidence of each person’s actions and knowledge. Irina’s point about examining the dynamics of these relationships is well taken.

Jacobsen: In our earlier discussions of cults, we examined Keith Raniere and NXIVM. Within DOS, the secret group Raniere led, members were required to provide compromising material as proof of commitment. The group called it “collateral.”

That collateral included sexually explicit photographs and potentially damaging claims about members or their loved ones, some of them fabricated. It was then used to enforce obedience and discourage members from leaving or exposing the group.

Is there evidence that entry into Epstein’s network came with comparable conditions, or that compromising material was used to secure loyalty in a way resembling DOS’s collateral system?

Guiora: The girls, I hate to talk like this. As I mentioned, some people describe the girls as “currency.” Others have used the word “transactional.” Scott, as someone who writes about international law, conflict, terrorism, and counterterrorism, I also think about the term “collateral damage.”

Were the girls treated as collateral damage to business transactions, to a senior partner at law firm A meeting a senior partner at law firm B and bringing in more business? Were their interests and safety disregarded while others pursued those relationships?

It’s an awful analogy, but it captures the disregard for the harm done to them. They were, however, direct victims of abuse and exploitation, not merely incidental casualties.

Jacobsen: There appear to be two distinct possibilities. One is that victims’ welfare was disregarded while powerful people pursued their own interests. The other is that evidence placing victims with elite individuals, particularly men, could have been used as leverage if those individuals threatened to speak out. What evidence would be needed to distinguish between those possibilities and establish that compromising material was actually used as leverage?

Guiora: In international humanitarian law, incidental civilian harm is recognized as a possible consequence of attacks on military objectives. The law does not set a fixed numerical limit, such as 10 people here or 15 people there. It prohibits attacks expected to cause civilian harm excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. It also requires all feasible precautions to avoid or minimize civilian harm.

That is a legal framework for armed conflict, not for Epstein’s crimes. The girls must be understood unequivocally as victims. In the metaphorical sense we’re discussing, their welfare was treated as secondary to other people’s transactions. That, in polite English, is beyond damning. Irina?

Tsukerman: The possibility I’m raising is whether victims were also exploited to create blackmail material. That would mean the abuse served not only the sexual desires of perpetrators but also a mechanism of control.

Was compromising material used to keep particular people in Epstein’s orbit, prevent disclosures, or protect others involved? That is the hypothesis I think deserves examination. It is not established that everyone in his orbit was blackmailed or participated in abuse.

Jacobsen: In other words, the theory depends on whether Epstein possessed compromising photographs or similar material and used it as leverage?

Tsukerman: Yes, if such material existed and was used that way. The comparison I’m considering is with groups in which sexual activity becomes a means of establishing power, enforcing loyalty, and creating shared exposure to damaging revelations.

But we cannot conclude that Epstein controlled everyone who associated with him or that everything worked exactly as he planned.

From a psychological perspective, what fascinates me is the question of why a powerful person would knowingly accept that vulnerability. Apart from the ethical horror of participating in abuse, why would someone commanding enormous resources allow another person to acquire compromising leverage over them?

Would access to contacts and proximity to power be worth the possibility of exposure, prosecution where crimes were committed, reputational damage, or losing a business? One disclosure could threaten an entire network.

We cannot know that none of these people asked themselves those questions. But where someone knowingly accepted such risks, I want to understand why their self-interest did not stop them. How could someone who was manipulative, charming, or useful acquire that much influence over people who already possessed considerable power? At the end of the day…

Jacobsen: Keith Raniere, whom I do not find particularly charismatic, nevertheless attracted enormous financial backing from Clare and Sara Bronfman, heirs to the Seagram fortune. Reports estimate that their spending and losses connected with Raniere and NXIVM exceeded $150 million. That is not the same as a finding that he personally swindled them out of that exact sum, but it illustrates the scale of their involvement. What does that case suggest about how destructive figures gain the loyalty of people with wealth, status, and ostensibly far more power than they possess?

Guiora: I think some of these people may have viewed themselves as untouchable. My hypothesis is that, where people possessed compromising information about one another, they could have felt protected by mutual vulnerability. Person X might have expected Person Y to remain silent because disclosure could also harm Person Y or Person Z.

That would be a self-protecting network in which people understood the risks. But we cannot assume that this describes everyone associated with Epstein.

There is evidence of cameras at Epstein’s properties. We cannot establish that every visitor saw them or knew about concealed cameras. My assumption is that visible cameras could have suggested the possibility of surveillance elsewhere, but that remains an inference about what particular people might have understood.

And I remind you that Epstein pleaded guilty in Florida in 2008 to state offences involving procuring a minor for prostitution and soliciting prostitution. His federal non-prosecution agreement and the leniency of his treatment are a separate conversation. People who associated with him after that conviction were dealing with someone whose criminal history was publicly documented, although that does not establish what each person knew.

The dynamic I’m describing is one of self-protection. If I’m a senior partner or another influential person, I might avoid antagonizing someone because I fear consequences for myself. It’s all about me. In that context, I pursue another business transaction while disregarding signs that someone else is being exploited.

I hate this language, but that is what the terms “currency,” “transactional,” and “collateral” are trying to capture: treating a girl as an instrument of someone else’s interests rather than as a person.

That connects with Irina’s point about whether people involved in wrongdoing had a shared interest in preventing disclosure. But we need evidence before concluding that particular individuals were involved or protecting one another.

Jacobsen: Could this be understood as a kind of family bound together by mutual protection?

Tsukerman: Groupthink taken to an extreme is one possible way of understanding that dynamic: being unwilling to question the status quo because of who else is involved. Wanting to fit in, avoid unwanted attention, prevent questions about your loyalty, and continue getting what you want.

But many billionaires, powerful people, and celebrities were not part of Epstein’s network. That raises the question of whether there were common characteristics among those who became closely involved.

I’m distinguishing casual acquaintances, whose names might appear in Epstein-related records because of ordinary professional interactions, from people who maintained sustained relationships with him. Even then, a sustained relationship does not by itself establish participation in abuse.

How did he identify people to cultivate? Was blackmail involved in any particular relationship from the outset, or did compromising leverage develop later? Those possibilities require evidence.

Or was there an element of self-selection? Did some people respond because they were attracted to what he offered and were prepared to overlook concerns to maintain access? That is another possibility worth examining.

Jacobsen: It may eventually be possible to map the network in layers. One might include people who sought Epstein out and developed direct relationships with him. Another might consist of those introduced through established associates or peripheral acquaintances.

What could such a map reveal about how these relationships formed, what participants knew, and how information moved through the network? And given that some of the people involved are elderly or deceased, how much of that structure can the surviving record realistically recover?

Guiora: There may also have been a third tier: people who wanted to join but were not admitted to the circle.

Jacobsen: I am less interested in who wanted to join than in what happened after someone was rejected. How might rejection have shaped that person’s perception of the network’s risks, or their willingness to disclose what they knew?

Tsukerman: Those people could potentially provide useful information to law enforcement, especially if rejection made them willing to speak. Having an axe to grind would also make corroborating their accounts essential.

Guiora: Irina, one of the questions we’re addressing in the article concerns decisions by law enforcement officials. We’re researching that because there is a lot of material available. But I’m careful about the distinction between what you read and what you can substantiate in writing.

Jacobsen: The case plainly involved documented failures. How should we assess where poor judgment or institutional breakdown ended and possible deliberate obstruction began?

Tsukerman: Failures or deliberate failures? Was it incompetence, poor judgment, or improper influence? Did any officials benefit from relationships that affected their decisions? Those are different explanations, and allegations of corruption require evidence.

Jacobsen: Any claim that someone offered benefits in exchange for a decision not to prosecute would require evidence. Given the network’s size and the number of unanswered questions, what standards should investigators and journalists use to separate plausible lines of inquiry from speculation?

Guiora: There are multiple layers of involvement here. You have to ask why particular people maintained these relationships. I understand the potential attraction of professional and business connections. But the interests involved could extend beyond that.

Again, I emphasize that association with Epstein does not establish that someone participated in sexual abuse. Different people had different relationships with him.

Tsukerman: Can I give you an example from a separate situation involving journalistic boundaries? I’m not suggesting an Epstein connection. Jay Solomon, a former Wall Street Journal foreign affairs correspondent, was dismissed in 2017 over ethical violations involving his relationships with sources.

One source was Farhad Azima, an Iranian-American aviation businessman who hosted him aboard his yacht near Monaco. This was not a case of Emirati royals hosting him on their yachts.

Solomon later wrote about it in Columbia Journalism Review. He acknowledged serious mistakes in managing the relationship and described how access to an unfamiliar world of wealth and influential contacts blurred professional boundaries. He denied entering business with Azima or benefiting financially from his dealings, while acknowledging that he accepted hospitality aboard the yacht.

The Journal said he had misled editors and engaged in impermissible interactions with sources. It also said its review found that the paper’s coverage had not been affected.

What interests me is the attraction of access: a journalist who usually observes that world from outside being welcomed into it.

Jacobsen: If someone obtained leverage over a journalist at The Wall Street Journal or The New York Times, that could create an opportunity to influence coverage or discourage scrutiny. What evidence would be necessary to show that such pressure affected reporting, rather than merely establishing that an ethically compromising relationship existed?

Tsukerman: That raises the question of whether proximity to powerful people contributed to failures to investigate Epstein despite warning signs. But journalists also played a crucial role in exposing his abuse and the institutions that supported him.

I gave an example in my report involving Joi Ito, the former director of the MIT Media Lab. He accepted Epstein’s financial support for the lab and investments in funds he controlled. He also served on the boards of The New York Times Company and the Knight Foundation. The Knight Foundation is distinct from the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University.

Those financial relationships are documented, but we cannot establish his motivations solely from them. Nor does his position on the Times Company’s board establish that he influenced its reporting.

I wonder whether, in particular instances, journalists or institutions avoided scrutiny because they feared reputational damage from having welcomed someone like Epstein. Could professional relationships have influenced their judgment without direct payments? Those are questions requiring evidence, rather than grounds for assuming that journalists collectively hushed up the story.

Jacobsen: From personal experience, I know that journalists who enter controversial cases involving cults, megalomaniacs, or political power can face sustained harassment. The work brings practical headaches and a considerable emotional burden, and reporters sometimes need time to recover before taking on another difficult subject.

That strain can make pacing essential. At the same time, perceptions of risk are deeply subjective: prominence or exceptional talent does not guarantee sound judgment about personal vulnerability, and some people enter dangerous situations without appreciating the consequences.

Others speak out despite threats to their reputation or safety, even when powerful people would prefer their silence. The system Amos describes appears vulnerable to disclosure because so many participants may hold fragments of information.

Yet arrangements like this can persist when enough people decide that silence serves their interests. What enables some witnesses to break from that logic of mutual protection, even when they fully understand the risks?

Guiora: Look at the emails in which someone holding an extraordinarily prominent position sought Epstein’s advice about pursuing a romantic relationship with a woman he described as a mentee. Putting that in an email, apparently without anticipating that it could become public, is extraordinary to me.

The reported correspondence concerned an adult woman he described as a mentee. We should not assume she was then his student or that she reciprocated his interest.

These are people in exceptionally influential positions. There are people like me, relatively modest in standing, and then there are people operating at those levels. Men and women alike.

I wonder whether some assumed that their institutional standing protected them from consequences. What’s the television show? The Untouchables. I’m borrowing the title as a metaphor: the belief that nothing can happen to you.

Again, the words “collateral,” “currency,” and “transactional” describe the dehumanization we’re discussing. The harm caused to the girls and young women was devastating.

There is also an account we’re looking into concerning a physician treating an injured young woman at an Epstein property. The details need verification, including the patient’s age, the circumstances of the injury, and what the physician knew or asked. We cannot yet state that a female physician stitched a minor’s face without asking about her parents.

The question for our research is whether medical professionals encountered signs of abuse and, if so, how they responded.

Tsukerman: I wonder how many medical professionals had contact with Epstein or his victims, and what those encounters involved. The number cannot be inferred simply from the scale of his network.

Guiora: We are looking into accounts involving two or three medical professionals, without naming them here. There may be others, but that remains to be established. Contact alone does not demonstrate misconduct.

It’s an interconnected network. But I remind us that Alexander Acosta, the U.S. attorney whose office negotiated Epstein’s 2007 federal non-prosecution agreement, later became Trump’s secretary of labour. Epstein subsequently pleaded guilty to state charges in Florida in 2008. The Justice Department’s later review found that Acosta exercised poor judgment, although it did not find professional misconduct.

In my view, it was an extraordinarily lenient arrangement. Epstein was a convicted sex offender, and people who associated with him after 2008 had the opportunity to learn about that public record.

If someone then encountered signs of exploitation at his home, that should have raised serious questions. But what each person saw and knew must be established individually. Denial can be powerful, as can deliberate avoidance of uncomfortable information.

Tsukerman: Medical professionals would have had relevant knowledge and training to assess injuries and recognize possible signs of abuse. That makes their conduct worth examining, but it does not establish that every clinician involved recognized abuse or deliberately ignored it.

If a physician failed to respond appropriately to suspected abuse, that could raise questions about professional ethics, safeguarding, and applicable reporting obligations. Whether a particular physician violated those duties or incurred legal liability depends on the evidence and the rules governing that encounter.

Guiora: That is one of the things we’re looking into. We plan to contact licensing bodies to ask how they would assess such conduct, both retrospectively and in future cases. We’ve also begun examining those questions concerning attorneys.

Tsukerman: There’s another question concerning psychologists and other mental health professionals. Were any practitioners involved in controlling victims, discouraging disclosures, or portraying people who might speak out as psychologically unstable? That would require evidence; we cannot assume such a system existed.

If practitioners participated in that conduct, are they still practising or holding influential positions? What mechanisms would allow complaints to be investigated? We cannot infer that they are involved in other undisclosed scandals.
Wealthy clients can create conflicts and pressures, but professional responsibilities remain. A clinician’s obligations to a patient should not be displaced by the interests of a powerful person paying for treatment.

I also have concerns about cultural and political biases in professional organizations, including how the American Psychological Association addresses antisemitism and the experiences of Jewish practitioners and patients. Those concerns need to be examined through specific policies, incidents, and responses. They do not, by themselves, establish that the organization endorsed discriminatory practices or pseudoscientific theories.

Similarly, accounts from people who report feeling pressured or inadequately informed during gender-related care deserve careful investigation. Individual allegations must be assessed on their evidence, rather than treated as proof that transgender care as a whole violates ethical standards.

My broader question is how professional safeguards operate when clinicians work with exceptionally wealthy and influential people. Where oversight is weak, how do we identify misconduct and protect patients?