Removing barriers to trade and investment is economically important, but politically difficult, and the benefits can take years to materialize. By contrast, gaining access to new markets created through defense procurement, industrial investment, and economic-security cooperation could deliver tangible economic gains much sooner.

Britain needs both approaches, but it should not confuse their timelines.

Prime Minister Andy Burnham is right that Brexit has damaged Britain’s economy. Yet his government should not look primarily to reversing Brexit for immediate economic gains from closer relations with the European Union. The most promising short-term opportunities lie elsewhere, at the intersection of geopolitics and geoeconomics.

A decade after the referendum, the economic case for closer European integration, potentially including eventual membership in the Single Market or even the EU itself, remains compelling. But there is a fundamental problem of timing. Even if Britain decided tomorrow to reverse Brexit, the economic benefits would take years to materialize.

Negotiations, implementation, and the adjustments required of businesses would be lengthy and politically fraught. Moreover, such a dramatic political reversal is not currently on the table, as Burnham himself has acknowledged.

Brussels remains wary of British promises after the upheaval of Brexit. Any meaningful reintegration would require durable political commitments. And with France, Germany, and other European countries confronting their own political turbulence, Britain is hardly the EU’s most pressing concern.

The Burnham government has inherited an incremental reset agenda and must now decide how far to take it. It should continue pursuing the agreements already under discussion, including those concerning food standards, energy, and mobility. But these measures, however necessary, will not fundamentally transform Britain’s economic prospects. Overselling them risks perpetuating an illusion of progress, mistaking modest improvements for action commensurate with the scale, urgency, and complexity of the challenges Britain faces.

There is, however, another path that could deliver results considerably faster.

The crucial distinction is between removing barriers to existing economic activity and securing access to opportunities that governments are actively creating. Traditional reintegration focuses on reducing the costs of trading with Europe. Increasingly, however, governments are shaping markets through industrial policy, strategic investment, public procurement, and measures designed to strengthen economic security.

The question is no longer simply how easily British companies can sell into European markets. It is whether Britain will have a seat at the table when decisions are made about the investments, industries, and technologies that will define Europe’s economic future.

The debate surrounding the EU’s emerging “Made in Europe” policies illustrates what is at stake. Britain risks being excluded from procurement contracts and industrial initiatives as European governments direct resources toward strategically important sectors. Seeking exemptions after the rules have been written is no substitute for helping shape those rules in the first place.

Increasingly, being inside the tent is more economically valuable than watching from the outside.

The geopolitical landscape has changed profoundly since Brexit.

Trade, investment, technology, critical raw materials, defense procurement, and industrial policy have become instruments of geopolitical power. Economic coercion, strategic dependencies, and competition over essential technologies are reshaping markets and challenging long-standing assumptions about globalization.

Liberal democracy also faces mounting pressure from authoritarian powers and illiberal movements at home. Despite their disagreements over Brexit, Britain and the EU remain fundamentally aligned in their commitment to democratic institutions, European security, and a rules-based international order.

That shared outlook offers a different route toward closer integration.

The emerging EU–Canada partnership provides an intriguing model. At their Montreal summit in October, the two sides launched an ambitious Alliance for the Future, extending cooperation beyond conventional trade arrangements into economic security, defense industries, advanced technologies, and critical raw materials. Canada’s participation in the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) defense financing instrument already demonstrates how strategic cooperation can translate into concrete industrial opportunities.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has floated the idea of Canadian “associate membership” in the EU. The terminology is problematic, particularly given the implications for sovereignty and EU decision-making. Indeed, the two sides have stopped short of formally adopting that designation. But the underlying concept of an ambitious, integrated partnership among trusted, like-minded democracies deserves serious consideration.

Crucially, such an arrangement would move beyond the traditional confines of Michel Barnier’s Brexit staircase, which links deeper economic integration to the acceptance of EU rules and obligations.

That logic remains relevant to Single Market membership. But geopolitical integration offers another dimension: the opportunity for countries to build capabilities, strengthen resilience, and exercise influence collectively in ways they cannot achieve individually.

For Britain, this could mean deeper defense-industrial integration, joint procurement, coordinated responses to economic coercion, closer cooperation on strategic technologies and supply chains, and shared financing for major investments. Such a partnership should also strengthen democratic resilience and help counter interference by authoritarian governments and illiberal actors.

The ambition should extend beyond the bilateral relationship. An Economic Security Alliance bringing together the EU, Britain, Canada, and other like-minded partners, including Japan, South Korea, and Norway, could coordinate industrial strategies, reinforce collective resilience, and defend shared economic and democratic interests.

This would not amount to Single Market access without obligations. Strategic integration requires trust, reciprocal commitments, and credible institutions. Nor would it erase Brexit’s long-term economic costs or eliminate the need for a broader debate about Britain’s relationship with Europe.

But it could alter the economic calculus much sooner. Access to joint procurement, strategic investment, and trusted supply chains could generate opportunities within months or years, rather than on the considerably longer timetable associated with fundamental economic reintegration. Participation from the outset would also give Britain influence over decisions that might otherwise be made without it.

Burnham should continue delivering the incremental reset while encouraging a serious national debate about Britain’s long-term European future.

Neither approach, on its own, constitutes a convincing short-term economic strategy.

Britain cannot afford to remain consumed by yesterday’s arguments over Brexit while overlooking tomorrow’s opportunities.

For now, the strongest argument for closer relations between Britain and the EU is geopolitical. But getting geopolitics right may also prove the quickest route to delivering meaningful economic benefits.