At the IGAD Summit in January, U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Michael Hammer, made a pointed statement, emphasizing, “The United States recognizes the Federal Republic of Somalia’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity.” He further warned that rising tensions over the agreement signed between Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi could derail the collective efforts—by Somalis, Africans, and international partners, including the U.S.—to combat the al-Shabaab insurgency. He noted troubling signs that the terror group was exploiting the discord to attract new recruits.

Since the start of the year, militant activity has increased, including recent arrests of individuals claiming they were headed to northern Somalia to disrupt Ethiopia’s anticipated expansion into key ports and land corridors. The U.S. has underscored its concerns about the illegal agreement by extending sanctions on Ethiopia for another year, a move echoed by other nations increasingly worried about the region’s downward spiral over the past nine months.

Ethiopia, already plagued by internal strife, faces escalating conflicts across its regions, from Amhara and Oromo to Benishangul and Afar, with the Somali states also entangled in these crises. Adding to this volatile mix is Ethiopia’s encroachment on Somali sovereignty, a move that risks sparking a broader war—one that could draw in Egypt, Turkey, and perhaps others. But perhaps most concerning is how Ethiopia’s actions seem to be giving terror groups in the region the space they need to grow, recruiting large numbers of young men under the guise of defending an Islamic cause.

The Ethiopian regime appears to have aligned itself with extremist positions held by Somali religious terrorists and secessionists. Abiy Ahmed’s government, seemingly unaware of the peril it’s inviting, has jeopardized not only its national security but also the stability of the region.

But Ethiopia’s ambitions aren’t confined to Somalia. The regime has also threatened Eritrea, seeking to reclaim its “lost” sea access, forfeited when Eritrea gained independence in 1993. Ethiopia’s military losses in internal conflicts have only compounded its frustrations. The regime’s attempt to outmaneuver its opponents through the Pretoria Agreement, designed to settle the Tigray conflict, has failed spectacularly. The Tigrayans saw through the government’s power play and have since rejected the agreement as self-serving.

The disillusionment extends beyond Tigray. The Amhara, once used as cannon fodder against the Tigrayans, now see that the regime has no interest in fostering democracy; its true goal is consolidating power in Addis Ababa. Even worse is Abiy Ahmed’s exploitation of his own Oromo people. Many believed he would champion their fight for freedom, a struggle that’s endured for over a century. Instead, they find themselves shackled under a ruler who has created more enemies than allies, with Somalis—once a haven of refuge—now among their adversaries.

Ethiopia’s many ethnic groups are war-weary, desperate for an end to both internal and external conflicts. Yet Abiy seems committed to stoking nationalism, distracting from the reality that his ambitions of sea access are historically baseless. Eritrea’s independence was a correction of history, not a loss for Ethiopia.

Rather than pursuing grandiose and illegal agreements with Somaliland, Abiy should focus on Ethiopia’s pressing domestic issues—like why so many high school graduates failed their exams or why university professors have turned to TikTok and taxi-driving to make ends meet. Or why so many young Ethiopians are being drafted into militias, dying on the multiple fronts of Ethiopia’s various wars.

Some analysts suggest three potential reasons for the regime’s erratic behavior. The first is a classic diversion tactic—blaming foreign powers like Somalia, Egypt, and Turkey to deflect from Ethiopia’s internal crises. The second is Abiy’s unspoken desire for Oromo dominance across the Horn of Africa, with whispers of plans to secure sea access via Kenya’s coastline. The third is that the regime is not acting independently but is being influenced by Gulf states seeking dominance over the region’s strategic ports and sea routes.

Whatever the reason, it’s clear that Abiy Ahmed’s government poses a grave threat to regional stability. Yet it may all be a bluff. Ethiopia is too weakened by its many entanglements to effectively administer itself, let alone project power beyond its borders. The country’s failing education system and the recent arrival of the IMF and World Bank underscore just how fragile the situation has become. Ethiopia’s economy is on the verge of liberalization, with state-owned enterprises like Ethiopian Airlines and Ethio Telecom set for privatization—clear evidence that the government can no longer maintain control.

Abiy has, however, succeeded in one area: shifting the national conversation from Ethiopia’s internal woes to the question of sea access. For this, he deserves some credit. The Horn of Africa has long been a theater for global power struggles, from the European colonialists to the Cold War rivalry between NATO and the Soviet Union. Today, it’s a battleground between NATO, China, and regional powers like Egypt, Turkey, and the Gulf states. Ethiopia is at the heart of this geopolitical competition, but Abiy seems to be overplaying his hand, juggling too many powers at once.

The result is ongoing misery for the people of the Horn of Africa, with Abiy Ahmed at the center, bluffing as if he holds all the cards. It’s time the world calls his bluff.