
Bitter Harvests: The Gaza Ceasefire
Twinning the terms “ceasefire” and “Gaza” seems not only incongruous but an obscene joke. This is largely because the ceasefire announced on January 15 between Israel and Hamas could have been reached much earlier by all the concerned parties. But will was lacking in Washington to force Israel’s hand, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu repeatedly clung to the belief that Hamas had to be unconditionally defeated, if not eradicated altogether, for any such arrangement to be reached.
A general outline of the ceasefire terms was released by Qatar, a vital broker in the talks between Hamas and Israel. According to its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the agreement is structured into three phases. The first phase will involve the release of 33 Israeli detainees in exchange for a number of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. The second and third phases “will be finalized during the implementation of the first phase.”
The first stage will last for six weeks and, if successful, will see the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all populated areas of Gaza and the return of Palestinians to their neighborhoods. (To say “homes” in this context would be monstrously distasteful, given that many have been reduced to rubble.) Humanitarian aid deliveries will also be increased and distributed “on a large scale,” while hospitals, health centers, and bakeries will be rehabilitated. Supplies of fuel for civilian use and shelter for displaced persons deprived of their homes will also be facilitated.
The second stage envisions a conclusion to the war, a full withdrawal of Israeli soldiers, and the return of all remaining living hostages in exchange for another allotment of Palestinian prisoners. The third stage entails reconstructing Gaza and returning any remaining bodies of hostages.
Despite his habitual impotence in the face of Netanyahu, former U.S. President Joe Biden saw the agreement as a masterstroke. Oddly enough, he insisted that the plan resembled almost to the letter a proposal he had advanced in May 2024. “I laid out the precise contours of this plan on May 31, 2024, after which it was endorsed unanimously by the UN Security Council,” he claimed.
He omitted mention of the U.S. vetoing no fewer than five ceasefire resolutions proposed at that same body, as well as the foggy “red lines” he insisted Netanyahu never cross while waging war against Hamas and the Palestinian populace. Such gestures as delaying the shipment of 2,000-pound bombs for fear they might be used by the IDF in areas like Rafah were purely symbolic in nature.
As Netanyahu had no interest in being bound by any such lines of engagement, Biden’s national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, could only crankily remark to reporters that it was all a media obsession. “The whole issue of the red line, as you define it, is something that you guys like; it’s almost become a bit of a national parlor game.”
While Biden clawed and scraped for credit, it was incoming U.S. President Donald Trump who claimed the lion’s share. And why not? With his inauguration on January 20, the timing of the ceasefire, with Israel finally relenting, was no coincidence. “This EPIC ceasefire agreement,” Trump declared in a roaring post on his Truth Social platform, “could only have happened as a result of our Historic Victory in November, as it signaled to the entire World that my Administration would seek Peace and negotiate deals to ensure the safety of all Americans, and our Allies.”
While Biden and his officials fumed at this claim, it was clear that Trump had a sharp point. His incoming Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, had a busy January interposing in the negotiation process, spending time in Doha as part of the discussions on the Israeli hostages, then meeting Netanyahu in a January 11 encounter that was reported to be “tense.”
According to the Times of Israel, Witkoff was insistent that the Israeli prime minister accept essential compromises. Two nights after their meeting, the negotiating teams of both Israel and Hamas notified the mediators that they had accepted the deal on hostages in principle. In the view of two Arab officials cited in the paper, Trump’s envoy had done “more to sway the premier in a single sit-down than outgoing President Joe Biden did all year.”
Whoever claims credit for these latest developments hardly lessens the bitterness of the harvest. The prevarications, delays, and obstructions have permitted massive destruction and loss of life to occur. Cowardice and bad faith have been the hallmarks of the process. It remains unclear how all the relevant parties will behave. Netanyahu will remain bitter that his goals of eliminating Hamas have not been achieved—a point his far-right cabinet colleagues, Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, are all too ready to remind him of.
The question of who controls Gaza after the phases conclude remains a thick encumbrance. Then there is the broader issue following Trump’s inauguration: How far will his involvement be constructive in achieving a lasting peace, or will it default to the exclusive security goals and interests of Israel? If history is a reliable guide, the omens are not good.