Russia’s war against Ukraine has produced a vast evidentiary record of attacks on civilians, infrastructure, and institutions essential to everyday life. Yet documenting these patterns in a way that can withstand legal scrutiny requires painstaking fieldwork, careful verification, and the integration of open-source analysis with survivor testimony. Few organizations have focused on this task as systematically as Truth Hounds, a Ukrainian human rights group investigating atrocity crimes since the early days of the conflict.

In this interview, Truth Hounds Co-Executive Director Dmytro Koval and Head of Research Roman Koval discuss their organization’s latest investigations into patterns of civilian terrorization during Russia’s full-scale invasion. Their work examines attacks on hotels housing journalists, the growing use of first-person-view drones against civilians, and the deployment of glide bombs whose wide blast radius makes them especially destructive in densely populated cities. They also describe how Russian forces target emergency responders, humanitarian workers, and energy infrastructure through tactics such as “double-tap” strikes designed to magnify fear and disrupt the basic functions of civilian life.

Beyond the battlefield, the interview explores a second, increasingly urgent concern: the future of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, Europe’s largest nuclear facility, which has remained under Russian occupation since 2022. The researchers discuss evidence of coercion, detention, and torture directed at plant personnel as Russian authorities sought to force Ukrainian engineers to continue operating the facility under Rosatom control. Together, these findings illuminate the intersection of human rights abuses, information warfare, and nuclear risk in one of the most dangerous theaters of the modern conflict.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: When examining the broader pattern of human rights abuses in this war—including attacks on journalists and independent media—what areas has Truth Hounds studied most systematically, and which patterns have emerged as particularly significant in your investigations?

Dmytro Koval: The scope of atrocity crimes committed in Ukraine since at least 2022 is vast and diverse. In our work at Truth Hounds, we have therefore focused on the areas we consider most urgent for international institutions to address and most critical for the international community to understand regarding the risks this war poses to affected communities.

Over the past year, our primary focus has been on two areas: nuclear safety and security—particularly the implications of the occupation of nuclear facilities during wartime—and the combined use of various methods of warfare to terrorize the civilian population.

Much of our research connects to this overarching pattern of terrorization. For example, we investigated attacks on hotels where journalists were staying near the front line. We consider these attacks to be acts of terrorization because they disrupt the distribution of humanitarian aid and undermine the presence of independent media reporting from affected regions. Together, these effects contribute to war fatigue and erode civilians’ hopes of normalization.

Another example is the extensive use of FPV drones in areas close to the front line. These drones are used not only against military objectives but also against civilian objects and members of the civilian population.

These attacks are accompanied by rhetoric from Russian military and occupation authorities designating certain frontline areas as “red zones,” declaring that any moving target will be attacked regardless of whether it is civilian or military. This policy reflects deliberate terrorization.

Another method involves using so-called glide bombs. These weapons are highly imprecise and were not designed for urban warfare.

Jacobsen: In this discussion, the term imprecise carries a technical meaning. In practice, however, many observers argue that glide bombs function as indiscriminate weapons when used in densely populated areas. From a legal and operational standpoint, how should we understand the distinction between imprecision and indiscriminate use in the context of urban warfare?

Dmytro Koval: A glide bomb can be used indiscriminately, but it is not inherently indiscriminate in every context. For example, if a glide bomb is deployed in a mountainous area where a guerrilla unit is known to be operating, its use might be considered a military choice aimed at achieving a large-area impact against a defined objective. In that context, the classification would depend on the targeting and surrounding conditions.

However, in an urban setting, glide bombs are effectively indiscriminate because of their wide blast radius and limited precision. They are not designed for accurate strikes against specific objects in densely populated areas. When used in cities, their impact cannot be sufficiently controlled to avoid civilian harm.

The widespread use of these weapons in urban areas suggests that they are not only intended to damage infrastructure but also to contribute to despair among the civilian population. In that sense, their use often aligns with a broader pattern of terrorization.

Roman Koval: Regarding short-range drone attacks against civilians, one significant characteristic is that, as Dmytro explained, Russian forces designate certain frontline areas as “red zones.” They declare that any movement within these zones will be treated as a legitimate target, whether it involves a pedestrian, a car, or a bus.

Another important observation concerns targeting patterns. Among priority targets for Russian forces are emergency services—rescuers, medical personnel, and workers who maintain essential civilian infrastructure, such as electricity, water, and heating systems. Energy infrastructure itself is also frequently targeted.

In our research, we examined nearly 400 kilometres along the right bank of the Dnipro River, extending at least a dozen kilometres inland. We observed a consistent pattern: Russian forces appear to be creating conditions in which normal civilian life becomes impossible. The objective is to force civilians to leave and to instill fear across the territory.

In the case of emergency services, Russian forces frequently employ “double-tap” strikes—attacking an initial target and then striking again when rescuers arrive. This tactic could be recognized as a method of terrorizing civilian populations.

In Ukraine, the State Emergency Service not only conducts rescue operations but also delivers humanitarian aid—water, food, and other essentials—to frontline communities. These rescuers are targeted not only through double-tap strikes but also through direct attacks on rescue facilities, headquarters, and bases.

From the beginning of the full-scale invasion through the end of October 2025, we documented approximately 400 attacks targeting rescuers, their facilities, and related humanitarian personnel, including drone strikes against demining teams and other specialized workers.

We have also observed threats directed at rescuers through Russian military-affiliated Telegram channels, warning them not to carry out rescue or humanitarian duties after attacks because they will be targeted.

The pattern suggests an intent to spread fear not only among specific professional groups but also throughout the broader civilian population. This is a central component of what we describe as terrorization.

Jacobsen: Your research describes a broader pattern of terrorization against civilians in frontline regions. To what extent is this campaign reinforced by information warfare—particularly through Russian Telegram channels and other media narratives that may shape expectations and spread intimidation among local populations?

Roman Koval: That is an important question. While information warfare has not been the central focus of our research, we consistently analyze Russian narratives in our investigations. Through fieldwork, we know that people living in frontline areas follow Russian Telegram channels. They have told us directly that these channels often contain threats.

Why do they read them? These channels frequently reflect Russian intent and anticipated actions. By monitoring them, civilians try to understand what may happen next.

It would be naïve to assume that Russian Telegram channels and state media operate solely for domestic audiences. Outlets such as RT and other state-affiliated media disseminate narratives internationally. Telegram channels likewise target audiences on both sides of the frontline.

Jacobsen: Nuclear safety remains a persistent concern in the war, especially regarding the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. As of late 2025 and early 2026, what developments have you observed related to operational risks at the facility and the reported coercion or mistreatment of Ukrainian personnel working under occupation?

Roman Koval: The most recent updates have been reported by Greenpeace Ukraine. Their analysis of satellite imagery indicates that Russia is constructing new energy lines through occupied Ukrainian territory to connect the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to the Russian energy grid. The apparent intention is to restart the plant under Russian control.

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi and the IAEA have publicly expressed serious concerns about any attempt to restart the plant under current conditions. The risks are heightened because the facility is located near active hostilities and because the Kakhovka Reservoir—previously the primary water source for the plant’s cooling systems—was destroyed and drained.

Russia has proposed building pumping stations to supply water to the cooling systems. However, these would not provide the same stable, large-scale water intake that the reservoir once ensured. This significantly complicates safe reactor cooling operations.

We have also observed that Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, appears to act as a geopolitical instrument of the Russian government. In this context, symbolic control over the plant may be prioritized over adherence to nuclear safety and security standards.

Regarding earlier periods, particularly 2022–2023, our research documented that Rosatom representatives participated in interrogations and were involved in a campaign of coercion directed at ZNPP employees. The purpose was to compel staff to sign employment contracts with Rosatom.

Our findings indicate that at least 78 ZNPP employees were unlawfully detained during that period. Many were reportedly subjected to torture in detention facilities in Enerhodar. Documented methods included beatings, electric shocks, use of batons, mock executions, and other forms of physical and psychological abuse.

Jacobsen: You referenced “mock executions” in the testimonies collected during your investigations. For readers unfamiliar with the term, could you explain what this practice entails and how it functions as a method of psychological coercion during interrogations?

Roman Koval: A mock execution is a form of torture in which a detainee is made to believe they are about to be killed. The perpetrator simulates the act of execution but does not carry it out. The purpose is psychological coercion—typically to extract information or force compliance.

Jacobsen: Research following abuses at Abu Ghraib and during interrogations in Afghanistan and Iraq indicates that torture does not reliably produce accurate information. If the intent is intelligence gathering, it is ineffective. If it is used simply as coercion or punishment, it remains a clear human rights violation.

Roman Koval: Extracting information was not the only objective. In many cases involving employees of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the primary goal was to force them to sign employment contracts with Rosatom. During interrogations—often accompanied by torture—employees were pressured to agree to work under Russian control. In some cases, we documented cooperation between Rosatom representatives and Russian security services.

Jacobsen: Which security services?

Roman Koval: The FSB. Information about ZNPP employees, particularly licensed and highly qualified personnel responsible for operating the reactors, was entered into Russian-controlled databases. Some employees were prevented from leaving Enerhodar. They were stopped at checkpoints and returned, effectively compelled to continue working at the plant.

Jacobsen: Because no one else was qualified to operate it.

Roman Koval: Correct. Operating a nuclear facility requires not only general nuclear engineering expertise but also detailed familiarity with the specific plant and reactor systems.

There is what we refer to as the “individualization” of complex technical systems. Even highly trained nuclear engineers cannot simply transfer seamlessly from one reactor unit to another. Each unit has operational nuances. One nuclear specialist told us that although he was licensed to operate one of the six reactors at the Zaporizhzhia plant, transferring to a different unit would have required significant adaptation. Small technical differences matter greatly in reactor management.

Russian authorities brought in nuclear personnel from other plants in Russia to assist in operations. However, they faced a major staffing problem. Many ZNPP employees fled Enerhodar and other occupied areas. The workforce responsible for maintaining nuclear safety and operating the plant reportedly declined from approximately 11,000 before the full-scale invasion to about 3,000 afterward.

This dramatic reduction in personnel was one of the reasons licensed staff were prevented from leaving Enerhodar.

Jacobsen: They had little operational choice.

Roman Koval: To clarify the issue of cooperation and databases: integrating information about nuclear personnel into Russian-controlled systems was one aspect—another involved direct pressure.

We documented a case in which a representative of the Russian security services and a Rosatom representative visited a nuclear engineer. According to the survivor’s testimony, they used a “good cop, bad cop” approach. The security officer played the role of intimidation. His presence alone conveyed the consequences of refusing to sign a contract or continue working under Russian control. Employees were already aware of what had happened to colleagues who had been detained, taken to basements, and tortured.

The Rosatom representative presented himself as the “reasonable” alternative, encouraging the engineer to sign a contract and remain at the plant.

Jacobsen: How long were the contracts intended to last?

Roman Koval: I do not recall the specific duration. I need to verify that detail in the testimonies.

Jacobsen: If the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant were to experience a serious failure or reactor meltdown, what kinds of regional or international consequences might follow, even in scenarios that fall short of a catastrophic accident?

Roman Koval: I am not a nuclear engineer, so I defer to technical specialists on precise modelling. In our report—prepared in collaboration with Greenpeace—one section outlines potential scenarios and consequences.

Radiation does not respect borders. Any significant release would pose risks beyond Ukraine. Even without catastrophic failure, smaller radiation leaks remain a concern. Since the beginning of the occupation, there have been multiple disruptions to external power supply lines, which are essential for maintaining reactor cooling systems. Loss of external power increases safety risks, even when reactors are in shutdown mode.

Jacobsen: Dmytro and Roman, thank you very much for the opportunity and your time.