Few armed forces have managed to make murder and executions the stuff of procedural aberration rather than intentional practice. Killing civilians and unarmed personnel is the stuff of misreading and misunderstandings, albeit arrived at with good conscience. And so it was that the killing of 15 aid and emergency workers in Gaza by the Israeli Defense Forces on March 23 could be put down to “professional failures, breaches or orders and a failure to fully report the incident,” a finding identified by an investigation conducted by the same organisation into its own personnel.

In marking its own report card—and awarding itself a credible pass—the IDF employed the kind of numbing language that renders murder a secondary concern. The deaths were treated as minor, though regrettable. While not explicitly libelling the deceased workers, the official press release straddled the line between excuse and exculpation, stressing that, on March 23, “the troops were conducting a vital mission aimed at targeting terrorists.” The killings took place “in a hostile and dangerous combat zone, under a widespread threat to the operating troops.” The armed forces were presented with the dilemma of protecting medical facilities (something the IDF has conspicuously failed to do), amid Hamas’ alleged exploitation “of such infrastructure for terrorism, including ambulances to transport terrorists and weapons.”

The insinuation that the aid workers were, in effect, culpable for their own deaths—simply by being present—emerges with raw clarity. The suggestion that executions occurred, or that any of the victims were bound before or after their deaths, was dismissed as “blood libels and false accusations against IDF soldiers.”

The IDF press release leaves an impression of forced thoroughness. There had been “extensive data collection from operational systems, the forces on the ground, and along the entire chain of command.” This had also included “relevant operational orders and directives, footage from various surveillance systems active during the event, radio recordings.” There was even a reconstruction of the events, the personnel involved questioned.

The inquiry identified three shooting incidents: the first involving troops firing on an alleged Hamas vehicle; the second, involving firing on a fire truck and ambulances close to the area where the troops were operating after the deputy battalion commander identified the vehicles as “employed by Hamas forces, who arrived to assist the first vehicle’s passengers”; and the third involving an attack by the IDF on a Palestinian UN vehicle “due to operational errors in breach of regulation.”

The inquiry barely grappled with damning evidence, including video footage of one of the slain workers, Red Crescent paramedic Rifaat Radwan, which compelled the IDF to revise its initially fabricated story—that the vehicles had approached stealthily, without lights or markings, in the darkness. It is difficult to believe that “the deputy commander did not initially recognize the vehicles as ambulances” given “poor night visibility.” The vehicles were clearly illuminated, their markings visibly distinct. But the narrative held: of the 15 Palestinians killed that night, six were identified as Hamas members. None were armed, but that was beside the point.

As for the subsequent handling of the bodies, the inquiry found little fault. The decision to bury the aid workers in shallow graves was, it claimed, intended “to prevent further harm” (though the victims were already dead, the harm conclusively done) and to clear vehicles in order to facilitate “civilian evacuation”—another euphemism from the IDF’s public relations arm used to justify expulsions and forced displacement. The removal of the bodies was deemed “reasonable”; however, the crushing of the vehicles, which could imply an attempt to conceal the events, was not. The IDF insisted there had been no intention “to conceal the event, which was discussed with international organizations and the UN, including coordination for the removal of the bodies.”

In watering down the murderous significance of the killings, the matter of failings, breach of orders and inadequate reporting are eclipsed by the continued commitment to battle Hamas “while upholding IDF values, operational discipline and orders.” The Golani Reconnaissance Battalion had acquitted itself well, “operating with great distinction for a year and a half.” Troops had opened fire on “suspects…after perceiving an immediate and tangible threat.” This is what happens when students grade their own papers, without invigilation and supervision by an independent authority.

The consequences of the inquiry are predictably mild and bureaucratically couched in self-justification. The execution of 15 Palestinian emergency workers results in the dismissal of a deputy battalion commander for “incomplete and inaccurate reporting” and a reprimand for a brigade commanding officer—specifically, the commander of the 14th Brigade. It is a grotesque calculus, but one repeatedly employed in the aftermath of Israel’s doctrine of overwhelming force, revived and intensified following the events of October 7, 2023.