Andrew Copson is a British humanist leader, writer, and public advocate whose work sits at the intersection of secularism, human rights, and evidence-based public policy. He has served as Chief Executive of Humanists UK since 2010, having previously led its education and public affairs efforts during a period of institutional expansion and growing public visibility. On the international stage, Copson played a central role in shaping the global humanist movement through his long tenure with Humanists International, where he served on the board from 2010 and as President from 2015 to 2025. A regular presence in media debates on religion and public life, he has written extensively on humanism, including Secularism: A Very Short Introduction, and, with Alice Roberts, several widely read and accessible works exploring humanist thought and practice.

In this interview, Copson examines the rapid unraveling of the so-called “quiet revival” narrative in the United Kingdom, a claim that gained traction following a widely circulated 2025 Bible Society report but was later undermined by flawed YouGov data. He argues that assertions of a Christian resurgence were not only overstated but contradicted by more rigorous evidence, and that they spread with striking speed across media ecosystems eager for signs of religious renewal. What followed, he suggests, was less a revival than a case study in how weak data, once amplified, can distort public understanding.

Copson explains why anecdotal signals, from rising Bible sales to isolated pockets of church growth, fail to demonstrate any meaningful national shift, and why serious policymaking depends on reliable, methodologically sound data about belief and identity. The discussion broadens into a sharper critique of confirmation bias and institutional credibility, touching on the reputational fallout for organizations that advance premature conclusions, as well as the longer arc of secularization, the role of immigration in shaping religious landscapes, and the growing tendency to deploy faith-based narratives as tools of recruitment rather than reflections of lived reality.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: There has been a wave of media coverage that, at times, appears misleading or premature—circulating not only within Christian outlets but also across mainstream media. A recurring claim suggested that Christianity was experiencing a resurgence in the United Kingdom, a narrative largely driven by the Bible Society’s April 2025 report, “The Quiet Revival,” which relied on YouGov data later withdrawn due to serious flaws, including fraudulent responses in the 2024 sample. Critics, including Humanists UK, challenged these conclusions early on, noting their inconsistency with more reliable datasets.

From a North American vantage point, a related—but not identical—pattern emerges. In the United States, long-term data still point to a substantial decline in Christian identification over the past two decades, even if that decline has slowed or plateaued in recent years. Generationally, the trend remains clear: younger cohorts are less religious than their predecessors, while the religiously unaffiliated continue to grow.

With that context in mind, how do you assess the broader significance of this episode? How serious was the issue in your view, particularly given the scale of its public amplification?

Andrew Copson: It was serious. The report was released by the Bible Society in April 2025 and was based on YouGov polling they commissioned. The Bible Society, which is an evangelising organisation but has also tried to position itself through its think tank Theos as making serious contributions to public life, presented it as evidence of a major shift in the religious landscape. At the time, the polling appeared statistically credible on its face, and many people treated it seriously. However, that confidence did not hold. In March, the report was withdrawn after YouGov concluded that the 2024 survey sample was flawed and could not be treated as a reliable basis for claims about Britain’s religious trends.

At Humanists UK, we attended the launch, engaged with the report, and were quite struck by these figures. YouGov conducted the surveys, and the sample appeared robust at first glance. However, when we got back to the office, our policy team started looking at it, and we began talking to some of our statisticians. Once the data were examined more closely and compared with other evidence, serious concerns emerged. The figures did not align with other credible sources, including the British Social Attitudes survey and church attendance data.

Jacobsen: What were the key discrepancies?

Copson: One central claim was that monthly church attendance in England and Wales had risen from 8% in 2018 to 12% in 2024, and that among 18- to 24-year-olds it had risen from 4% to 16%. That was the headline claim. However, other evidence did not support it. Analyses of British Social Attitudes data found no clear evidence of a Christian revival, suggesting either stability or continued decline. Church attendance records also did not show anything close to the dramatic increase claimed in the report.

Additional concerns centred on methodology. Critics noted that opt-in online panels are more vulnerable to distortion than probability-based sampling, especially when quality controls fail. That mattered in this case because YouGov later acknowledged failures in data integrity, including fraudulent responses in the sample. Once that foundation was undermined, the broader claims about revival amounted to very little other than anecdote.

But at the same time, because this data was very unlikely, the claims made about it were very large. And it was all around the world in 20 minutes. It was picked up globally and repeated in church, media, and public commentary. I mean, even the new Archbishop of Canterbury in England referenced it in her speech when she became the Archbishop of Canterbury, this revival that was happening. By the end of last year, it had become accepted as fact. Media outlets would run stories stating, “As we all know, there is a major revival of Christianity in the UK,” and then frame further discussion around that assumption. This was entirely untrue. It distorted public discourse and introduced a significant false premise.

We raised concerns immediately. We engaged constructively and published an analysis on our website in April 2025, showing that the data were not only unlikely but also inconsistent with other evidence. We then consulted professional statisticians, including leading academic experts, who confirmed that the findings were implausible.

We received hostility in response. This was not limited to us. Other critics, including Christian commentators, also questioned the findings and faced similar reactions. The criticism was often personal, with accusations that we were motivated by humanist beliefs to undermine Christianity. But our position was straightforward. The issue was not religious advocacy but data quality. Whether the number of Christians rises or falls is not the concern. The concern is that public policy and public understanding rely on accurate data.

The situation remained unresolved for about a year. Eventually, YouGov acknowledged that its quality assurance processes had failed and that the survey data could not be relied upon. The Bible Society withdrew the report. However, they stated publicly that they were not withdrawing the broader claim of a revival, instead pointing to anecdotal evidence and isolated examples of church growth.

As Professor David Voas noted, this is misleading. If a minority of churches are growing while a larger proportion are declining, the overall trend remains downward. Individual cases of growth do not constitute a national revival.

 

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Jacobsen: Richard Dawkins once read excerpts of his hate mail aloud, drawing attention to both its tone and its underlying assumptions. In your case, did the controversy surrounding this report generate a comparable response? Were there any particularly notable or revealing reactions to your critique?

Copson: I don’t engage in that type of shaming! We saw a slight increase in the usual categories of correspondence. There is hate mail, accusing us of opposing Christianity, and love mail encouraging us to convert to Christianity and be happy. That pattern remained consistent, though the report was referenced more frequently during that period as an example of our ‘hatred for god,’ and they didn’t like us criticizing the data because they saw it as trying to undermine a religious revival, which was obviously making them feel good.

Of course, that’s what Christians want to do; they want to convert other people to Christianity, so that anyone who dares to question this research, which was giving them such a shot in the arm, is clearly quite unpleasant for them. As a result, criticism of the report was often received very negatively, with hostility of the lashing-out variety. Perversely, that’s gotten even worse since the report was found to be flawed.

The broader reality in Britain remains one of long-term religious decline, as demonstrated by high-quality longitudinal data. Survey data shows that over 60% of people aged 16 to 34 continue to identify as having no religion. More importantly, if we are being asked to believe that a revival is taking place, then 94% of young people raised non-religious remain non-religious as adults.

If the word revival is to mean anything, it must mean that previously non-religious people are becoming religious. Some increases in religiosity in England in recent years have been linked to immigration, including Christian immigration. But immigration is not revival. Revival would surely mean previously non-religious people becoming religious.

What was striking was not only how much attention this clearly false data received, but that it pointed in the opposite direction from what is actually happening. The broader trend is growth in the non-religious.

Jacobsen: To what extent do you see similar dynamics at play in North America—particularly in the United States—where claims of religious revival periodically surface? Even if such claims may hold in specific denominations or be shaped by immigration patterns at particular moments, do they amount to a broader, measurable revival, or something more limited and situational?

Copson: I am not an expert on the United States or Canada, but I would expect some similar dynamics. There are well-funded organizations and highly motivated individuals, and confirmation bias plays a major role.

None of this research is entirely disinterested. The Bible Society sought to demonstrate that a religious revival was underway and presented evidence to support that claim. Some people want it to be true, so they believe it. They seize on even weak evidence, despite its contradiction by stronger evidence, and combine it with their own experience. Since they work in evangelizing environments, they naturally encounter people becoming religious. They then treat that experience as confirmation of a wider trend.

There is also a darker side. Some people do not care whether the claim is true. They care only that it may help create momentum in their direction. You know, “come on in the water’s warm, you see, it’s lovely being a Christian. Everyone’s becoming a Christian. Why aren’t you becoming a Christian? What’s wrong with you?”

Some Christian commentators even argued that the publicity around the so-called quiet revival was encouraging young people not only to become more religious, but also to become more open and evangelical about their faith. Publicity of that sort may have influenced some people. It may have created a bandwagon effect.

Even before the figures were formally withdrawn, some Christians online were already saying things that amounted to this: even if it is not true, it is still a useful recruiting tool.

Jacobsen: A rare moment of honesty.

Copson: Exactly. Now, instead of calling it a quiet revival, some seem to prefer the phrase “vibe shift,” because the revival was apparently so quiet that no one could actually see it.

The phrase they are not using is “vibe shift,” suggesting that people are becoming more open to religion. It is vague and not measurable. When we discussed this internally, we reviewed past claims of religious revival over the last century. Similar claims recur throughout the decades, and humanist organizations have consistently responded to them.

My conclusion is that there are always motivated groups claiming that religion is returning. Some do so sincerely but mistakenly; others do so for less defensible reasons. Statistical misunderstanding, self-interest, and self-deception all play a role. The damage that the Bible Society did to public truth was compounded by time. The narrative persisted for a year, with extensive media coverage. By that point, the story had reached a massive audience, making corrections more difficult.

Jacobsen: That level of exposure creates a reputational problem, too.

Copson: Yes, I think in the end it is likely to have caused reputational damage, and appropriately so. That said, my point is not that the Bible Society could have known the data were fraudulent. They relied on YouGov, which repeatedly assured them the data were reliable. I believe them. We also contacted YouGov repeatedly, raised concerns, and they maintained full confidence in their data, even though that position later proved incorrect.

However, even setting aside the data integrity issue, the claims in the report were exaggerated and unsupported by the broader body of evidence. But the claims they made in the report, even based on that data and all the other data available at the time, were overblown. They were exaggerated. They were inaccurate. And I think the way they behaved when their data was questioned in public was also disreputable.

I have sympathy for those who are placed in the position of publicly defending the report, particularly senior leadership, as no one wants to be in that situation. But if you make those claims and behave in that way, I guess you also have to own it.

Jacobsen: Looking at the longer arc, what does the global evidence suggest about religiosity as societies become more economically developed, better educated, and more gender-equal? And conversely, what tends to happen when those conditions deteriorate or reverse?

Copson: Broadly (and this is something of a caricature), when societies are stable, prosperous, and secure, levels of religiosity tend to decline. When conditions become unstable—economically, socially, or politically—there can be increased interest in systems that offer certainty, meaning, support, and reassurance. That pattern has been observed across different contexts.

It would not be surprising if some individuals today are drawn to such belief systems in response to uncertainty. However, that does not constitute a broad revival. It reflects localized or individual responses to changing conditions. And I don’t think that’s anything to be so cock-a-hoop about if you’re an evangelising Christian, because it’s a bit like celebrating the shittiness of the world, cheerleading insecurity and instability.

Jacobsen: Were there any particular claims from the Bible Society that stood out?

Copson: One frequently repeated claim was that Bible sales had increased. They keep saying this, and I don’t know what they mean by it, really. Even if sales had increased, that would not necessarily demonstrate greater religious anything.

What does it mean? I mean, the best-selling book on Amazon in the religion and spirituality section was “The Subtle Art of Not Giving a F*ck.” Does that mean something, too?

Many of these claims are difficult to pin down, which is why the survey data were such a gift to those promoting the idea. The data appeared clear, objective, and measurable. By contrast, claims about Bible sales, young people online, or adult baptisms draw on very different kinds of evidence that do not add up to a single conclusion.

My honest view is that the people making these claims do so because they want to believe a religious revival is happening, and they want others to believe it as well. That is their motivation. The difference with Humanists UK is that Humanists UK is not a charity established to persuade people that humanism is true and religion is false. It is a human rights and equality charity that cares about public discourse and, in relation to data on religion and belief in society, is interested in sound public policy grounded in evidence.

We want to know what is true. I would be disappointed if the non-religious share of the UK population declined in the long term. Yes, of course I would. But that is not because it is Humanists UK’s mission to increase it. It reflects my own views about whether it is healthier for society to be more or less religious.

Many of the Christian groups making these claims, on the other hand, I believe, are genuinely motivated by a desire for more people to become Christians. They want this to be true. They hope for a Christian revival in the country, and I think that hope shapes their judgment. I understand what drives them, but it also makes me skeptical of many of their claims, because – as with all of us – their motivations might cloud their judgment.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Andrew.