Belkis Wille is an associate director at Human Rights Watch, specializing in Ukraine and international humanitarian law. She leads investigations into civilian harm, conditions in occupied territories, and accountability for violations by all sides.

Human Rights Watch’s Ukraine portfolio spans the documentation of short-range drone strikes and other attacks on civilians, Russian detention abuses, including torture and sexual violence, and the forced Russification of education for children in occupied regions. Current investigations focus on Russian authorities’ seizure of homes, the treatment of Ukrainian children inside Russia, and the effect of aid cuts on humanitarian operations. Wille has also contributed to reports on the execution of prisoners of war, unlawful weapons use, and the impact of infrastructure attacks on essential winter services. Human Rights Watch emphasizes survivor-centered fact-finding in all its work.

In this interview, Wille describes how short-range drone warfare has intensified into a leading cause of civilian casualties, with deliberate quadcopter strikes along the front lines. Russia’s winter assaults on infrastructure—and its public posting of strike footage—are intended to instill fear. Meanwhile, aid cuts have strained mobile medical teams, though donors continue to sustain food and water support. Education remains imperiled by power outages and enforced Russification in occupied areas. Research challenges persist due to limited access to these regions. Wille also underscores that Human Rights Watch documents Ukrainian violations, including the mistreatment of Russian prisoners of war, the use of antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions, and media distortions that misframe air-defense debris as offensive attacks.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Thank you for joining me today. What have been some significant changes in Russian tactics over the past six months, whether in targeting civilians or civilian infrastructure?

Belkis Wille: Russian forces have targeted civilian infrastructure in areas near the frontline and in the West of the country since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. That was one of their main military aims early on. These attacks have continued and, over the past three years, have fluctuated in intensity, but this is not a new dynamic.

What has changed quite significantly, however, is the way in which Russian forces are delivering munitions in frontline areas and in the West of the country. These tactical choices have led to an increase in civilian targeting and deaths. In particular, I’m referring to drone warfare.

At present, short-range drone attacks account for a large share of civilian harm. In January, UN monitors attributed about 27 percent of civilian deaths and 30 percent of injuries to short-range drone attacks. Early in the invasion, drones were responsible for a much smaller share. This demonstrates a significant change in how drones are being used to target and kill, and the intensity of such attacks has increased since mid-2024 and through 2025.

Jacobsen: So, just over a year now. Has this targeting been indiscriminate, or are there specific areas where they’re focusing more heavily?

Wille: When we talk about the use of drones—specifically quadcopters and other short-range drones, which are distinct from the larger military drones such as the Shaheds and others sent deeper into Western Ukraine—we’re referring to drones equipped with live camera feeds. These drones identify individuals, follow them, and then drop ammunition directly onto them. In these cases, we are talking about deliberate targeting of civilians rather than indiscriminate attacks. We have observed such attacks along the front line.

This can be explained by the fact that short-range drones operate over relatively limited distances near the front line, with range extended in some cases by relays. We have seen certain areas along the front line where Russian forces are using this tactic more frequently than in others. Several factors, such as the presence of large civilian populations, can explain that variation. In some parts of the contact line, all civilians have already left.

In other cases, these attacks occur in areas where Russian forces have specific military objectives—for example, clearing out a particular city or village. They use short-range drone attacks as a means of forcing the civilian population to leave more quickly.

Jacobsen: Targeting civilians is typically a terror tactic. Is this also intended to break morale?

Wille: Russian forces have carried out many actions that appear aimed at terrorizing the civilian population and breaking morale. Among these are attacks on infrastructure in cities, particularly during the winter months, when a lack of access to electricity, gas, and heating has the greatest impact. In areas where drones are used, the constant presence overhead is clearly intended to intimidate people, in addition to pushing them out.

Furthermore, we have observed that Russian units conducting these attacks often publish videos of them—with captions—on social media groups they know are used by Ukrainians.

Jacobsen: What about food and water shortages, and access to healthcare? How are those expected to look in the coming winter months?

Wille: The U.S. aid cuts, which have had a global impact—and, I would say, have affected Ukraine less than many other countries—still have had a significant effect. Until this spring, the U.S. government funded the entire budget of Ukraine’s Center for Disease Control, for example. The U.S. government was also funding large portions of the Ministry of Health’s activities, and, of course, contributing to the World Health Organization and other UN and humanitarian partners that support the healthcare system.

Those funding reductions have real consequences, particularly for mobile medical teams that provide urgent care in frontline areas. What Ukraine has had to do, instead of terminating those services, is move money from elsewhere to cover the funding gap. So those services will persist, but at a cost—and some programs will inevitably need to be scaled down somewhat.

Access to food and water is still supported by international donors. Despite the global cuts to humanitarian aid, Ukraine has felt the impact less than many other countries. Along the front line, because the contact line has been moving more slowly than earlier in the conflict, fewer civilians remain. Therefore, fewer people are available to serve in challenging and dangerous environments.

As a result, the government has been able to meet the needs of many displaced people who moved some time ago and are now living in urban centers that can receive assistance. But like every country, Ukraine is having to compensate for global funding cuts.

Jacobsen: What about education? Children have a right to education, yet many have faced frequent interruptions since Russia invaded. In the winter months, with power outages, what will be the likely outcomes for this school year?

Wille: Power cuts, as you mentioned, have many consequences, including for children attending physical schools—whether in their home regions or in the places they’ve been displaced to. Some children have tried to continue their education online with the schools they attended before displacement. In that context, power cuts seriously impede access to learning.

There are also children in occupied territories who have tried to continue participating in the Ukrainian education system online. On that side of the contact line, power outages again severely impact their ability to study. At the same time, we’re seeing Russia intensify efforts to complete the Russification of occupied territories, and that includes imposing the Russian curriculum and language in schools.

The curriculum in occupied territories—from primary through secondary school—has been entirely replaced with the Russian system. Students and parents are having to make tough choices, particularly those who grew up in and are from these occupied regions. Their decision to stay or leave will fundamentally affect their ability to pursue education and employment later.

If they choose to stay in occupied territory, they only have access to the Russian education system. That means that even if, at age eighteen, they wanted to cross into Ukrainian-controlled areas, they might not be able to do so academically because they lack the necessary Ukrainian credentials or educational background. This is increasingly becoming one of the lasting consequences of prolonged occupation.

Jacobsen: What about the dynamics of a war economy—reconstruction demands, black market activities, and corruption risks? Has Human Rights Watch covered that?

Wille: We generally don’t carry out corruption investigations as an organization, either in Ukraine or globally. It requires a particular kind of expertise, and other organizations—such as Transparency International—are much better suited to it.

Obviously, like most humanitarian and human rights organizations, we’ve condemned steps by the Ukrainian government that appeared to impede the work of anti-corruption agencies. But beyond that, we haven’t conducted research into corruption or black-market activities.

Jacobsen: What about disinformation campaigns? How severe are they, and what’s been their trajectory?

Wille: It’s an important question, but again, not one we’re best positioned to answer. We do see disinformation and misinformation campaigns, particularly those spread through Russian-controlled media and social networks, targeting people in occupied territories. Because we don’t have physical access to those areas, we have minimal ability to track these trends systematically or verifiably.

It isn’t easy to know how these campaigns have evolved or what their precise impact on civilians has been. The messages often include false claims about what will happen if people leave for Ukrainian-controlled territory or whether they’ll come under attack from Ukrainian forces. These efforts have multiple strands, and while we know they exist, we cannot measure their overall effect without on-the-ground access.

Jacobsen: A good follow-up from that might be: where are the most significant gaps in information gathering for human rights organizations? In other words, where are the blind spots?

Wille: The most significant gap when it comes to documenting abuses in occupied territories is access—plain and simple. Because we can’t safely enter those areas or speak freely with people still living there, it’s impossible to collect sufficient, verifiable information to produce a complete picture of abuses.

We’re currently conducting new research into housing, land, and property rights in occupied territories, as Russian-installed authorities have increasingly tried to strip displaced Ukrainians of property ownership. For example, suppose a person doesn’t appear in person within a specific time frame. In that case, their property can be seized and reallocated. This has become a mechanism for expropriating the homes of people who have fled to Ukrainian-controlled areas.

We’re trying to understand the scale of this issue, but conducting comprehensive research is extremely difficult. Again, the primary limitation is access. We have to rely on a smaller number of people who have left the occupied territories and can share information safely.

Jacobsen: On the subject of children, what is the current status of those who have been abducted or transferred?

Wille: There are a few organizations in Ukraine that have worked very hard over the years to locate and bring back children who were taken to Russia or Russian-controlled territories.

These organizations have had some successes—they’ve brought back dozens of children. The experiences of those children while in Russia have varied depending on where they were held and how they were treated. What we’ve been hearing more recently, particularly regarding teenagers, is that some were sent to Russian military summer camps.

These camps are presented as youth programs but often serve as recruitment and militarization centers. Many of the children who return from Russia require time and support to readjust to everyday life in Ukraine. Several Ukrainian organizations are doing excellent work by establishing rehabilitation programs to support the reintegration.

That said, there are still thousands of children in Russia or Russian-occupied territories. The longer the time passes, the harder it becomes to locate them. No one has a complete picture of where all these children are—whether they’ve been absorbed into the orphanage or adoption systems or placed elsewhere.

Jacobsen: In terms of human rights abuses by Russian forces, what does Human Rights Watch identify as the most serious and enduring ones to emphasize?

Wille: The targeting and killing of civilians are among our top priorities for documentation and accountability. We’re also focused on various forms of ill-treatment, including torture and sexual violence, against civilians in areas under temporary or prolonged Russian occupation.

These abuses extend to Ukrainians taken to Russia and held in detention, both civilians and prisoners of war. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission, which has interviewed nearly all returning POWs and civilian detainees, has reported an alarmingly high prevalence of torture and, in many cases, sexual violence. Ensuring accountability for those subjected to such treatment is critical.

Jacobsen: That brings us to another serious area of concern—sexual violence as a weapon of war. How widespread is this?

Wille: At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, there were many reports of rape and sexual violence committed by Russian soldiers. Early claims suggested tens of thousands of cases had been reported to the Ukrainian Ombudsperson’s Office. However, the Ombudsperson later resigned after it became clear that the methodology for counting these cases was flawed, and the scale was much lower than initially stated.

That said, confirmed cases do exist, and we have documented several. The exact number is less important than ensuring that those who were victims of these crimes have access to justice and accountability. Rape and sexual violence are recognized as war crimes under international law, and ensuring redress for survivors is an essential part of the broader accountability process.

What we’ve seen developing over time, and what has become far more prevalent, is the use of sexual violence against people in Russian detention. That’s distinct from the reports of sexual violence committed by Russian soldiers during the invasion in communities they temporarily controlled. In detention facilities, sexual violence appears to be used routinely as a method of torture, coercion, and humiliation.

Jacobsen: What about propaganda and hate speech? How are those progressing in terms of violations of human rights standards?

Wille: Hate speech has been a core element of Russian state doctrine since 2014. It has been used systematically in domestic and occupied-territory messaging as a means of justifying aggression against Ukraine. This includes dehumanizing language directed at Ukrainians and their national identity—portraying them as “Nazis,” “traitors,” or “subhumans.”

Unfortunately, that rhetoric hasn’t subsided. It continues to function as a justification tool for the Kremlin’s actions in Ukraine. Polling data from within Russia shows this approach has had an effect: large segments of the population have internalized these narratives and see the invasion as legitimate or necessary.

Jacobsen: Let me frame this differently. What human rights violations has Russia been least liable for? In other words, what are the areas where public perception of wrongdoing may not match the evidence?

Wille: There have been numerous reports of Russian attacks on schools and hospitals. In our investigations, we found that while there have indeed been many such incidents, in many cases, there was either a legitimate Ukrainian military target in or near the area, or the damage resulted from Russia’s use of inherently indiscriminate weapons systems—such as cluster munitions or unguided rockets—that scatter shrapnel widely.

In the early stages of the full-scale invasion, organizations such as UNICEF and the United Nations released figures on the number of schools and hospitals affected. The phrasing of those reports sometimes gave the impression that each incident represented a deliberate strike against civilian institutions. Our findings indicate that deliberate targeting of schools or hospitals has occurred, but far less frequently than those early reports might suggest. In most cases, the damage was collateral—caused by indiscriminate or reckless attacks rather than intentional strikes on civilian facilities.

Jacobsen: Another angle that often comes up, particularly in more private discussions, concerns media coverage. Some Ukrainian observers argue that the West selectively emphasizes or downplays certain narratives. What does Western media typically get right, what do they get wrong, and what do they tend to miss entirely?

Wille: Most reporting has been excellent and largely accurate in capturing the realities on the ground in Ukraine for ordinary people. Where Western media has fallen short—and I don’t necessarily blame individual journalists, but rather the editorial structures of major outlets—is in their near-total lack of interest in documenting abuses committed by Ukrainian armed forces.

At Human Rights Watch, we investigate and report on abuses by all sides in a conflict. But Western media coverage has overwhelmingly focused on Russian abuses while virtually ignoring Ukrainian violations, such as the mistreatment of prisoners of war or unlawful use of antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions.

As for what’s been misrepresented, I’d say one key issue is how some attacks are framed. For instance, an attack may occur in an area where there’s a legitimate Ukrainian military target. Yet, the reporting sometimes presents it as a deliberate strike against civilians—suggesting Russia intentionally targeted a neighborhood to terrorize the population. In some cases, there’s little acknowledgment that a military installation or infrastructure site was nearby.

Ukraine has positioned several military assets within large urban centers, which inherently puts civilians at greater risk. When Russian forces attack those areas, civilians are sometimes caught in the crossfire.

Take the recent attacks in cities like Kyiv, Lviv, and others in western Ukraine. You might see an apartment building hit, resulting in civilian deaths, with no apparent military infrastructure visible. The narrative in much of the Western press tends to assume Russia deliberately targeted that building. However, in many of these cases, investigations show that the building was struck after Ukrainian air defences intercepted incoming munitions—whether drones like the Shahed series or ballistic missiles—and debris from those interceptions caused the destruction.

So while the civilian deaths are tragic, they sometimes result from the interception process, not an intentional Russian strike on that specific building. That distinction is rarely made in mainstream reporting. To be clear, this doesn’t absolve Russia of responsibility for launching attacks in the first place, but it does mean the narrative of deliberate targeting can be misleading.

Jacobsen: You mentioned some areas of inquiry that Human Rights Watch wants to expand. What are the regions you would most like to access, but currently can’t?

Wille: It always comes back to the occupied territories. That’s where the most significant information gaps remain. We need access to investigate the full scope of Russian abuses, including how Russian or proxy authorities are conducting so-called “law enforcement” operations—how arrests are made, how detainees are treated, and what happens to those transferred from occupied Ukrainian territories to prisons in Russia.

There are enormous gaps in understanding that system and the abuses likely occurring within it. And because of this lack of access, we’re also missing another crucial area of inquiry: Ukrainian attacks in occupied territories or even within Russian territory that may kill or injure civilians. These incidents are far less documented, and without firsthand investigation, we can’t form a complete picture of the conflict’s toll on all civilians affected, regardless of which side they live under.

We know that Ukraine is conducting attacks across the contact line and into Russian territory using drones, antipersonnel landmines, cluster munitions, and other weapons. What we haven’t been able to document well are the civilian impacts and potential unlawful attacks carried out by Ukraine in those territories.

Jacobsen: What have been the main human rights abuses committed by Ukrainian forces?

Wille: Unfortunately, one of the earliest documented violations following the full-scale invasion was the execution and torture of Russian prisoners of war. We have, of course, seen the same from the Russian side—the execution and torture of Ukrainian POWs—but Ukraine’s actions in this regard are equally serious under international law.

We’ve also documented Ukraine’s use of banned weapons systems, including antipersonnel landmines, which directly violates the Ottawa Convention, or Landmine Ban Treaty, to which Ukraine is a signatory. Ukraine has used cluster munitions and antipersonnel mines in civilian-populated areas, including in cities under Russian occupation that still contained Ukrainian civilians.

There have also been disturbing videos showing Russian soldiers apparently attempting to surrender to Ukrainian drones and then being killed, though we have not been able to verify these. These incidents would fall under the same category—unlawful killing of prisoners of war.

In addition, we published a detailed report on the treatment and prosecution of Ukrainians who lived under Russian occupation and have since been charged with collaboration. Many of these charges are vaguely defined and problematic from a human rights perspective.

Most recently, in a large prisoner exchange, Ukraine transferred to Russia not only Russian nationals but also Ukrainians who had been convicted of collaboration charges. We have no way of knowing whether these individuals consented to be sent to Russia or what happened to them after the transfer.

Jacobsen: Before we wrap up, what question do you, as a specialist, never see asked in the media but believe should be?

Wille: I think we’ve covered most of the essential ground. There isn’t one that immediately comes to mind that hasn’t already been discussed here.

Jacobsen: Understood, one final question. I recently published an anthology on antisemitism and its global resurgence. Regarding hate speech and related actions, is antisemitism a concern in Russia, in Ukraine, or the surrounding region in the same way we’re seeing in other parts of the world?

Wille: That’s not an area we’ve monitored closely as an organization, so I can only speak anecdotally. There are certainly instances of antisemitic speech in the Russian Federation. However, I can’t talk to their prevalence firsthand, as I haven’t lived or worked there. In Ukraine, there are also incidents of antisemitism. However, my sense—again, anecdotally—is that it is not at the level Russia has claimed in attempting to justify its full-scale invasion.

Like much of Europe, there are segments of the population in both countries who hold antisemitic views and occasionally express them publicly. But I couldn’t provide a comparative assessment of the scale between Ukraine, Russia, or elsewhere in Europe.

Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time today, Belkis.

Wille: Thank you, take care.