Confrontation in the Persian Gulf need not physically close the Strait of Hormuz to produce strategic consequences. Mines, explosive-laden unmanned surface vessels (USVs), attacks on export terminals, and sustained GPS interference could delay shipping, drive up insurance premiums, and persuade commercial operators to suspend transit.

For the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, then, the central challenge is not simply intercepting missiles. It is keeping ports, energy terminals, shipping lanes, and naval facilities operating under attack. South Korea could contribute through three interconnected packages: protecting critical maritime nodes, creating certified shipping corridors, and building regional sustainment capacity. These capabilities should be delivered through an open consortium rather than handed wholesale to a single conglomerate.

Protecting Critical Maritime Nodes

Gulf governments cannot protect every port, oil refinery, desalination plant, and anchorage equally. They should prioritize major energy terminals, water infrastructure, and ports essential to maritime access. That list would include facilities in eastern Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the UAE’s ports at Fujairah and Jebel Ali, and Oman’s ports at Duqm and Salalah.

Each priority site should host a modular port-protection unit, similar in concept to the counter-drone packages Ukraine has recently deployed. A major energy terminal could combine surveillance sensors, harbor sonar, electronic warfare, short-range weapons, and crewed and uncrewed patrol platforms. South Korean defense, aerospace, systems-integration, and shipbuilding firms are well placed to offer such a package jointly.

Electronic warfare would be the least expensive first line of defense, but it would not be sufficient. A USV following a programmed route or relying on inertial navigation could continue moving even after losing communications. Ports would therefore still need patrol craft, helicopters, remote weapon stations, and machine guns capable of destroying the vessel before it reached a tanker or loading pier.

These capabilities should be sold as deployable modules backed by adequate stocks, maintenance support, and guarantees of rapid repair. The point is not simply to install equipment, but to ensure that it continues working once a crisis begins.

Creating Certified Shipping Corridors

Protecting ports would mean little if tankers and liquefied natural gas carriers could not safely reach them. Rather than attempting to sweep the entire Persian Gulf, GCC states should establish a limited number of corridors for energy shipments, military logistics, and essential commercial traffic. Each corridor would need to be surveyed, cleared, certified, and regularly resurveyed.

Operating from a mothership outside a suspected minefield, unmanned surface and underwater systems could survey routes, locate and neutralize suspicious objects, and feed their findings into a shared mission-management system.

South Korean firms could provide vessels, unmanned platforms, systems integration, and maintenance, while specialized European partners supplied mine-countermeasure equipment and operational certification. An open consortium would also allow South Korean participation to grow after successful trials in Gulf waters.

The system should produce two distinct products: a classified operational map for GCC navies and a releasable corridor-assurance report for port authorities, national oil companies, shipowners, and insurers. The public-facing report should identify cleared lanes, residual dangers, and a schedule for resurveying. If shipowners and insurers do not trust the process, mine clearance alone will not restore traffic.

Given their geography, the UAE and Oman would be logical candidates to lead a GCC corridor-certification body. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as major energy exporters, should participate alongside regional navies, port authorities, oil companies, tanker operators, and insurers.

GPS jamming and spoofing could also disrupt shipping without a single vessel being physically attacked. South Korean companies should therefore develop a regional navigation-integrity service that compares satellite positioning with onboard sensors, radar, vessel-tracking data, and fixed coastal references.

A shore-based center could detect implausible vessel movements, abrupt changes in reported position, and other anomalies, then distribute warnings and recommended routes. The system could initially be tested aboard ships operated by major Gulf energy companies before being extended to a wider commercial network.

Building Regional Sustainment Capacity

Defense systems in the Gulf must be able to operate for weeks without depending entirely on emergency deliveries from abroad. Rather than duplicating every capability across all six GCC states, South Korea should propose two regional support hubs.

A hub in Saudi Arabia could specialize in ammunition and equipment support, while one in the UAE focused on sensors, electronic warfare, and unmanned and naval systems. This division of labor would reduce unnecessary duplication while ensuring that critical expertise and supplies remained within the region.

Localization should proceed in stages: beginning with final assembly, maintenance, training, and forward stockpiles; expanding into the production of non-sensitive parts and ammunition components; and eventually moving toward joint munitions production.

Contracts should measure readiness, not merely delivery. They should include repair-time guarantees, required mission-capable rates, and minimum stock levels. GCC governments, meanwhile, should calculate the ammunition, spare parts, and batteries needed to withstand disruptions lasting 14, 30, and 90 days, based on expected consumption and the time required to replenish supplies.

A Practical Hormuz Agenda

Gulf governments should begin by selecting ports and terminals for pilot protection units, creating a technical working group for corridor operations, and involving oil companies, port operators, tanker fleets, and insurers in exercises. Those civilian participants are not an afterthought: their confidence will determine whether trade continues during a crisis.

Seoul, for its part, should establish an open consortium of South Korean firms and specialized foreign partners, while GCC clients procure each module competitively. South Korean companies should also recognize that European and American partners will remain necessary, particularly in mine warfare, maritime autonomy, and electronic warfare.

South Korea cannot turn Hormuz into an impregnable fortress. It can, however, offer something more realistic: a system for keeping selected ports open, maintaining certified corridors, protecting navigation, and repairing damaged equipment locally. That would represent a distinct contribution to Gulf security—not another layer of missile defense or an exclusive package from a single company, but an architecture designed to keep maritime trade and energy systems functioning under attack.