
Syria’s Shifting Alliances: A Westward Turn?
The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December has ushered in a new era for Syria, now under the leadership of transitional head Ahmed al-Sharaa. In a striking departure from his predecessor’s policies, al-Sharaa has signaled an interest in strengthening ties with the West. His outreach to nations such as Germany, France, and the United States stands in sharp contrast to the Assad regime’s long-standing alignment with Russia and Iran. This shift, while still in its early stages, suggests Syria is reevaluating its place on the global stage and considering a departure from its traditional alliances.
For more than a decade, Syria’s strategic partnerships with Moscow and Tehran were the cornerstones of its foreign policy. Now, with Assad out of power, the new leadership is reconsidering these ties. More significantly, Syria’s outreach to the West has been met with cautious optimism. Both the United States and Europe have indicated a willingness to engage with Damascus, raising the possibility that Syria’s 14-year diplomatic isolation may finally be coming to an end. While these developments suggest a potential opening for a more democratic and free Syria, the road ahead remains fraught with challenges.
For the first time since the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, Western nations are engaging with Syria in a tangible way, exploring pathways to rebuild relations and reintroduce the country into the global order. In a recent diplomatic visit, the foreign ministers of France and Germany held discussions with Syrian officials, focusing on phased sanction relief and assistance in drafting a new constitution. However, Western governments have made it clear that any substantive reengagement remains contingent on Syria’s willingness to undertake meaningful political reforms—most notably ensuring that “all Syrians, regardless of their ethnic or religious group, are given a place in the political process.”
While the road to full diplomatic normalization remains long, European leaders increasingly recognize the strategic importance of fostering a stable Syria. Beyond humanitarian concerns, a Syria that is no longer in turmoil offers Europe a chance to reduce migration pressures and curb regional instability.
In Washington, the response has been similarly measured. The Biden administration took an initial step toward engagement by easing certain sanctions, allowing humanitarian aid to flow more freely into Syria. This cautious but notable policy shift mirrors the approach taken by European nations: a willingness to engage, but only under strict conditions. The Biden administration made it clear that sustained economic and diplomatic cooperation will only materialize if Syria moves decisively away from authoritarian governance and embraces democratic reforms.
Al-Sharaa himself has made no secret of his desire to restore ties with the United States, even under the new Trump administration. He has repeatedly emphasized the necessity of reintegrating Syria into the global economy, portraying U.S. sanctions as the single greatest obstacle to that goal. “The most serious risk facing the country,” he recently stated, “is the continued burden of these economic restrictions.” He has urged President Trump to lift sanctions in the interest of fostering peace and stability in the region. Yet, despite his appeals, al-Sharaa admitted in an interview with The Economist that no direct communication has taken place between Damascus and the Trump administration.
Perhaps the most striking indication of Syria’s diplomatic pivot westward is its growing distance from Iran. Once a steadfast ally, Iran has become a target of sharp criticism from Damascus’s new leadership. Al-Sharaa has publicly condemned Tehran and its regional proxies, arguing that Iranian-backed militias have long posed a threat to Syria’s sovereignty and regional stability. “The presence of Iranian militias under the previous regime posed a strategic threat to the entire region,” he declared. Syria’s denouncement of Iran—a country facing its own deepening isolation from the West—sends a clear message: Damascus is signaling its intent to break with old alliances and forge a new path forward.
For decades, Iran was one of Syria’s closest strategic partners, supplying weapons, financial aid, and military support to the Assad regime. Tehran’s proxy groups played a decisive role in keeping Assad in power. But as Iran faces mounting economic struggles and increasingly harsh U.S. sanctions under Trump’s renewed “maximum pressure” campaign—designed to cripple Tehran’s oil exports—Syria appears to be reassessing the viability of its relationship with Iran. The new government’s public rebuke of Iran suggests a calculated shift, one that aligns with Damascus’s broader efforts to distance itself from its former allies and seek new diplomatic opportunities.
However, while Syria’s break with Iran is becoming increasingly clear, its relationship with Russia remains far more complex. For years, Moscow has been Syria’s most influential patron, providing critical military and economic support to Assad’s regime both during the civil war and after. Even after Assad’s downfall, Russia welcomed him into exile, demonstrating its continued commitment to its interests in Syria. Yet, recent developments suggest that Syria is beginning to reevaluate its dependency on Moscow.
One of the strongest signs of this shift came with Syria’s abrupt cancellation of a major development contract with a Russian construction firm—a decision that hints at Damascus’s desire to reduce its economic reliance on Russia. Additionally, reports indicate that Moscow has begun withdrawing some of its forces from Syria’s Tartus port, a critical naval base on the Mediterranean. Under Assad, Russia was granted full access to the port in a 2017 deal that solidified Moscow’s military presence in the region. The scaling back of Russian infrastructure projects and military assets suggests that Syria may be looking to diversify its partnerships beyond its traditional alliances with Moscow and Tehran.
As part of this broader strategy, al-Sharaa recently met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to discuss a potential joint defense pact. The proposed agreement reportedly includes the establishment of Turkish air bases in Syria, as well as training programs for Syria’s newly restructured military. While this meeting underscores Syria’s diplomatic recalibration, it also introduces a new layer of complexity to its geopolitical realignment. As a NATO member with deep ties to both the West and Russia, Turkey occupies a uniquely ambiguous position on the global stage. Syria’s willingness to engage with Ankara reflects an attempt to expand its diplomatic options without committing fully to a Western or Eastern bloc. This ambiguity makes it difficult to determine whether Syria’s recent overtures signal a permanent shift in alliances or merely a temporary recalibration.
Syria’s post-Assad trajectory suggests a country in transition, actively seeking to redefine its place in the world. Its public denunciation of Iran, the cancellation of Russian contracts, and its renewed diplomatic overtures to the West all indicate a desire to move beyond its previous geopolitical entanglements. Yet, despite these signs of change, Syria remains deeply entangled with Moscow and Tehran in ways that cannot be undone overnight. Economic dependencies, military arrangements, and lingering security concerns ensure that these old relationships, while strained, are far from severed. Even Syria’s newfound engagement with Turkey leaves open questions about the nation’s long-term geopolitical orientation.
As Syria navigates this uncertain transition under al-Sharaa’s leadership, one question looms: Is this the beginning of a true and lasting shift westward, or merely another instance of Damascus adjusting its position within the ever-shifting dynamics of global power?