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Baloch Rebels Expose the Cracks in Pakistan’s Military Armor
Baloch insurgents have exploited Pakistan’s military redeployments to launch a wave of coordinated attacks, exposing the state’s deepening vulnerability in Balochistan.
A surge of coordinated attacks by Baloch insurgents has laid bare a critical vulnerability in Pakistan’s national defense architecture. As the Pakistani military redirected its focus toward tensions on the Indian front, rebels seized the moment to strike hard and often—staging six attacks in a single day in Quetta, the provincial capital of Balochistan. With many units redeployed eastward due to escalating hostilities with India, the Balochistan region has become increasingly exposed, allowing militant groups to step into the vacuum with alarming efficiency.
The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), the region’s most potent insurgent force, launched an ambitious offensive—dubbed Operation Herof—claiming to have carried out 71 coordinated strikes across 51 locations. According to the BLA, its fighters seized key infrastructure, including highway checkpoints on the vital N-65 corridor linking Balochistan and Sindh. They also overran government facilities such as the Levies Police Station and the local NADRA office. These events starkly highlight a troubling truth: Pakistan’s military presence in Balochistan is brittle. Any temporary redeployment renders the state apparatus exposed, vulnerable to rebel advances, and unable to assert control.
Despite its sweeping deployment across the region, Pakistan’s security footprint in Balochistan has failed to deliver lasting stability. Every major arm of the federal security establishment is present in the province, yet cracks persist. The powerful XII Corps, headquartered in Quetta and led by a three-star general, is responsible for army operations across Balochistan. The Air Force operates four bases, with the 31st Fighter Wing stationed at Samungli in Quetta. The Navy maintains a string of bases on the Arabian Sea, most prominently at Gwadar, Pakistan’s second-largest port and home to the 3rd Battalion of the Coast Guard. Additional naval outposts exist in Jiwani, Ormara, and Pasni.
Balochistan is also saturated with intelligence operations. The Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) maintains a strong presence, including strategic surveillance outposts like those in Saindak—overseeing the western border—and Gwadar, monitoring the Gulf of Oman. The ISI’s Joint Signals Intelligence Bureau plays a crucial role in collecting and processing communications data. Each branch of the military also deploys its own intelligence units under the broader umbrella of Military Intelligence (MI), further underscoring the region’s strategic weight.
Domestically, the Ministry of Interior controls a parallel network of security forces, including the Balochistan Police, the provincial constabulary (often referred to as the Levies), and the Frontier Corps Balochistan (FCB). While the police focus on law and order, the Levies extend state reach into remote territories. The Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force also under the Interior Ministry, plays a critical role in the province’s security ecosystem. Yet even this intricate web of armed institutions has failed to suppress the insurgency’s steady evolution.
The recent attacks mark a turning point. The Baloch insurgency appears to be transitioning from a fragmented campaign to a unified, strategically calibrated guerrilla movement. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 added fuel to the fire. Advanced American weapons once in the hands of Afghan forces, have flooded regional black markets. Baloch insurgents now wield a diverse arsenal that includes RPGs, PKM and MG3 machine guns, and even heavy weaponry.
Alongside improved armaments, the insurgents have restructured their leadership. Traditional tribal commanders are being eclipsed by a younger, more educated Baloch middle class with stronger ideological commitments and greater tactical acumen. These leaders are steering the fight away from sporadic skirmishes and toward sustained organized resistance. Alliances between previously competing groups have pooled resources and strengthened coordination, allowing for more complex operations with far-reaching impacts.
Crucially, the Baloch rebels have become more adaptable. Their ability to endure, adjust, and resist the counterinsurgency strategies deployed by the Pakistani state is perhaps their most formidable asset. Employing classic guerrilla tactics—ambushes, IEDs, sniper attacks, and suicide bombings—they’ve managed to inflict significant damage while avoiding the full brunt of military retaliation. Their communications are more sophisticated, and their operations are more precise.
Balochistan, it seems, is slowly slipping through Islamabad’s fingers. For all its military firepower and intelligence prowess, the Pakistani state has failed to quell the insurgency or address the deeper grievances that fuel it. Without a drastic strategic shift or a political reckoning with Balochistan’s longstanding autonomy demands, the country risks confronting not just a security crisis but a historic rupture. Unless Islamabad recalibrates its approach, it may one day find itself confronting the unthinkable: the disintegration of the nation’s western frontier.
Manish Rai is a geopolitical analyst and columnist for the Middle East and Af-Pak region. He has done reporting from Jordon, Iran, and Afghanistan. His work has been quoted in the British Parliament.