With elections fast approaching, there are growing concerns that political violence could spiral out of control in Bangladesh.

As Bangladesh approaches a high-stakes parliamentary election and a referendum on February 12, 2026, the political climate is tightening into something sharper and more combustible. In a detailed analysis for The Diplomat, regional expert Bahauddin Foizee, a geopolitical analyst and columnist, argues that the likelihood of unrest is high, and that the country’s next political rupture may come not on election day but in the long, grinding lead-up to it.

Bangladesh’s political stability is closely linked to South Asia’s wider security dynamics, economic growth, and the ambitions of outside powers. Strategically positioned between India and China, Bangladesh shares a long border with India and deep political, economic, and cultural ties that make the two countries’ interests difficult to disentangle. Any upheaval in Dhaka could reverberate across the region, particularly given the already strained India–Bangladesh relationship following former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, as well as tensions with Myanmar over the ongoing Rohingya crisis.

A Tumultuous Path to the Polls

In 2024, Bangladesh experienced a student-led uprising that forced Sheikh Hasina into exile and brought Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus to power in an interim government. The fall of Hasina’s Awami League, once the country’s dominant political force, triggered a deeper political crisis: not only a scramble for power, but a battle over legitimacy and the rules of the next order. Hasina’s ouster, followed by a ban on the Awami League’s participation in the electoral process and her death sentence for alleged crimes during her tenure, have set the stage for an intense political battle whose outcome will shape the country’s institutions for years.

That sense of existential threat is now being translated into street politics. Hasina’s son, Sajeeb Wazed, has warned that the Awami League will take to the streets if his mother’s party is excluded from the electoral process. His promise of mass protests, and the potential for clashes with law enforcement, adds volatility to an already fragile situation. Wazed claims that hundreds of thousands of Awami League activists are prepared to mobilize. Even if the reality falls short of the rhetoric, the prospect of confrontation is destabilizing in a system where street power has long been a decisive instrument.

Rivalries, Tensions, and Divided Loyalties

Foizee’s analysis also emphasizes how fractured Bangladesh’s political field has become as parties maneuver for advantage. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, and the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (Jamaat), which had been banned under Hasina, are gearing up for fierce electoral competition. Both parties were historically opposed to Hasina; now they are trying to dominate the post-Hasina landscape, and to claim the mantle of democratic restoration without surrendering their own partisan ambitions.

Foizee underscores the danger of large-scale protests and street violence. With Hasina’s party banned, the political vacuum could become an accelerant rather than a stabilizer. In that vacuum, confrontations could escalate not only between the Awami League and the state, but also between rival contenders who see the transitional moment as their best shot at power. Foizee points in particular to the BNP and Jamaat, who are already locked in their own power struggle. This rivalry could become more dangerous when the incentives of coalition-building give way to the incentives of outmaneuvering a rival in the streets.

The problem, Foizee suggests, is not simply rivalry between parties, but rivalry within them. Internal divisions among competing factions inside both the BNP and Jamaat could further fuel unrest, as leaders fight for nominations, constituencies, and the authority to speak for the party as a whole. In a volatile season, these intra-party contests can spill outward, transforming organizational disputes into public confrontations and widening the field of conflict beyond the usual lines.

To prevent violence, the interim government has pledged to boost security by deploying military personnel alongside regular law enforcement agencies. Yet even a heavier security posture may not be enough if political divisions persist and the Awami League’s calls for protests are realized. Bangladesh’s electoral history since independence from Pakistan has often been marred by bloodshed, and that history shapes expectations now: security forces anticipate disorder; protesters anticipate repression; rival parties anticipate provocation.

A Test of Bangladesh’s Political Resilience

Foizee’s analysis in The Diplomat paints a challenging outlook, suggesting that restoring political stability will be an uphill battle. The February 2026 election could still offer a chance for a fresh start, possibly paving the way for a more reformed political system. But the path to that future remains uncertain. Deep-rooted divisions and the looming threat of violence create a volatile environment in which Bangladesh’s state institutions may be tested not only for their capacity to keep order, but also for their ability to maintain legitimacy while doing so.

All eyes will be on the interim government’s ability to navigate these turbulent times. Foizee argues that how the government manages growing unrest, balances competing political interests, and handles security will determine whether Bangladesh can hold a peaceful election, or whether the nation will once again be consumed by the instability that has plagued its recent history.

With so much at stake, the upcoming election is more than a political contest. It is a test of Bangladesh’s political resilience, and of whether a country that has repeatedly flirted with violence at the ballot box can choose a different outcome this time. The world will be watching closely, hoping for peace, and bracing for further turmoil.