Ahmed al-Sharaa’s Syria is a ticking bomb disguised in the language of legitimacy.

Recent violence against Syria’s Druze community in the southern province of Sweida is a chilling reminder of the sectarian brutality that has marked Syria’s past—and threatens to define its future. The Druze, a small religious minority comprising just over 3 percent of the population, have been targeted in what rights monitors describe as deliberate massacres. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), forces loyal to Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Shaara, and allied militias carried out coordinated attacks that left approximately 600 Druze dead, including 140 women and children. This atrocity is not an isolated event. It is part of a larger, systematic campaign of terror against Syria’s religious and ethnic minorities since al-Shaara assumed power.

The Syrian National Army (SNA), now operating as part of a broader coalition under al-Shaara’s leadership and heavily influenced by Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), launched attacks on Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria in December 2024. Fighting around the Tishreen Dam was particularly fierce. Just a few months later, in March, the regime’s affiliated militias targeted the Alawite minority in coastal cities such as Banias. In some instances, entire families were executed. More than 1,300 individuals—mostly Alawites—were killed in what appeared to be retaliatory acts framed as responses to attacks from Assad loyalists in Latakia and Tartous. Yet in truth, these were acts of collective punishment against communities seen as tied to the old order.

In June, a suicide bombing devastated a church in Damascus, killing 25 people. While Syrian authorities quickly blamed the Islamic State (IS), a lesser-known Sunni extremist faction, Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah, claimed responsibility. Analysts believe this group maintains longstanding ties with HTS, dating back to the early years of the civil war. At that time, the group allegedly worked under HTS’s broader umbrella and helped establish covert cells in areas still controlled by Assad. Viewed in context, this pattern of attacks suggests not rogue operations, but a coordinated strategy—one enabled or tacitly endorsed by al-Shaara’s regime. These atrocities appear designed to intimidate and suppress minority communities, deterring them from asserting their political rights.

What makes this campaign more dangerous is the normalization of its architect. The current regime has been emboldened by the lifting of Western sanctions and a creeping recognition from Arab governments and even the United States. In May, the U.S. president met with Ahmed al-Shaara in Riyadh and effusively praised him as a “tough guy with a very strong past”—a moment that stunned many regional observers. That “past,” as the president called it, is saturated with jihadist affiliations, not statesmanship. Al-Shaara’s record is not one of resilience, but of radicalism.

Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham, al-Shaara’s political and military foundation, adheres to the same Salafist ideology as al-Qaeda. In regions it had previously controlled, HTS imposed austere Islamic rule. Civilians have described their governance as nearly indistinguishable from the practices of the Islamic State. The group’s hostility toward heterodox Muslim sects such as the Druze and Alawites has remained constant. In 2015, HTS’s predecessor, the al-Nusra Front, forced Druze villagers in northern Idlib to convert to Sunni Islam. That legacy persists.

Despite cosmetic efforts to distance itself from al-Qaeda through organizational mergers and rebranding, HTS’s ideological commitments have remained unchanged. Formed in January 2017 through the merger of multiple Salafi jihadist factions—including Nour al-Din al-Zenki and Jabhat Ansar al-Din—HTS attempted to shed its al-Qaeda affiliation. But the move was strategic, not substantive. It sought to broaden its appeal without abandoning its core radicalism.

That history casts a long shadow over Ahmed al-Shaara’s current regime. The notion that donning a tailored suit and shaking hands with Western leaders can absolve him of that past—or erase his ongoing complicity in sectarian violence—is both naïve and dangerous. Syria is a fragile mosaic of communities: Sunni Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians, Armenians, Turkomans, Alawites, Druze, and Yazidis. A stable future for the country can only be built on genuine inclusivity and respect for all its citizens. Any regime that targets minorities as enemies of the state cannot be a partner in peace.

Unless Syria’s leadership demonstrates a real commitment to pluralism, the international community must reevaluate its engagement with al-Shaara. HTS, and by extension his government, should be politically and diplomatically isolated. The regime’s blend of jihadist ideology and militarized repression poses a long-term threat—not just to Syria, but to regional security. As it stands, al-Shaara’s Syria is a ticking bomb disguised in the language of legitimacy.