Erdogan is leveraging the Syrian conflict to serve Turkey’s strategic interests, abandoning the Syrian opposition and realigning with Assad.

For quite some time now, tensions have been rising in Syrian opposition-held areas due to Turkish moves toward rapprochement with Syria. Recent violence against Syrians in Turkey acted as a catalyst, sparking retaliatory riots in opposition-held areas of northwestern Syria. Hundreds of Syrian demonstrators, some armed, took to the streets in protest, tearing down Turkish flags, hurling rocks, and targeting Turkish commercial trucks. In recent days, anger has boiled over, with anti-Turkish sentiments visibly dominating the streets.

Many people in Turkish-controlled zones in northern Syria are demanding the withdrawal of Turkish forces, exacerbating the already volatile situation. In some areas, Turkish-trained Syrian opposition forces fired at Turkish armored vehicles, prompting Turkey to deploy additional troops to the region to maintain control. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a war monitor, many people were killed and injured in exchanges of fire with Turkish troops.

Turkish President Erdogan recently stated, “There is no reason not to establish relations with Syria,” emphasizing that Ankara has no plans or goals to interfere in Syria’s internal affairs. However, his statements starkly contradict Turkey’s actions in Syria since the start of the conflict in 2011.

Many senior Syrian opposition figures now believe that Ankara has abandoned the Syrian revolution. Turkey has been one of the main backers of Syrian opposition groups since the start of the conflict, supporting the overthrow of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In reality, Turkey has always used the Syrian conflict to serve its own vested interests. President Erdogan has sold out the Syrian opposition on many occasions since 2016, allowing the Assad regime to reoccupy areas controlled by Turkish-backed groups. Ankara’s initial policy in the Syrian civil war was ostensibly in support of the moderate Syrian opposition. However, Turkey opened its borders to foreign fighters traveling to Syria in 2012 and 2013, fueling extremist groups, including ISIS. The emergence of ISIS irked the international community, which then reduced support for Turkish-backed rebels, shifting focus to helping groups fighting ISIS, such as the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG). Consequently, Turkey readjusted its policy in Syria, pushing mostly Arab Syrian rebels to fight the Kurds. Throughout the conflict, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) has been the armed opposition group most aligned with and dependent on Turkey.

After 2015, Turkey shifted to a strategy of containing the PYD/YPG-led Syrian Kurds by creating buffer zones in northern Syria. It used FSA groups as irregular forces in hybrid military operations: Operation Euphrates Shield (2016), Operation Olive Branch (2018), and Operation Peace Spring (2019). These groups were renamed the Syrian National Army (SNA). Turkey supplies the SNA with training, salaries, and weapons in exchange for participation in Turkish military operations. These groups supported Turkish operations against Kurdish forces east of the Euphrates River, receiving Turkey’s support in fortifying and defending parts of northwestern Syria.

Furthermore, Turkey used these Syrian opposition groups in conflicts like Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh as cannon fodder. These groups failed to realize they were being manipulated by Turkey, which eventually sold them out. Turkey’s divide-and-rule policy in Syria fielded Syrians against each other based on requirements. In sum, Turkey’s vision of resurrecting the ‘revolutionary’ cause in the Syrian civil war for its own benefit has been effectively executed through institutionalized control over Syrian opposition groups.

Today, Turkey is open to a new era of ties with the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad to serve its greater strategic interests. Meanwhile, the Syrian opposition appears to be merely a sideshow for Turkey. It is unlikely that the opposition will accept a settlement between Turkey and Syria without clear and specific commitments and a regional political cover for issues related to potential political and constitutional change in Syria. However, Turkey would not allow their higher-order interests to be governed by client groups like the Syrian opposition. Ankara will try to contain key Syrian opposition armed factions and possibly eliminate those suspected of opposing its new agenda.

At this point, the most suitable option for opposition groups is to join forces with the Kurds in northern Syria and form a joint political and military command. This would give Arab and Kurdish opposition groups control over roughly 35-40 percent of Syrian territory and a sizable portion of the total population. Despite the animosities that developed between Arabs and Kurds during the previous war years, it will be mutually beneficial to form such an alliance if the alternative is their political demise. The United States might consider supporting this alliance, given its past efforts to unite the Kurds and include them in the Syrian Negotiating Committee, as well as its call for the revitalization of trade between Kurdish- and opposition-controlled regions.