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Hezbollah’s Future After Nasrallah’s Death
The death of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has shaken Lebanon’s political and militant landscape at a time when tensions between Hezbollah and Israel are once again escalating. Israel has launched a ground offensive in Lebanon, targeting Hezbollah’s leadership and resources. According to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli forces entered Lebanon to carry out “limited and targeted” operations against the group. To understand the implications of these developments and Hezbollah’s position today, we must look back at the organization’s origins, which run deep into Lebanon’s past.
Hezbollah, founded in 1982 during the Lebanese Civil War, emerged as a response to the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. What began as a guerrilla movement aimed at expelling Israeli forces soon evolved into a multifaceted organization deeply rooted in the Shia community and shaping Lebanese politics and society. According to Joas Wagemakers, an expert in Islamic Studies at Utrecht University, Hezbollah’s history is not only about its militant wing—it’s also about how the group became a voice for Lebanon’s marginalized Shia community.
However, the seeds of Hezbollah’s rise were planted much earlier. In the 1930s, Lebanon conducted a census that revealed Christians were the majority, with six Christians for every five Muslims. This demographic structure was encoded into Lebanon’s constitution: the president must always be a Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament a Shia. Over time, however, the Shia population grew, becoming Lebanon’s most prominent religious group, yet they remained economically and politically disenfranchised.
In response, Shia organizations began to form. The “Movement of the Deprived,” founded in the 1970s, and the Amal Movement were prominent examples. But for some in the Shia community, these groups didn’t go far enough. This opened the door for more radical organizations, such as Hezbollah, to take root.
Iran’s revolution in 1979 played a pivotal role in the birth of Hezbollah. Ayatollah Khomeini was eager to export his revolutionary ideals, particularly to Shia communities beyond Iran’s borders. Hezbollah became Iran’s primary vehicle for spreading its ideological and geopolitical influence in the region. Tehran invested heavily—financially and militarily—into Hezbollah, establishing it as a powerful proxy in its broader confrontation with Israel and the West.
Hezbollah’s trajectory mirrors that of Hamas in many ways. Both organizations have militant wings but also engage in significant social work. In the 1980s, Hezbollah built schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure, all aimed at serving Lebanon’s Shia community, much like Hamas did for Palestinians. However, these efforts are often overshadowed by their military activities. Public discourse outside the region frequently focuses solely on Hezbollah’s militancy, sidelining its role in providing social services.
The controversy surrounding this dual identity is exemplified by the case of CNN journalist Octavia Nasr, who lost her job in 2010 after praising Hezbollah-affiliated cleric Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah on Twitter. Fadlallah was a prominent figure in Lebanon’s Shia community who opposed violence against women and advocated for women’s rights—a nuanced legacy that complicated his association with Hezbollah.
In 1989, the Taif Accord brought an end to the Lebanese Civil War, with all militias required to disarm—except Hezbollah. At the time, this exemption was justified by Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon. Even after Israel withdrew in 2000, Hezbollah retained its arms, framing its military presence as essential to resisting Israeli aggression and defending Palestinians.
Even as other Lebanese factions disarmed, the group’s ability to maintain its military capabilities solidified its power. Hezbollah’s role in the broader Israel-Palestine conflict has bolstered its legitimacy, even as many in Lebanon warn against the risks of provoking Israel. Following the October 7 attacks, there were growing concerns that Hezbollah could drag Lebanon into another war despite widespread Lebanese opposition.
Nasrallah’s death raises essential questions about Hezbollah’s future. The organization’s leadership structure is markedly different from Hamas, where frequent assassinations have led to a constant rotation of leaders. Nasrallah’s 32-year reign over Hezbollah has been far more stable, with Nasrallah playing a critical role in maintaining strong ties with Iran and Syria. His death is a significant blow not only to Hezbollah but also to its regional backers.
While Israel appears to have targeted much of Hezbollah’s senior leadership, the group is expected to endure. Hezbollah’s legitimacy, drawn from its resistance to Israel and its position as the defender of Lebanon’s Shia, will remain intact. However, the loss of Nasrallah will challenge Hezbollah’s internal cohesion and its ability to navigate external pressures, particularly as Israel continues its military operations.
As Hezbollah faces the post-Nasrallah era, the group’s survival will depend largely on Iran’s support. Tehran’s financial backing and military aid will be crucial as Hezbollah grapples with leadership changes, domestic pressures, and external threats. How Hezbollah’s new leadership addresses these challenges will determine the group’s future role in Lebanon and the region.
Ali Muthahari is pursuing a Bachelor's degree at Universitas Islam Indonesia. Ali is passionate about Islamic Studies, Arabic literature, and Middle Eastern affairs. He has honed his debating skills at the Qatar Debate Center in Doha. Currently, Ali leads the Arabic Language Arts and Skills Development Institution 'el-Markazi' at Universitas Islam Indonesia, Yogyakarta.