Europe must take greater responsibility in securing the Red Sea, as the U.S. can no longer shoulder the military and financial burden alone.

With the war in Gaza intensifying following the collapse of a recent ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, tensions in the Red Sea remain dangerously elevated. Supply chain disruptions persist, as major shipping companies hesitate to resume normal operations through the waterway. In the meantime, U.S. Navy warships continue to patrol the strait, where the threat from Yemen’s Houthi rebels looms large. The group has pledged to resume attacks on commercial vessels should the fragile ceasefire in Gaza fully unravel.

The economic impact of this crisis has been deeply felt across the Eurozone, with analysts estimating it could add as much as 1.8 percentage points to inflation. Yet, despite the global ramifications, the United States has borne the brunt of the security response—risking the lives of its service members to ensure the continued freedom of navigation through one of the world’s most vital maritime chokepoints. By contrast, though more directly affected economically, Europe has largely played a peripheral role.

The war in Ukraine has already stretched the U.S. defense industrial base thin, rendering the current force posture in the Middle East increasingly unsustainable. If the U.S. intends to continue managing multiple global crises at once, it must begin to delegate more responsibility to its European allies, whose lack of recent combat experience has become increasingly apparent. As dangerous as it is, the Red Sea crisis also presents an opportunity for European navies to build operational readiness in real-world conditions.

Trade disruptions stemming from the conflict have affected Europe more significantly than the United States. Roughly 40 percent of trade between Asia and Europe and over 95 percent of shipping traffic between the two continents pass through the Red Sea. As Mark Hopkins of Moody Analytics observed at the onset of the crisis, “Transport costs are a small component in the final cost of most goods, and while some supply chain disruptions may arise, affecting certain industries and energy, these effects will mainly be felt in European trade, rather than U.S. trade.” Nevertheless, the U.S. Navy has absorbed the costs—using $2.1 million interceptors to destroy Iranian-made drones valued at a mere $2,000. Although the U.S. has avoided casualties thus far, one destroyer narrowly averted disaster when a Houthi cruise missile came within a mile before being intercepted.

Sustained combat operations in the Red Sea have significantly strained the already depleted U.S. defense industrial base, which is simultaneously supporting Ukraine and maintaining a presence in other Middle Eastern flashpoints. To date, the U.S. Navy has spent approximately $1 billion on munitions in the region, having conducted more than 450 strikes against Houthi targets and intercepted over 200 drones and missiles. Pentagon officials have voiced concern about a critical shortage of air defense missiles, warning that the high use rate in the Middle East is impairing the Navy’s ability to respond to a potential crisis in the Pacific. Given the operation’s escalating costs and dwindling interceptor supplies, Washington has reason to press its European partners to take on a greater share of the burden—particularly as the current arrangement is inequitable.

Since the crisis began, the European Union has struggled to demonstrate meaningful commitment. On February 19, the EU launched its maritime security initiative, EUNAVFOR Aspides, aimed at protecting commercial vessels. Unlike the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian, which pursues a more aggressive strategy by targeting the Houthis’ assets to degrade their capabilities, the EU’s mission focuses solely on escorting ships through the region. When announcing the operation, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs described it as “a fast and robust reaction to the attacks of the Houthis, who are attacking commercial ships in the region.” Yet the EU’s response was neither fast nor robust—it came two months after the U.S.-led mission and deployed just four frigates, despite the backing of 19 out of 27 EU member states. The EU’s reluctance to endorse a more assertive approach stems from its desire to avoid escalating tensions and from its aspiration to be perceived as a stabilizing force in the region—all while benefiting from the security umbrella provided by the United States.

The crisis has exposed the alarming degree to which Europe’s navies are unprepared for high-intensity maritime operations. A German warship came dangerously close to shooting down a U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone after firing two missiles that missed due to technical malfunctions. The British Royal Navy has faced setbacks, with aircraft carriers unable to deploy to the Red Sea due to chronic staffing shortages—symptomatic of a wider recruitment crisis within the UK armed forces. Denmark, participating in the EU-led mission, suffered an embarrassing failure when its frigate’s weapons system malfunctioned during an attempted drone interception. Although the threat was neutralized, the Danish government dismissed its top military official for failing to notify the Ministry of Defense promptly. Belgium, meanwhile, indefinitely delayed the deployment of its frigate Louise-Marie after a test revealed that its RIM-7 Sea Sparrow interceptor failed to launch during a simulated drone attack.

If European forces struggle to counter a nonstate actor like the Houthis, how can the United States rely on them to respond to more formidable adversaries—whether deterring Russia in the Baltic or confronting China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea? While some foreign policy analysts argue that Europe’s current shortcomings at sea leave the U.S. with little choice but to shoulder most of the burden, the Red Sea crisis remains a critical opportunity for European militaries to gain the operational experience they sorely lack. Just as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine galvanized EU states to treat defense more seriously and ramp up military spending, this crisis could serve as a wake-up call—compelling European nations to prioritize naval modernization and preparedness. But so long as the U.S. continues to carry the weight of regional security, its allies will lack the incentive to step up.

The U.S. defense industrial base is already operating under intense strain due to overlapping global commitments. Continuing to sustain its current level of engagement in the Red Sea—on top of supporting Ukraine and guarding against escalation in other regions—is untenable. If the U.S. intends to remain a credible global power while addressing simultaneous crises, it must press for a more equitable distribution of responsibility within the transatlantic alliance. Europe has long benefited from the U.S.-led security architecture without matching its investment. A recalibrated burden-sharing agreement would not only ease the pressure on American forces but also raise the strategic credibility and readiness of Europe’s own militaries. Such a shift would foster a more balanced Western alliance—one in which each member fulfills its obligations and strengthens collective resilience in an increasingly unstable world.