The U.S. should back Japan in creating a NATO-style alliance in East Asia to counter China and replace outdated bilateral security arrangements.

Japan’s first female prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, and her party swept to a landslide victory in a snap election on February 8, securing a historic two-thirds supermajority. President Trump congratulated her, writing, “I wish you Great Success in passing your Conservative, Peace Through Strength Agenda.” Buoyed by broad public support, Prime Minister Takaichi visited the White House in March and met with President Trump to negotiate over East Asian security.

To advance the Takaichi agenda, the United States should do more than encourage Japan to increase defense spending and adopt a more assertive regional posture. It should also support Japan in establishing a NATO-type multilateral organization in East Asia. China has emerged as a regional hegemon, posing mounting threats to Taiwan, Japan, and other Indo-Pacific states. Confronting an increasingly assertive China will require more than bilateral ties; it will demand a coordinated, multilateral security architecture capable of preserving peace and stability across the region.

The United States forged bilateral alliances with Japan and other partners in the aftermath of World War II. These arrangements proved effective in their time, but the strategic landscape has shifted. Today, bilateral frameworks risk constraining Japan’s development as a fully capable defense actor and limit deeper cooperation among U.S. allies themselves. In a bilateral system, allies often lack the mechanisms to strengthen ties with one another independently, weakening collective resilience. The absence of a multilateral military organization in East Asia undermines the region’s ability to counterbalance a rising China.

As Ely Ratner, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, has argued, the current alliance architecture in Asia remains too informal to support the level of operational integration required among the United States, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. Moreover, bilateral arrangements offer little recourse when U.S. policy introduces friction, whether through tariffs, strategic ambiguity, or calls for uneven burden-sharing. As Japan’s rise continues and public opinion increasingly favors a more “normal” national role, the time has come to move beyond bilateralism toward a multilateral framework.

Japan has already demonstrated its capacity to lead in this direction. During former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s tenure, Tokyo advanced a series of multilateral initiatives, including the Indo-Pacific strategy, the Quad, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and its successor, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). In each case, Japan played a central and often indispensable role. In September 2024, former Prime Minister Ishiba further developed this vision in an op-ed for the Hudson Institute, proposing the creation of an “Asian NATO.” As he argued, “the absence of a collective self-defense system like NATO in Asia means that wars are more likely to break out because there is no obligation for mutual defense. Under these circumstances, the creation of an Asian version of NATO is essential to deter China from its Western allies.”

Japan is now seeking to assume greater international responsibility, counter China across both economic and security domains, and loosen the constraints imposed by legacy bilateral arrangements. As Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent observed, “when Japan is strong, the U.S. is strong in Asia.” Washington should not only acknowledge this shift but actively support Japan’s longstanding and increasingly forceful call for a NATO-type multilateral organization in the region.

Such an organization could include Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, and the United States. By pooling the strengths of these six actors, it would enable coordinated deterrence against China. Integrated command structures and joint operational capabilities would generate significant strategic synergy. Modeled on NATO’s Article 5, such an alliance could establish a credible collective defense commitment, discouraging any attempt by China to attack Taiwan or encroach upon the territories of East Asian states. The result would be a far more robust and reliable deterrence posture than what currently exists.

Within this framework, all member states would enjoy equal rights, strengthening the position of allies, including Japan, and addressing longstanding imbalances embedded in bilateral relationships. At the same time, the United States need not fear a loss of leadership. As with NATO, its status as a superpower would ensure it retains a leading role within the organization.

Critics caution that including Taiwan in such an alliance would provoke China. Yet precedent suggests a workable path forward. When former President Biden stated that the United States would defend Taiwan militarily, the State Department reaffirmed its commitment to the One China policy. Taiwan could participate in this multilateral organization as a non-state member, similar to its status in the World Trade Organization, while Washington continues to uphold its official policy framework.

It has now been 80 years since the end of World War II. The bilateral system, Japan’s status as a defeated nation, and the broader postwar order in East Asia are increasingly out of step with contemporary geopolitical realities. China, as a rising and assertive power, conducts near-daily military drills around Taiwan, and regional tensions continue to intensify. In this environment, incremental adjustments are no longer sufficient. Only a NATO-type multilateral organization in East Asia can provide the level of deterrence necessary to counter China, elevate Japan’s international standing, and secure lasting peace and stability in the region.