Nuclear deterrence is selectively vilified to serve Western and allied interests while ignoring broader regional realities and double standards.

Nuclear narratives are rarely neutral. In the global discourse on proliferation, the line between strategic realism and political bias is often blurred—especially when drawn by those already in possession of the world’s largest nuclear stockpiles. For much of the Global North, deterrence is a right reserved for themselves; for others, it is labeled a threat. This hypocrisy is not merely rhetorical—it undercuts the strategic autonomy of sovereign states like Pakistan and Iran and perpetuates an inequitable nuclear order.

There is no universally agreed-upon definition of a “rogue state.” The label is political—a cudgel wielded by global powers to delegitimize adversaries while shielding allies. Alexander Wendt once observed that 500 nuclear warheads in the United Kingdom pose no threat to the United States, but 50 warheads in North Korea are deemed an imminent danger. This double standard reveals the extent to which international “threats” are constructed, not absolute—sculpted by the interests of dominant powers, not shaped by consistent principles.

Against this backdrop, Sadanand Dhume’s recent column in The Wall Street Journal makes a provocative and troubling claim: that allowing Iran to develop nuclear weapons would repeat the “catastrophic mistake” of permitting Pakistan to go nuclear. The comparison is both ahistorical and analytically lazy. It brushes aside the complex strategic realities of South and West Asia, offering a view of regional security that is more ideological than informed.

To start with, Dhume’s treatment of Iran as an existential threat to regional security ignores the long track record of Israeli aggression. Since its founding in 1948, Israel has flouted international law and defied multiple UN Security Council resolutions—187, 194, and 2334 among them. It has repeatedly violated Article 2(4) of the UN Charter by infringing on the sovereignty of neighboring states, with little international consequence.

While Israel’s nuclear arsenal remains an open secret, its program has never been subjected to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, in defiance of UN Resolution 487. Nor has it signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran, by contrast, is an NPT signatory and has cooperated with the IAEA in allowing inspections of its civilian nuclear infrastructure. Despite this, Israel has repeatedly launched preemptive strikes against Iranian facilities and orchestrated assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists—tactics more befitting a rogue actor than a stable democracy.

Yet in Dhume’s narrative, Iran remains the villain. The irony is jarring. Even more so is his casual assertion that Pakistan’s nuclear program was born of deceit and linked to regional terrorism—a claim with little substantiated evidence and a glaring omission of geopolitical context.

Pakistan’s path to nuclear capability was reactive, not conspiratorial. Following India’s nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998—actions that drew minimal international sanction—Pakistan faced a strategic imperative. It had no choice but to develop its own credible deterrent to preserve national security. This was not brinkmanship; it was a matter of balance.

Since acquiring nuclear weapons, Pakistan has adhered to the principle of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), which has ironically stabilized the region more than it has destabilized it. India’s nuclear doctrine, by contrast, is riddled with aggressive signaling—publicized missile tests, the development of intercontinental ballistic and hypersonic missiles, and the adoption of preemptive strike postures. These actions have not only exacerbated regional tensions but have also largely gone unchallenged by the international community.

Pakistan maintains strict nuclear protocols aligned with IAEA safety standards. Its doctrine of credible minimum deterrence, with a full-spectrum response capability, is rooted in stability, not expansion. The country has made repeated commitments to nonproliferation and has steered clear of the kind of safety lapses that have marred India’s nuclear history.

That history is not without consequence. India’s record is checkered with radioactive leaks, reactor fires, and other critical safety incidents—Tarapur (1989, 1992), Narora (1993), Rajasthan (1992), Kaiga (2009), and Mayapuri (2010), to name a few. These episodes raise legitimate concerns about safety culture, regulatory oversight, and a lack of international transparency.

Dhume’s characterization of Pakistan’s arsenal as an “Islamic bomb” is particularly irresponsible. Such terminology isn’t just misleading—it is dangerous. It casts Muslim-majority states as inherently unstable or extremist, feeding Islamophobic and orientalist tropes that equate Muslim identity with terrorism. Meanwhile, nuclear weapons held by Israel, India, or the West are framed as rational, strategic, and defensive. This selective framing doesn’t just distort nuclear discourse—it widens civilizational rifts and erodes the foundations of global peace.

Equally flawed is Dhume’s invocation of the death toll from “Pakistan-backed” terrorism. His figure—4,000 deaths over three decades—ignores the far steeper price Pakistan has paid in its fight against terrorism. Since becoming a frontline state in the U.S.-led war on terror, Pakistan has lost over 100,000 civilians and security personnel to terrorism and endured 789 attacks in 2023 alone. Few nations have borne the brunt of militancy as Pakistan has. To suggest it sponsors the very phenomenon that has devastated it is a distortion of the highest order.

What Dhume presents as analysis is, in truth, an exercise in narrative warfare. His framing relies on half-truths, convenient omissions, and an uncritical embrace of Indian exceptionalism. It is not meant to inform—it is meant to persuade, to position India and Israel as natural partners in a Western security paradigm, while relegating Pakistan and Iran to the margins of legitimacy.

However, if history teaches us anything, it is that deterrence, when backed by responsibility and diplomacy, is effective. The selective outrage that colors Western and Indian narratives only serves to undermine that reality. By painting Pakistan and Iran as outliers while absolving allies of their excesses, commentators like Dhume perpetuate an unstable and unsustainable global order.

Portraying Iran as an existential threat may serve the short-term interests of Washington and Tel Aviv. It justifies regional interventions, bolsters security alliances, and provides a convenient pretext to secure Middle Eastern oil. But such narratives come at the cost of long-term peace.

In an increasingly polarized world, nuance is often the first casualty. Dhume’s piece is a case study in this dynamic. It fails not because of ideological leanings, but because it ignores the facts that complicate the narrative he wishes to sell. And in doing so, it contributes not to understanding, but to the very instability it claims to decry.