The Platform

MAKE YOUR VOICES HEARD!
Photo illustration by John Lyman

Despite being decades apart, the parallels between the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan are eerie.

Following World War II, the United States was entrenched in the Cold War with the Soviet Union for nearly four decades. This ideological battle frequently manifested as open, full-scale “hot wars,” the most impactful being the Vietnam War. The United States Foreign Service (USFS) played a pivotal role in justifying, initiating, and conducting American involvement in Vietnam. Yet, despite the decades that have passed and subsequent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the USFS has struggled to internalize the lessons of Vietnam, leading to repeated strategic and operational missteps.

The Vietnam War remains polarizing, interpreted variously as a tragic misstep in a civil conflict, a noble struggle against communism, or a hubristic and naive imperialist endeavor. Its origins lie in the 1954 Geneva Conference, which sought to unify Vietnam under elections anticipated to favor communist leader Ho Chi Minh. The USFS, under Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, opposed this resolution, opting instead to back Ngo Dinh Diem’s South Vietnamese regime. Guided by the Domino Theory—the USFS shaped its foreign policy to counter this perceived threat. The Strategic Hamlet Program of 1961, initiated under President Kennedy, sought to undermine communist insurgency but faltered due to Diem’s alienating policies. This failure precipitated a shift toward a “regime change” strategy, culminating in Diem’s assassination—an event that shocked but did not fundamentally alter USFS support for subsequent regimes.

Despite efforts to “win hearts and minds,” such initiatives floundered, and the USFS pivoted to direct military intervention. Following the Gulf of Tonkin incident, President Lyndon Johnson escalated U.S. involvement, deploying thousands of soldiers and framing the intervention as vital to halting communism’s spread across Asia. However, the Tet Offensive in 1968 irreversibly shifted public opinion, exposing the war’s staggering costs and strategic failures. President Richard Nixon’s strategy of “Vietnamization” aimed to shift the conflict’s burden onto South Vietnamese forces while pursuing diplomatic overtures with the Soviet Union and China. Yet, shifting justifications for continued involvement, coupled with the revelations of the My Lai Massacre and Pentagon Papers, further eroded public trust.

The Vietnam War’s aftermath profoundly influenced American foreign policy, often serving as a guide for what not to do. The 1973 War Powers Resolution sought to limit presidential authority in troop deployments, reflecting a broader reluctance to engage in Vietnam-like quagmires. The so-called “Vietnam Syndrome” curtailed U.S. interventions for decades, even as presidents like Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush attempted to redefine America’s military posture. This cautious ethos shaped the Gulf War’s swift conclusion and President Clinton’s restrained engagement in Kosovo.

The paradigm shifted with 9/11, the first direct attack on U.S. soil since Pearl Harbor. Traumatized, the nation rallied for a “war on terror” that seemed to transcend the ghosts of Vietnam. Initially targeted at the Taliban, the mission soon expanded to include democratization and the eradication of weapons of mass destruction—echoes of Vietnam’s nebulous and ever-changing objectives. The Afghanistan War, much like Vietnam, became a protracted conflict without clear goals, driven by moral imperatives and ideological battles. Both wars sought to “win hearts and minds” but entrenched opposition instead. Both relied on flawed allies and failed to communicate candidly with the American public. The chaotic 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan, with the Taliban’s return to power, drew stark comparisons to Saigon’s fall in 1975.

The parallels between Vietnam and Afghanistan underscore a failure to internalize key lessons. Both conflicts illustrate the perils of intervening in civil wars, backing unreliable partners, and pursuing shifting objectives. Despite the Vietnam War’s enduring legacy of promoting human rights and moral considerations in foreign policy, it should also be a cautionary tale. As Carl von Clausewitz asserted, war must always serve political objectives and remain subordinate to them.

The U.S. must apply the lessons of Vietnam and Afghanistan with precision. Military interventions should be precise in purpose, limited in scope, and supported by defined objectives. Freedom and human rights—while noble goals—are best pursued after clear victories, as the Marshall Plan demonstrates. By understanding the limits of its power and the complexities of foreign conflicts, the U.S. can chart a more effective and ethical path in international relations.

Saahith Reddy graduated from Detroit Country Day School. His interests include history, diplomacy, physics, engineering, and philanthropy.