In December 2024, rebel forces from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—once designated a terrorist organization—toppled the Assad regime, ending over two decades of brutal authoritarian rule in Syria. This seismic shift presents the United States with a rare and consequential opportunity: to reassert its influence in Syria and across the broader Middle East. To seize this moment, Washington must reconsider its designation of HTS as a terrorist group and begin engaging diplomatically with Syria’s emerging government. U.S. involvement could forestall the return of ISIS, curtail Russian influence, and help lay the foundation for regional stability and economic revival.

HTS, under the leadership of Ahmad al-Sharaa, now governs large portions of Syria. It has formed a provisional government, met with foreign diplomats, and launched a national police force. While HTS was once affiliated with al-Qaeda, Sharaa has insisted the group has broken with extremist ideologies and is committed to building an inclusive government that respects minority rights and religious freedoms. In a country still reeling from years of civil war and foreign intervention, the U.S. must weigh in—not necessarily to endorse, but to influence. Engagement does not require full endorsement, but it does offer the best chance for peace, democracy, or at minimum, a functioning state.

Yet the United States remains constrained by HTS’s 2016 designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). That label—rooted in the group’s extremist past and allegations of religious repression—has made it politically and legally difficult for Washington to work with the new Syrian leadership. Other international actors, including the United Kingdom and the United Nations, have begun to debate whether conditions now warrant removing HTS from their terror lists. The U.S., too, must now seriously consider the implications of holding onto outdated classifications that no longer reflect the group’s present posture.

HTS’s transformation is not just rhetorical. Since assuming power, it has maintained relative stability and curtailed violence. Its actions suggest a genuine attempt to transition from insurgency to governance. Lifting the terrorist designation would open the door to direct diplomacy. American NGOs, private enterprises, and government agencies could then interact with Syrian institutions without running afoul of federal law—allowing for targeted aid, infrastructure investment, and institutional support, all while advancing U.S. interests in the region.

Moreover, deeper engagement with Syria’s new rulers would act as a strategic counterweight to Russia. For over a decade, Moscow served as Assad’s chief patron, projecting power in the Levant through military bases and proxy forces. Assad’s fall has weakened Russia’s hand. If the United States steps into the void, it can limit Russian resurgence and assert a stabilizing influence.

More critically, U.S. engagement would hamper the resurgence of ISIS and other extremist groups. HTS, despite its origin story, has distanced itself from al-Qaeda and other radical Islamist factions. By forging ties with the new leadership, Washington can support counterterrorism operations that deny ISIS the space to rebuild. Declassification is not an endorsement of past conduct but an acknowledgment of political evolution—and an investment in future security.

The debate over redesignation is not occurring in isolation. The UK and the UN are publicly considering similar steps. Should the United States lead the way, it could do so from a position of strength—leveraging the decision to advance its long-term strategic aims in the region. Such a move would not absolve HTS of prior abuses, but it would create the leverage necessary to demand accountability, human rights protection, and political inclusivity in exchange for continued U.S. support.

Sanctions on the Assad regime would remain intact, serving as a clear warning to HTS: Syria cannot return to the politics of repression. If HTS hopes to rebuild Syria with international legitimacy, it must avoid the mistakes of both Assad’s tyranny and its own heavy-handed governance in Idlib. The U.S. has tools to incentivize reform—removing the terrorist label is one of them.

As HTS attempts to build a new government, the United States faces a choice. It can cling to obsolete definitions and watch Syria spiral back into chaos. Or it can engage with the new reality, recalibrate its policies, and help shape a post-Assad Syria. The stakes are high: preventing the rise of extremism, preserving regional stability, and advancing democratic governance in one of the world’s most fragile states. The U.S. should not squander this chance.