Irina Tsukerman, a New York-based human rights and national security attorney, brings a global perspective shaped by her expertise in international law, media strategy, and information warfare. As the editor-in-chief of The Washington Outsider, Tsukerman provides sharp analysis of geopolitical affairs while championing human rights advocacy. Her work has spanned critical regions, including the Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America.

In this interview, Tsukerman criticizes the international community’s chronic failure to uphold the laws of war, enforce the Geneva Conventions, or impose meaningful sanctions on human rights offenders. Layers of conflict complexity, rampant disinformation, and inadequate media coverage have all obstructed accountability efforts.

She draws particular attention to the harrowing abuses in Ukraine, marked by mass abductions and forced labor. Tsukerman juxtaposes these atrocities with Russia’s limited internal societal shifts, probing deeper issues like gender parity, demographic pressures, and the psychological state of authoritarian leaders.

The conversation delves into sanctions as a geopolitical tool and a stress test for global alliances, analyzing how BRICS nations navigate around such measures. Tsukerman also highlights the sociopolitical undercurrents—paranoia, regime health, and the erosion of democratic values—that shape the durability of autocratic and democratic systems. Above all, she underscores that long-term stability hinges on a commitment to equality and sustained civic engagement.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Irina Tsukerman is a New York-based attorney specializing in national security and human rights. She heads Rising Incorporated, a strategic advisory firm, and has been an active member of the bar since 2010 when she earned her Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law. Her work focuses on foreign affairs, Middle East policy, and international security.

Her insights have appeared in The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the Kyiv Post, and Trends Research & Advisory. The Jewish Week recognized Irina for her leadership as a “36 Under 36” honoree. She is multilingual and frequently pursues speaking, publishing, and collaboration opportunities.

Today, we’ll explore the situation in Ukraine. From an international law and human rights standpoint, how would you assess the scale of abuses since the start of the full-scale invasion and the adoption of United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1?

Irina Tsukerman: The situation regarding events unfolding in Ukraine has been extremely bleak, if not catastrophic. Reports estimate that over 90,000 Ukrainian casualties have occurred, although breaking these figures down is complex. These numbers are approximate and have been verified to an extent. Still, there are also unverified figures that could be significantly higher.

One of the most pressing yet underreported issues, beyond the sheer number of those killed or wounded, is the mass abduction of individuals to Russia. While some attention has been given to the forced abduction of children, with several thousand cases documented, reports suggest that over 400,000 individuals, including adults, have been forcibly relocated to Russia. Many are believed to have been sent to Siberia or other remote regions, potentially in work camp-like conditions.

There is also evidence indicating that some of these individuals may have been victims of human trafficking. Additionally, there are unsubstantiated but persistent allegations of illegal organ harvesting and extrajudicial killings. It has been extraordinarily difficult to confirm these claims due to the lack of access and transparency, but what is known is that large-scale forced displacement and ethnic cleansing have taken place.

While there have been limited mediation efforts resulting in the liberation of some abducted children, there has been no comparable progress for the disappeared adults. Their fate remains unknown, with little information available. The Ukrainian government has been preoccupied with immediate and critical needs—primarily military operations and basic humanitarian aid—leaving limited resources for addressing the issue of missing individuals.

Jacobsen: Are there reports from individuals who escaped these conditions and shared their experiences? Do we have better insights into where these abducted civilians might have been taken? Are there overlooked stories or regions that independent researchers should investigate?

Tsukerman: Some of the abducted children have returned and provided testimony about their experiences. However, regarding the adults, the lack of focus and resources on this issue means their stories, if any exist, remain largely untold. I haven’t heard of any clear accounts.

Many of them are believed to have been taken to Siberia and may still be there—at least those who survived the journey. That’s why I’m emphasizing this as one of the lesser-discussed stories. Moving people across such vast territories, under heavy guard, and to remote regions of the country makes it incredibly difficult for them to escape. Unless there is a formal exchange, getting back is nearly impossible.

These civilians, not formal prisoners of war, might be exchanged through official mediation channels. The abducted civilians are being treated entirely outside the protections of international law.

There have been well-documented massacres and accounts of torture. Still, the challenge lies in documenting who was involved, how it was carried out, and who is ultimately responsible. The chaotic conditions on the ground make it extremely difficult to gather clear evidence. Any proper investigation of such crimes requires direct access to the crime scene, the perpetrators, and witnesses—none of which has been easily accessible.

This war has created a uniquely fluid and dynamic environment where events unfold rapidly, making it hard to trace exactly what happens in each case. What’s clear is that their soldiers have been indoctrinated. Many of them have been actively encouraged to participate in atrocities, fostering a different mindset compared to the 2014 invasion, which was more of a conventional military takeover.

The level of brutality and butchery we’re seeing now signifies a far greater degree of dehumanization. Over the last decade, this has escalated significantly, creating conditions where such atrocities are far more likely to occur.

Jacobsen: What evidence exists regarding human rights abuses in Ukraine’s territories currently occupied by Russian forces?

Tsukerman: Yes. In the occupied territories, civilians have been increasingly lied to and misled. They were promised that their humanitarian needs would be met. Still, their resources have been systematically confiscated over time, leaving them in dire conditions.

These civilians are essentially stuck in dehumanizing circumstances. They’ve become more like indentured servants than citizens. They are treated worse than the average Russian Federation citizen, who is already subjected to significant rights limitations. People in the occupied territories are treated as second or even third-class individuals.

Their property has been confiscated for war purposes, and their civil and economic rights are increasingly disregarded. As a result, many are facing severe financial losses and economic destitution. They’ve also been exploited for propaganda purposes. Now, with the mounting hardships of war, these individuals are seen as disposable by the occupying forces.

Jacobsen: I’ve spoken with displaced residents of Kharkiv, and it remains the most remarkable city I’ve visited in Ukraine. I recall telling my colleague, Remus Cernea—a former leader of Romania’s Green Party and now, unexpectedly, a freelance war correspondent for Newsweek Romania—that it would be tragic if Kharkiv or its oblast were to be destroyed. The city’s architecture is uniquely Eastern European, embodying a cultural depth transcending political or historical divides. Losing that heritage would be deeply painful.

Shifting focus, what is the state of internal human rights within Russia under Putin’s administration? How are violations being addressed, particularly concerning soldiers who desert or citizens who openly protest the regime?

Tsukerman: Incidentally, that’s where I was born. Those situations are incredibly dangerous. Deserting soldiers or protesters face immediate and severe consequences. In Russia, during wartime, it’s not uncommon for deserters to be shot on sight. Many Russian soldiers who try to desert often aim to defect instead, knowing that if they are caught fleeing, they can be executed. By defecting to Ukrainian forces, they might secure basic POW protections or even the chance to fight for Ukraine, which is far preferable to being killed.

There are also reports of systematic physical abuse against soldiers who disobey orders or make mistakes. Their superiors have beaten some, and there are even stories of soldiers retaliating by killing their commanders after being forced to commit brutal acts or thrown into hopeless situations. These soldiers have been lied to, manipulated, and sent into battle with little to no equipment. They’re essentially being used as cannon fodder in wave attacks against Ukraine. While these attacks sometimes advance the offensive, they result in massive casualties among poorly equipped and poorly trained troops.

There is a clear and troubling pattern. Many recruits come from ethnic minority regions in the peripheral territories of Russia rather than Moscow or Saint Petersburg. These areas are already subject to systemic discrimination, and the people there are viewed as expendable. There’s a stark imbalance in the number of ethnic minorities being sent to fight compared to ethnic Russians from major urban centers.

In the past, the Russian government tried to compensate the families of soldiers killed in action. Still, these payments have decreased or ceased as the economy deteriorates. Authorities have also been reported to have confiscated money from private bank accounts above certain limits, which leaves people with no incentive to save. Instead, they are forced to hide their money or invest it elsewhere to avoid being seized for war efforts.

Jacobsen: The global response was swift during the first ten days of the full-scale invasion. The United Nations General Assembly’s 11th Emergency Special Session condemned Russia’s aggression with a 141-to-5 vote, calling for troop withdrawal and the return of annexed territory. Since then, how has the international community maintained pressure? Are these continued appeals effective when confronting a nation as prominent as Russia?

Tsukerman: No. They have not been effective, mainly because one of the permanent, veto-carrying members of the UN Security Council is China, which has essentially backed Russia every step of the way. The other veto-holding country is Russia, which, of course, will not vote against its actions.

Both countries have been actively lobbying other nations, particularly those in the Global South, former Soviet bloc states, and former colonies, to secure political support. They’ve also focused on cultivating practical cooperation through mechanisms such as sanctions evasion, trade agreements, and political arrangements.

For instance, many countries have outright disregarded the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin. Countries such as Mongolia and Afghanistan, among others, have indicated that they would not comply with such an order. Meanwhile, Russia and Iran have strengthened their bilateral ties, creating financial structures and mechanisms to bypass international sanctions. The BRICS bloc has also been a critical resource for sanctions-busting efforts.

Its primary effectiveness has been facilitating sanctions evasion and providing a platform for technology sharing and transfer within its member states. Beyond that, it hasn’t achieved much on other fronts. However, it has allowed Russia to exploit export-import controls and trade agreement loopholes. Initially, Russia relied heavily on discounted oil sales to countries like India, which helped sustain its economy. However, as caps on Russian oil imports were imposed and pressure from other countries increased, India began shifting its focus to Gulf states for oil supplies.

As a result, Russia’s value as a supplier has diminished. Now, Russia is circumventing energy sanctions by diluting its oil with other types of oil in places like Singapore and Saudi Arabia. When mixed with fuel from other sources, it becomes difficult to trace the origin, enabling Russia to sell the oil under the radar.

Jacobsen: Regarding broader strategy, how impactful have diplomatic and economic pressures on Russia been? Has the UN exerted meaningful influence on the situation?

Tsukerman: The UN’s political pressure has been largely symbolic and ineffective. Russian officials’ high-level visits to other countries have continued unabated. Russia has maintained its ability to negotiate contracts and secure deliveries in developing countries.

For example, Russia is still working on large-scale projects like civil nuclear reactors in Egypt and Turkey. It has also managed to leverage trade hubs in countries like Kyrgyzstan, which serve as intermediaries for trade with the European Union. In essence, Russia has used its diplomatic and economic relationships to turn the situation to its advantage, even under significant international sanctions.

The sanctions, in general, have not been entirely effective. For example, the U.S. never implemented sanctions on aluminum and other metals from Russia. Until recently, the EU didn’t address these areas either, which led to a doubling of Russian metal imports in the second year of the war. So, as you can see, the sanctions regime is full of loopholes. Political commentary becomes meaningless when ongoing political, diplomatic, economic, and social mechanisms allow normal relations to persist.

Jacobsen: Pew Research projects that Russia’s population could shrink by 25 million by mid-century—a demographic crisis with significant geopolitical ramifications. What challenges do economies face when experiencing such a drastic population decline over a single generation? Given Russia’s reliance on oil and gas revenues, how do sanctions and the workarounds utilized by BRICS nations affect the Federation’s long-term stability and adherence to international norms?

Tsukerman: That’s precisely why they’ve been importing Ukrainians—essentially as forced labour to extract energy, metals, and other natural resources. This has provided them with a source of free or near-free labour. Additionally, Russia may need to rely on Chinese workers in the future, particularly in the Far East, where there are historical territorial disputes. This creates a precarious dynamic, as some of that land originally belonged to China.

Russia has a serious demographic problem. However, due to automation in extraction industries and reliance on cheap foreign labour, the Kremlin is far more focused on immediate gains for the elites than on the country’s long-term viability. It prioritizes extracting as much wealth as possible in the short term while consolidating power.

That’s why many of Russia’s elites have moved their wealth abroad or attempted to secure assets elsewhere to the extent possible. This has created controversy around Western sanctions, such as confiscating assets and their subsequent use for Ukraine’s military or loan repayments. While Russia’s long-term economic prospects are grim, the Kremlin is attempting to mitigate this by exploiting foreign labour and resources to maximize short-term gains.

Jacobsen: What are the prospects for peace—or prolonged conflict—if Trump regains the U.S. presidency? How might the growing influence of conservative and libertarian movements in the West shape future diplomatic efforts?

Tsukerman: Trump is likely to push for some “frozen conflict” or a deal that benefits Russia, as his instincts and advisers—like Tucker Carlson—favour such approaches. However, Russia has consistently rejected even favourable peace proposals. This could force Trump’s hand, requiring him to pressure Russia because their refusal to cooperate would make it impossible for him to present a deal as a political victory.

The Russian administration has painted itself into a corner. They have made any reasonable compromise impossible, hastily committing to antagonism. Even if certain agreements would ultimately benefit its geopolitical objectives, it has become trapped by the need to maintain credibility domestically and internationally.

Jacobsen: Have there been any notable shifts in the stance of European populist parties regarding Russia? Are these movements influencing their nations’ foreign policies or support structures?

Tsukerman: Yes, dissatisfaction is growing. Populist parties in Europe that have ties to Russia are losing traction. For example, we’ve seen changes in public opinion in Switzerland and Slovakia. Even Viktor Orbán, a long-time supporter of closer ties with Russia, is losing popularity in Hungary. This signals a broader shift as European populations grow increasingly wary of leaders associated with Russian policies.

AfD in Germany is highly unlikely to gain significant political control, even with efforts like Musk’s to influence the landscape. Nigel Farage, too, has had to moderate his rhetoric on Russia following the invasion in 2022. He’s stepped back from some of his previous positions. Similarly, the Reform Party in the UK is not gaining the votes needed to dominate the political landscape.

In the short term, these parties don’t have a bright future. People are starting to see that they don’t deliver tangible results, and the ultimate beneficiary of their rhetoric appears to be Putin, not the average citizen.

Jacobsen: With Russia losing economic leverage, do populist movements or other actors propose viable long-term visions for their countries?

Tsukerman: There’s very little they can offer. From the average citizen’s perspective, aligning with Russia doesn’t provide economic or political benefits. A pro-Western stance offers far more opportunities.

China might capitalize on this situation and push its agenda. Still, even China is experiencing significant internal financial problems. Its ability to expand influence as it once did is increasingly limited. The more isolated China becomes, the harder it will be to project economic power abroad, mainly because it is losing foreign direct investment.

While domestic investors might inject more capital in the short term, there’s only so much they can do. Suppose Western countries take stronger measures to protect their intellectual property and decouple technologically from China. In that case, the long-term outlook for China will become bleak.

Yes, China has made significant investments in areas like AI, supported by the intellectual groundwork laid in the past. However, if the West becomes more serious about technological independence, China will struggle to maintain its current trajectory.

Jacobsen: Russia and China both face medium- and long-term demographic challenges. However, China’s larger population provides it with more resilience. Declining birth rates, driven by evolving social trends, are a critical concern for both nations. In many cases, women attain higher education and career opportunities than men, leading women and men to forgo parenthood. Meanwhile, autocratic regimes often curtail gender equality, further alienating their populations and exacerbating demographic decline. How do xenophobic policies and gender parity issues affect the longevity of such regimes?

Tsukerman: Xenophobia plays a significant role in both Russia and China, though in different ways. In Russia, there’s a marked ethnic divide, while in China, it manifests in crackdowns on groups like the Uyghurs. These policies deepen societal fractures, making long-term unity under these regimes more difficult.

Gender parity issues further complicate the situation. When people feel disenfranchised—whether due to gender inequality or ethnic discrimination—they become less invested in their communities and the state itself.

It all ties back to a broader nihilistic view of the future. If people have no hope for their futures, they’re unlikely to invest in their communities or feel loyalty to the state, leading to societal decay.

For example, in Russia, there’s a massive AIDS epidemic—not because of a lack of education or access to medical care, but because people don’t care. When basic infrastructure and hope are absent, it’s impossible to foster the kind of societal loyalty or stability needed for long-term autocratic or oligarchic governance.

There’s also a high rate of alcoholism in Russia, driven by this pervasive social nihilism and a complete lack of optimism about the future. It seems like people are, in a way, slowly killing themselves prematurely. Women in Russia, and to some extent in China, remain in highly subservient positions. While there are a few high-profile figures—such as top propagandists or the wives of state officials—paraded around, domestic abuse is rampant.

In addition, there’s a high maternal mortality rate, and child mortality rates remain significant, even though women are being pressured or compelled to reproduce more. The outlook for families in these countries, especially when they lack essential opportunities, is bleak. Yes, in the West, people may choose not to have large families. Still, the rate of societal deterioration is far more severe in countries where the state has no genuine interest in the well-being of its people.

The misogynistic and anti-family attitudes in these regimes make it clear that it’s not about supporting families—it’s about producing new soldiers for the regime or servants for the state. If you’re giving birth to children only to see them drafted into war later, there’s little incentive to want to build a family. So, despite all the propaganda about alleged Western depravity and corruption, the West offers far better conditions for building families than Russia or China.

Jacobsen: Let’s consider a cultural parallel. During my tenure with Humanists International—where I served as Secretary General—I visited Iceland. What struck me was how deeply gender parity was embedded in daily life, even in blue-collar settings. In Reykjavik, for example, social norms in bars were simple: regardless of gender, if you were interested in someone, you’d buy them a drink. There was no pressure for one gender to pay over the other.

In contrast, many working-class communities in North America still adhere to traditional expectations, where men are expected to pay.

Setting aside East-West divisions or the Russia-Ukraine conflict, what lessons can a country like Iceland—hailed by the World Economic Forum as the most gender-equal nation for over a decade—offer regarding the role of gender parity in sustaining governance, whether democratic or authoritarian?

Tsukerman: You’re right to highlight the importance of investing in gender parity for sustainable populations and governance. However, we need to consider Iceland’s context. Its population ranges from 250,000 to 300,000, about the size of a medium city in the United States. Because of its small population, it isn’t easy to make broad extrapolations for larger societies.

That said, Iceland is an interesting case study in social cohesion. Its relatively homogenous culture makes it easier for people to share norms, feel comfortable, and maintain gender-equal practices. Scandinavian and Scandinavian-adjacent cultures tend to be highly conformist, reinforcing these shared values.

However, applying Iceland’s example to much larger or more diverse nations, like Russia or China, becomes significantly more challenging. These countries face deeper structural and cultural barriers to gender equality. While Iceland’s model is valuable as an experiment, its scalability is limited when dealing with nations with millions—or even billions—of people.

Once something becomes the norm in one community, it can affect society, making everyone feel more comfortable. That dynamic might not hold in more heterogeneous societies, where different cultures have varying social expectations.

Interestingly, the war in Ukraine has pushed women to the forefront—not just in their professional or social functions but also in combat roles, on par with men. This is a unique situation. Even in Israel, where women have long participated in the military, the number of women in active combat roles has historically been much smaller.

What we’re seeing in Ukraine is unprecedented. Women are now participating in combat positions in numbers comparable to men, which is not the traditional role for women in war. Historically, women played supporting roles during wars or took over positions vacated by men. But this time, because Ukraine faces an existential threat and doesn’t have enough people, women are on the front lines.

This will likely affect gender dynamics, societal relations, and the country’s rebuilding process. The constant state of “fighting mode” is reshaping traditional roles and fostering a sense of equality, camaraderie, and informality in social interactions—similar to what’s observed in Iceland but driven by entirely different circumstances.

In Russia, women play significant roles as propagandists and local supporters of the war effort. Still, their overall societal roles haven’t shifted due to men being sent to war. The traditional dynamic remains essentially unchanged. Men are still drafted and sent to the front lines, while women continue in their supporting roles.

Jacobsen: Does the age and health of world leaders influence geopolitical decision-making? Zelensky starkly contrasts older leaders like Putin, Trump, Xi Jinping, and Orbán.

Age, combined with health factors such as obesity, can shape leadership approaches. Many male leaders, particularly in Russia, have shorter life expectancies due to poor health habits, stress, and substance use.

How might these conditions impact their choices or urgency to secure a lasting legacy? Could this explain risk-taking behavior, such as launching wars or pursuing aggressive policies in their twilight years?

Tsukerman: Many of these leaders also have the resources to extend their lifespans well beyond what would normally be expected for someone in their demographic. They have access to the best healthcare, advanced medical treatments, and ways to mitigate some factors that shorten life expectancy.

Even so, the average man in Russia or China in their age group—without their level of wealth—would not live very long under similar conditions of obesity, unhealthy habits, and extreme stress. These realities underscore the psychological and geopolitical calculations that may come into play as leaders approach the later stages of their lives.

Life can be good for a dictator if they manage to avoid being poisoned or killed. Theoretically, they can enjoy their wealth and protect themselves far beyond what’s possible for an average person. Take Putin, for instance: His paranoia about COVID-19 led him to take extreme measures to avoid exposure.

By contrast, leaders like Trump, who also contracted COVID, received treatment and remained active and publicly visible afterward. Similarly, Biden and other officials didn’t wholly isolate themselves. They maintained public appearances and stayed relatively engaged. Putin, on the other hand, was the opposite. He was, and remains, highly paranoid—not just about germs but also about potential assassination attempts, including the possibility of radiation exposure or other threats.

This level of paranoia is typical for authoritarian rulers. On the one hand, it drives them to take extreme precautions to ensure their safety. Still, on the other hand, it’s incredibly stressful. The constant fear of betrayal, illness, or attack undoubtedly takes a toll on their mental and physical health.

Dictators like Putin accumulate immense wealth, wield enormous power, and enjoy extravagant lifestyles, but they are also deeply invested in prolonging their lives. Despite nuclear threats and rhetoric, these leaders don’t want to die. They want to preserve their legacy, enjoy their wealth, and maintain their grip on power for as long as possible.

For example, Putin lives in an opulent palace with thousands of rooms. This isn’t the behaviour of someone who expects or plans to die soon. His actions suggest he is doing everything possible to extend his lifespan and safeguard his position.

Jacobsen: Thank you for your time, Irina.