It comes as little surprise that Iran and Russia are deeply unsettled by the rapid changes unfolding in Syria over the past two weeks. Both countries have long invested heavily in maintaining Bashar al-Assad’s rule, seeing his regime as a lynchpin of their strategic influence in the region. Assad’s fall represents a significant blow to their geopolitical interests, though the responses of the two allies have diverged sharply. Russia’s reaction to the new Syrian leadership has been calculated and reserved, while Iran’s approach reveals a more fraught mix of ideological rigidity and diplomatic uncertainty.

There are already signs that Russia may be seeking to recalibrate its strategy. Speculation has emerged about Moscow’s interest in removing Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) from its terror list to negotiate terms that would allow it to maintain a military presence in Syria. In contrast, Iran’s position remains opaque, caught in a tug-of-war between the cautious statements of its foreign ministry and the hardline rhetoric emanating from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. This contradiction is emblematic of Tehran’s broader challenges in adapting to Syria’s new political reality.

When HTS forces advanced rapidly on Damascus, Iran’s foreign minister struck a conciliatory tone, declaring that Tehran would support any outcome endorsed by the Syrian people. Yet just three days after Assad’s ouster, Khamenei delivered a pointed defense of Iran’s support for Assad, framing it as part of a larger struggle against terrorism and Israeli aggression. Without acknowledging the widespread Syrian support for HTS, he placed the blame for Assad’s fall squarely on Israel, the United States, and Turkey. Although his remarks reflected deep skepticism toward HTS’s rise, he notably refrained from branding the group as a terrorist organization. Khamenei’s statements stood in stark contrast to the more measured tone taken by President Masoud Pezeshkian, who projected a willingness to engage with Syria’s new leadership during the D-8 meetings in Cairo earlier this month.

Iran’s state-controlled media, largely silent prior to Khamenei’s December 11 speech, quickly rallied behind his message. A cascade of anti-HTS and anti-Turkey commentary followed, including direct criticism of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. If this posture of defiance continues, Iran risks making one of its most consequential foreign policy mistakes in recent years.

The collapse of the Assad regime has dealt a severe blow to Iran’s Axis of Resistance strategy. Yet antagonizing Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham could exacerbate the damage to Tehran’s regional influence. Iran must reckon with the stark reality that it lacks the capacity to meaningfully intervene in Syria without the cooperation of its new rulers. Its forces and civilian personnel were evacuated under Russian auspices, leaving Tehran without a foothold for further engagement. Iran can no longer count on material support from allies like Hezbollah, and even Russia appears to be pivoting toward a pragmatic accommodation of the new Syrian regime. Meanwhile, in Iraq—another key theater for Iranian influence—Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani has backed Syria’s political transition and curbed the activities of pro-Iran militias to prevent interference in Syria.

A confrontational stance toward HTS risks closing the narrow window of opportunity for rapprochement that remains. Mohammed al-Julani, HTS’s leader, has thus far signaled openness to dialogue, and Russia has indicated its interest in renegotiating its naval presence in Tartus under the new government. By clinging to its hostility, Iran could alienate potential partners at a critical juncture.

Tehran’s combative rhetoric also threatens to destabilize its relationship with Turkey, a regional power emboldened by Assad’s fall. Turkey has emerged as a key supporter of Syria’s new leadership and is unlikely to tolerate Iranian interference. Diplomatic tensions between the two countries have already flared, with high-profile exchanges of criticism in the media. Should these frictions escalate, it is Iran—isolated and economically strained—that stands to lose the most.

The risks extend further. Hostility toward Syria’s new regime could undercut Iran’s efforts to rebuild its relationships with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The Gulf Cooperation Council has embraced Syria’s political transition, with countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE poised to invest in reconstruction efforts. For Saudi Arabia, a stable Syria aligned with mainstream Arab interests is a strategic priority. Tehran’s recent overtures to Riyadh and Cairo, including President Pezeshkian’s visit to Egypt, could unravel if Iran’s approach to Syria is perceived as antagonistic.

Beyond the region, Iran’s actions in Syria could draw sharp rebukes from the United States and Europe. Washington has cautiously welcomed Syria’s new leadership and remains invested in its stability. Any Iranian attempts to destabilize Syria are likely to prompt a strong response, potentially in the form of heightened economic sanctions or tacit support for Israeli military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities. With the incoming Trump administration signaling a more aggressive posture toward Tehran, the risks to Iran’s already fragile economy and political stability are mounting.

Despite these challenges, it is uncertain whether Iran’s leadership can adapt to the new realities in Syria. President Pezeshkian and other moderate voices may push for pragmatism, advocating for a strategic recalibration. But Ayatollah Khamenei’s ideological commitment to the Axis of Resistance has often overridden practical considerations. Unless the survival of Iran’s Islamic regime is directly at stake, Khamenei appears unwilling to abandon his doctrinal approach to foreign policy.

For Iran, the stakes in Syria extend far beyond its borders. The choices Tehran makes in the coming weeks will not only shape its influence in the region but also test its capacity to reconcile ideological commitments with pragmatic realities.