Eric Kaufmann (@epkaufm) is a distinguished scholar and thought leader whose work explores the intersection of politics, culture, and identity. He is currently a Professor of Politics at the University of Buckingham and directs the Centre for Heterodox Social Science.

Kaufmann graduated from the University of Western Ontario and earned his Master’s and PhD at the London School of Economics. His academic journey includes positions as a Lecturer at the University of Southampton and Birkbeck, University of London. From 2008 to 2009, he was a stipendiary Fellow at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government.

Kaufmann is the author of numerous books, including Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration, and the Future of White Majorities, The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America, and Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth? His forthcoming book is Taboo: How Making Race Sacred Produced a Cultural Revolution. He has also authored opinion pieces in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Times of London, Newsweek, National Review, New Statesman, Financial Times, and UnHerd.

Beyond academia, Kaufmann is affiliated with esteemed think tanks and institutions, including the Manhattan Institute, Policy Exchange, the Center for the Study of Partisanship and Ideology, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, and the University of Austin. His research delves deeply into pressing issues such as immigration, ethnic change, and national identity, illuminating the cultural and psychological drivers behind populist movements. He offers nuanced perspectives on white identity, nationalism, and supremacy, advocating for open and balanced dialogue to mitigate polarization.

In his reflections, Kaufmann has tackled a broad spectrum of topics—from the challenges of modern journalism to the resilience of Ukraine and the pressures facing liberal democracy in an era of suppressed debates. His work underscores the importance of fostering resilient, inclusive discussions as society grapples with complex and often contentious issues.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: What inspired you to write Whiteshift in 2018? What are the fundamental value conflicts in these conversations on majority-minority dynamics? Considering the taboos you address, where should such discussions begin?

Eric Kaufmann: The first thing to note is that I’ve studied the intersection of immigration, ethnic change, and national identity since my Master’s degree in 1994. My PhD at the London School of Economics, my first book, examined immigration and ethnic change in the U.S. during its transformation from a predominantly WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) country to a majority-white nation that included Catholics and Jews. That’s where it stands today. I was particularly interested in the decline of the WASP phenomenon. My work then covered developments up to around 2004, when Samuel Huntington published Who Are We? and Pat Buchanan gained attention for his political campaigns.

At the time, the big question was: How is it possible that there hasn’t been an anti-immigrant nationalist-populist movement in the U.S.? This topic was of considerable interest in the mid-2000s. It wasn’t until Donald Trump’s campaign that such a movement emerged.

When it happened, many people following these developments said, “There it is.” However, I had already studied and written about these topics for years. Then, of course, the populist moment arrived. In 2014, during the European Parliament elections, we saw the beginning of this shift.

That election marked the emergence of three parties gaining close to 30% of the vote: the Danish People’s Party, the National Front in France, and the UK Independence Party. What started happening around 2014 was an increase in asylum seekers and immigration in Europe, peaking during the migrant crisis in late 2015. This crisis led to the rise of significant populist parties in unexpected places like Sweden and Germany. Later, we saw figures like Matteo Salvini in Italy and the rise of Vox in Spain, along with other movements in Europe. While Italy already had the Northern League, many of these movements were entirely new phenomena.

Meanwhile, Trump emerged as the only one among 17 primary Republican candidates willing to make immigration his signature issue—not just focusing on the border but making immigration central to his platform. That was particularly taboo, even within the Republican Party. Trump’s rhetoric, including inflammatory comments about rapists crossing the border, broke with convention. Brexit followed shortly afterward, and then Trump’s eventual election victory.

This past decade has been pivotal. Since then, we’ve seen the influence of events like COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine, which have added new layers to populist and nationalist movements worldwide.

Those events led to a dip because attention shifted from migration to health and the economy. However, migration and related topics are now back and stronger than they have probably ever been. We’ve essentially had a decade of populist movements.

What’s particularly interesting is that economic factors do not easily explain this phenomenon. While there are tens of thousands of academic papers and many books on the subject, my argument has always been that this is fundamentally psychological and cultural, not economic. If we want to explain these dynamics, pointing to financial crises or deindustrialization is inaccurate. These explanations fail to capture the sociological and psychological contrasts between how people perceive white identity versus white nationalism.

Jacobsen: Could you delve into the distinction between white identity and white nationalism? How are they similar, and where do they diverge?

Kaufmann: Absolutely. Let’s clarify the terms because they’re often conflated. Nationalism, broadly speaking, refers to territoriality. For example, the southern U.S. under slavery was not white nationalist because it deliberately maintained a multicultural society, albeit one based on inequality and exploitation. Plantation owners had no desire for the Black population to leave because their economic system depended on enslaved labour.

In contrast, the vision of the northern U.S. during that era leaned toward what could be described as white nationalism. Many in the North supported the idea of “free soil.” Essentially, they argued that enslaved people should be emancipated and then repatriated to Africa. They argued that society could not function without slavery. Still, their vision often involved racial homogeneity rather than coexistence.

This distinction is important: white nationalism is about securing a white ethnostate characterized by homogeneity, whereas white supremacy typically operates within a multicultural society marked by systemic inequality. Multicultural inequality and white nationalism are fundamentally different societal structures.

Jacobsen: How do these distinctions manifest in public discourse across the political spectrum? Are there consistent patterns in how they are debated or misunderstood?

Kaufmann: There’s a tendency, especially in public and political discussions, to lump white identity, white supremacy, and white nationalism together. Each of these concepts is distinct, yet they’re often conflated.

On the cultural left, for instance, there’s a valid critique that pursuing an ethnostate—a racially pure society—is inherently racist. History shows us that such pursuits lead to horrific consequences like ethnic cleansing. That’s a fair and important point.

However, the problem arises when all expressions of white identity are lumped in with white nationalism or white supremacy. White supremacy, for example, is largely a feature of a multiethnic society, where one group dominates others within a system of inequality. This is distinct from white nationalism, which seeks to establish a homogenous ethnostate.

Meanwhile, white identity, at its core, is no different from other racial identities, such as Black identity or Hispanic identity. People identifying with their racial or cultural group isn’t inherently problematic. Yet, it often gets conflated with extremist ideologies, which leads to unnecessary polarization.

Jacobsen: Where do you identify valid points and common misconceptions in these discussions? What nuances often get overlooked?

Kaufmann: A valid point from the cultural left is the recognition that racial purity as a goal is unacceptable and has historically led to atrocities. That’s an important critique. However, on the cultural right, there’s also a valid observation that recognizing white identity doesn’t inherently equate to supporting white nationalism or white supremacy. This distinction often gets lost in broader public discourse, resulting in oversimplification and, in some cases, unjust labeling of individuals or groups.

When you examine the survey data, Ashley Jardina’s book White Identity Politics highlights this dynamic. She found that 45% to 65% of white Americans consider their white identity to be meaningful to some degree. Evidence of this can also be seen in patterns of behaviour, such as whom people choose to marry and where they choose to live. There is clear sorting that takes place. For example, areas that were predominantly white in 2011, where whites make up a significant majority of the population, tend to experience a net increase in their white population. Places like Boise, Idaho, and Portland, Oregon, are examples.

By contrast, areas where whites are a minority—such as Greater Los Angeles or San Francisco—tend to see a net decrease in their white population over time. These patterns hold at a large scale and at the neighbourhood level. The same dynamics are observable in other countries, such as Sweden, Britain, and Canada.

Intermarriage data reflects similar patterns. Take Canada, for instance, which does not share the same historical context as the U.S. In cities like Toronto or Vancouver, where roughly half the population is white—perhaps slightly less now—the rate of marriages crossing racial lines is around 8% to 10%. While this is significant, it’s far below the 50% rate that would occur if people were paired randomly. This suggests that de facto white identity persists, though it’s not inherently abnormal or something to be condemned outright.

Jacobsen: What drives the significance of white identity for some individuals? Is it rooted in cultural, historical, or psychological factors?

Kaufmann: The strongest predictor of the importance of white identity to someone is their attachment to ancestry. For example, suppose someone feels strongly connected to their Italian or Irish heritage. In that case, they are more likely to feel attached to being white than someone who doesn’t feel a strong connection to their ancestry. It’s like an outer layer of identity, similar to how attachment to being Mexican often correlates with attachment to being Hispanic.

Importantly, attachment to white identity is not necessarily associated with hostility toward other groups. Jardina’s book and the psychology literature emphasize that attachment and hatred are separate dispositions. They only overlap in contexts of zero-sum conflict, whether violent or political.

For instance, the American National Election Study shows a clear zero-sum relationship between partisanship: the warmer Republicans feel toward their party, the colder they tend to think toward Democrats. However, regarding racial identity, the data tells a different story. White Americans who feel warmth toward whites on a 0–100 scale are, if anything, slightly warmer toward Black and Hispanic people than whites who feel colder toward their racial group. This isn’t the same zero-sum relationship that we see with political partisanship.

Jacobsen: Why do discussions about white identity so often devolve into toxicity? What structural or cultural forces contribute to this?

Kaufmann: Part of the issue is the conflation of white identity with white nationalism and white supremacy. While there’s some overlap, these are distinct concepts. White identity reflects a sense of connection to one’s racial group, which is no different from the identity seen among Asians or Hispanics. White nationalism, by contrast, seeks to create an ethnostate, and white supremacy involves systemic domination within a multicultural society. These distinctions often get lost, leading to misunderstandings.

It’s also worth noting that not everyone has a strong white identity. Just as not everyone feels deeply connected to their extended family, not all white people find their racial identity meaningful. However, it’s not necessarily unhealthy or harmful for those who do.

Jacobsen: The tension between individual and group identity seems pivotal here. People experience varying levels of warmth or detachment toward their own group or others, and these feelings often depend on context and personality. While many discussions focus on group dynamics, individual experiences frequently deviate from collective narratives. In diverse, liberal societies, how do individuals typically reconcile the tensions between personal and collective identities?

Kaufmann: That’s a fascinating question. There’s a strong narrative around colour blindness, for example, but it has different interpretations. On the one hand, colour blindness can mean treating people equally, regardless of their skin colour, which aligns with the classical liberal ideal of equal treatment. On the other hand, if colour blindness means ignoring or discouraging identification with a racial or ethnic group, it becomes problematic. Some people will feel strongly connected to their group identity, while others won’t, and neither should be stigmatized.

Of course, any of these ideas that are taken to an extreme can become harmful. When discussing individual identity, we need to clarify what we mean. Does it refer to personal achievements, character traits, or something else? One challenge with focusing solely on achievements is that not everyone has the same opportunities to succeed. There needs to be space for individuals who don’t have conventional achievements, such as career success, educational attainment, or high income.

People with fewer “achieved” identities often gravitate toward “ascribed” identities—such as ethnicity, religion, or nationality. This is a well-documented phenomenon in social identity theory and is entirely legitimate. Not everyone can be defined by achievements, and that’s okay.

Jacobsen: How does this dialogue intersect with broader philosophical perspectives on identity? Do you see a link to existential or ethical considerations?

Kaufmann: There’s an interesting debate in political philosophy about what constitutes true individuality. Some argue that to truly be yourself, you need to strip away the attachments imposed on you at birth, such as ethnicity, religion, or cultural traditions, and find your authentic self through introspection. This is similar to certain Buddhist or Cartesian ideals of enlightenment.

In contrast, thinkers like Charles Taylor emphasize the importance of community. He argues that groups—whether chosen or inherited—play a crucial role in shaping who we are. Engaging with intergenerational communities, such as those based on religion, nationality, or ethnicity, can enrich our sense of identity. Taylor’s communitarian perspective suggests that breaking entirely from these connections can lead to a poorer existence, while engaging with them adds depth and meaning to our lives.

Of course, there’s a balance to be struck. Being completely subsumed by group identity can stifle individuality, but engaging with chosen or inherited communities can enhance it. Communitarians would argue that group affiliations contribute to, rather than detract from, individuality.

Jacobsen: This theme aligns closely with humanist principles, as outlined in the Amsterdam Declarations of 1972, 2002, and 2022. These declarations emphasize respect for the individual’s right to self-determination while acknowledging the necessity of social responsibility. How does this perspective inform your thinking?

Kaufmann: Individual and collective identity interact; we can’t escape that dynamic. Humans naturally seek rooted, multi-generational identities through religion, nationality, or other affiliations. Denying this aspect of human nature doesn’t align with the way many people experience life.

Jacobsen: Humanist philosophy celebrates the balance between individual autonomy and communal connection, suggesting that both are vital for a meaningful existence. How do you see this duality influencing contemporary identity debates?

Kaufmann: We must recognize that there are trade-offs. Striking the right balance between individuality and collective identity involves costs, and different people and societies navigate this balance differently.

The more you move toward collective identity, the more there may be costs in terms of individuality, and people will navigate that balance differently. I think one key issue is that while it’s respected for minority groups to have collective identities and attachments, there has been a tendency to stigmatize majority group attachments. I wouldn’t call it outright censorship, but expressing a majority attachment is more politically incorrect. That creates a problem because there’s social pressure against majority identities. This pressure either drives those identities underground or stokes resentment among individuals who strongly connect to their majority identity.

This is not a significant issue for people with a low level of attachment to their group identity. But for those with a strong sense of group identity, this can lead to frustration. This is not primarily about metropolitan versus rural divides, as David Goodhart explores in his book The Road to Somewhere. Nor is it simply about wealth or class divides.

When you look at the data, these external factors, such as wealth or whether someone lives in a rural or urban area, only explain a small proportion of whether they identify with their ethnic group or align with progressive politics. For example, white working-class individuals living in London were just as likely to vote for Brexit as their counterparts elsewhere in the UK. The perception that London is a pro-European Union oasis is more about its demographic composition—being younger, highly educated, and more ethnically diverse—than the city itself. When you compare similar groups, the differences diminish significantly.

There’s also been an overemphasis on the sociological context of these issues. The core drivers are psychological and individual. Research suggests that dispositions toward identity are one-third to one-half heritable. This means that sociological factors, while important, are often exaggerated in discussions about group identity and political behaviour. Yes, education and the rural-urban divide correlate with populist voting. Still, the differences are not as stark as some narratives suggest. For example, London might see nearly 40% voting to leave the EU, while rural Northern Britain might approach 60%. This is a difference, but it’s not the absolute divide of 0% versus 100% that some might imagine.

Jacobsen: Do you believe conversations about ethnicity, white identity, and minority identity risk fueling racialist politics? How can we address the toxicity of political culture, particularly when social media amplifies these issues?

Kaufmann: Those are critical questions. First, discussing these identities does carry a risk of playing into racialist politics. However, the real question is whether allowing people to discuss these topics openly is more likely to lead to such politics than trying to suppress the conversation. Suppression can often backfire, driving these sentiments underground and creating a sense of grievance among those who feel their perspectives are being silenced.

Second, addressing the toxic elements of political culture requires consistency. If we are to accept group identity politics for some, it should apply equally to everyone. People who feel the need to attach themselves to their group identity—whether a minority or majority group—should be able to do so without fear of stigmatization.

The question ultimately becomes one of balance: Does creating space for these discussions reduce polarization and resentment, or does it risk exacerbating racialist tendencies? It’s better to create a space where people can discuss identity openly and thoughtfully rather than attempting to shut down the conversation entirely. These issues are complex and subtle, requiring nuanced approaches, particularly in an era where social media often amplifies divisive rhetoric.

I don’t think the people who immediately reach for suppression—whether normative or legal—have the evidence to justify an anti-speech position. For example, I’m not convinced that restricting speech is effective. Allowing freer expression and open debate within mainstream institutions could remove much of the toxicity.

Consider, for instance, the fact that in Germany, it is illegal to question whether the Holocaust happened. In contrast, in the U.S., it is not. Is antisemitism significantly worse in the U.S. than in Germany? I don’t think there’s any evidence to support that claim. Many European countries have similar speech restrictions, but if anything, these measures may promote radicalism.

For example, research by Jacob Aasland Ravndal suggests that when populist right-wing parties perform well electorally, street-level attacks on minorities decrease. For a long time, there was no populist right in Germany. Yet the country routinely experienced attacks on asylum hostels, including attempts to burn them down. This raises the question of whether these movements act as a safety valve. Expression, rather than suppression, may mitigate these issues.

Take Sweden as an example. If mainstream parties had been willing to converse about immigration levels—saying to voters, “Do you want less or more immigration? Here’s why we think more (or less) is a good idea”—there would likely have been no electoral space for the Sweden Democrats. However, because the mainstream parties avoided the topic, the Sweden Democrats became the only ones willing to discuss it, allowing them to rise in prominence. This pattern has played out across Europe, with populist parties emerging as significant players in their political systems.

Jacobsen: Do you think the suppression of open debate on identity-related topics has contributed to the rise of polarizing figures like Donald Trump?

Kaufmann: Absolutely. Suppose other Republican candidates had been willing to address border and immigration issues openly and respectfully. In that case, Trump might not have gained the traction he did. However, because they avoided these topics, Trump—unrestrained by norms—filled the vacuum. This lack of restraint meant he could make inflammatory statements, such as insinuating that Mexicans are rapists, which took the conversation in a toxic direction.

When populists emerge, they often act as loose cannons, disregarding established norms and escalating tensions. Addressing these issues early and within a normative framework could prevent such figures from dominating the discourse.

Jacobsen: What question do you feel is missing from these conversations? What remains an unresolved issue in the discourse?

Kaufmann: The underlying cause of populism’s rise is the West’s ethnic diversification. Immigration serves as the lightning rod for these parties, but the deeper driver is cultural and psychological rather than economic. The widely accepted narrative attributes concerns about immigration to pressures on public services and jobs, but that’s not the primary factor.

The actual driver is that some people feel discomfort with rapid ethnic change. They see the familiar slipping away, perceive differences as disorderly, and perceive changes as a form of loss. If we cannot have open conversations about these underlying drivers, we will continue to miss the root causes and allow these tensions to fester.

That’s a perfectly respectable viewpoint. We want to move toward a position where we don’t frame the issue as “either you’re an open person or a closed person.” If someone wants to restrict immigration, they’re not automatically a closed person or a bigot. Similarly, being open doesn’t necessarily mean supporting escalating levels of migration.

Instead, it would be more productive to acknowledge that there are faster and slower-paced individuals. If the slower-paced viewpoint wins in an election, reducing immigration is legitimate. Conversely, if those arguing for higher immigration—perhaps citing economic benefits—win the argument, then the numbers can increase. The key is ensuring that the chosen policy is seen as legitimate.

As long as the discussion avoids vilifying specific outgroups or labeling them as inferior or threatening, it should be considered a valid debate. Taboos around those harmful attitudes are understandable, but it’s not reasonable to impose taboos on the pace of change or the desire for familiarity. Attachment to an ingroup or preserving the current ethnic composition of a country at a slower pace is fundamentally different from outright racism.

Racism, in my view, involves either advocating for an ethnostate with no minorities or portraying outgroups as evil, inferior, or threatening. These are problematic positions. However, wanting to slow the pace of change isn’t racism. The longer we try to ignore this distinction, the more pressure builds up.

Jacobsen: Lastly, how do you see the pressures of demographic and cultural change manifesting in society? Are there specific examples that highlight these dynamics?

Kaufmann: When these views are suppressed, it leads to a sublimation effect. Populists then emerge as the voice for these repressed and sublimated opinions. Unfortunately, populists are often less likely to adhere to liberal norms and more likely to veer off into irrational tangents—whether it’s conspiracy theories about vaccines, extreme environmental skepticism, or inflammatory rhetoric about certain groups being rapists or criminals. This undermines the sound functioning of liberal democracy.

The real issue is that elite institutions and the establishment are constrained by an overly narrow set of taboos on these discussions. The key question is whether these institutions can reform themselves to allow for more open and balanced debates. Can they expand the parameters of acceptable discourse, or will they double down on suppressing these topics?

Unfortunately, populists like Trump sometimes make outrageous statements, reinforcing the belief among elites that they’re justified in maintaining these taboos. However, this only exacerbates the polarization dynamic, driving people further into opposing camps.

Jacobsen: Eric, thank you very much for taking the time to speak today. I appreciate it.

Kaufmann: Thanks a lot, and good luck with everything.