Oleksandr Kalitenko, a Ukrainian legal expert, stands out as a pioneering figure in the fight against corruption. One of only three Ukrainians awarded a government grant to study in Lithuania, Kalitenko pursued a graduate degree in European Union and International Law. His academic journey began with a specialization in Commercial Law and culminated in a master’s thesis supervised by the head of Lithuania’s Constitutional Court.

Kalitenko’s international legal training extends beyond academia. He gained practical experience at a leading Swedish law firm that twice earned the prestigious British Legal Awards for the best European law office. His résumé is also enriched by voluntary work and a deep commitment to public service, including researching whistleblower protections across the European Union. His findings informed recommendations for Transparency International Latvia and an expert group led by Latvia’s prime minister, shaping the groundwork for future whistleblower legislation.

Between 2014 and 2018, Kalitenko spearheaded grassroots campaigns such as “They Would Not Be Silent,” which aimed to dismantle public stigma against anti-corruption activists and promote a culture of accountability. This work earned him a European Union grant and further cemented his role as a thought leader in transparency and governance.

Kalitenko’s influence extends into Ukraine’s evolving legal landscape. Since 2014, he has been crucial in drafting and advocating anti-corruption legislation, often amid immense political and social challenges. He has lectured widely, coordinated volunteers, and co-authored studies on Ukraine’s burgeoning anti-corruption ecosystem. His insights on asset declaration, conflicts of interest, and governmental transparency resonate at national and international forums.

Currently serving as a legal adviser at Transparency International Ukraine, Kalitenko is at the forefront of efforts to reform Ukraine’s anti-corruption infrastructure amid the turmoil of war. He underscores the importance of building robust institutions from the ground up, citing Ukraine’s distinct reform trajectory and significant achievements in public procurement and asset declaration—areas where, remarkably, it has outpaced some European Union countries. Despite setbacks, such as delays in establishing the High Anti-Corruption Court, Kalitenko remains optimistic about Ukraine’s zero-tolerance approach to corruption and its capacity for transformative change.

For Kalitenko, the path forward lies in maintaining momentum, fostering international partnerships, and addressing systemic challenges head-on. His vision reflects hope and a determination to see Ukraine emerge stronger, more transparent, and more just—a model for other nations grappling with corruption.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: As a legal adviser at Transparency International Ukraine, your work spans anti-corruption and commercial law, mainly focusing on international legal frameworks. You completed a thesis in Lithuania analyzing the responsibilities of states and international organizations for wrongful acts. Can you walk us through the key findings of your research and how they inform your current anti-corruption efforts?

Oleksandr Kalitenko: That was a crucial part of my master’s thesis, which was the final stage of my program at Vilnius University in Lithuania. They offer an LLM program focused on International and European Union law. I chose this topic because I was interested in comparing the responsibilities of states and international organizations.

I selected one of my professors, who later became the head of Lithuania’s Constitutional Court. At that time, he was my professor in international organizations, so it was a logical choice to have him as my thesis supervisor. My research was exciting because I began by examining how the United Nations responded to international crises, such as the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Unsurprisingly, some international organizations could have responded better to crises. History seems to be repeating itself, as we saw recently with António Guterres’s visit to Russia and his meeting with Vladimir Putin, a wanted war criminal. Even while working on my thesis, I observed that international organizations often failed to respond adequately to crises, which influenced my decision to pursue my current career.

After completing my studies in Lithuania, I decided to volunteer for Transparency International because non-governmental organizations are often more effective than bureaucratic government bodies. It was a natural decision for me. I started as a volunteer and intern at Transparency International Ukraine in 2014, following a successful internship with Transparency International Latvia in Riga. I chose the Baltic because I was very interested in how these post-Soviet states became successful members of the European Union, NATO, Schengen area, etc., and what needs to be done in Ukraine to follow a similar path.

During my internship in Latvia, I began researching international best practices for whistleblower protection. This interest originated from my master’s thesis, where I noted that whistleblowers often spoke out about issues within international organizations. Still, their concerns were not met with proper responses. This led me to collect information for the new whistleblower protection law in Latvia, which was under development in 2013.

Whistleblower protection wasn’t a prominent issue in Ukraine then, particularly during Viktor Yanukovych’s rule. Therefore, I chose to focus on the Latvian model and worked as part of a team to contribute to developing whistleblower protection frameworks.

The Latvian prime minister headed it, and the goal of this working group was to collect all the international best practices and recommendations to draft a strong whistleblower protection law in Latvia. Later, I can say that my future work—I’ve been working for Transparency International for 10 years, currently with the Ukrainian chapter—has been very much connected with whistleblower protection and anti-corruption prevention. I believe it is far more effective to protect whistleblowers through legislation than to be a typical lawyer who can only protect one client at a time. For example, fighting for good laws that protect many people, including whistleblowers, is much better.

That was the conclusion of my master’s thesis: I want to protect as many people as possible. In addition to whistleblower protection, I work on legal issues related to asset declarations and conflict-of-interest prevention and the analysis of international best practices in anti-corruption measures and policies. I’m also involved in the CPI (Corruption Perceptions Index) analysis. Transparency International releases this study annually. Part of my expertise is analyzing trends in martial law, corruption, and what we observe in our CPI studies.

Jacobsen: What were the most significant findings from your research on whistleblower laws across EU countries?

Kalitenko: The EU has a directive on whistleblower protection related to reporting breaches of EU law. This year, another directive was adopted to combat what’s known as SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation), used to harass whistleblowers. In such cases, companies with large legal teams or even government-influenced organizations might start legal proceedings against whistleblowers to distract them from their reporting by burdening them with lawsuits.

The European Union now has these two directives. We’ve researched the implementation of the first directive on whistleblower protection for breaches of EU law. Unfortunately, the implementation has not been ideal. Some countries missed the deadline set by the EU for integrating the directive’s provisions into their national laws.

Sadly, some countries introduced draft laws that were not fully aligned with the EU directive. This wasn’t very helpful because the EU had set good standards with this directive, especially when it was introduced five years ago. But again, the real issue is the question of implementation.

There has been some progress, and the situation is better than it once was. However, Transparency International conducted research that revealed almost every country still needs to fully implement the EU directive on whistleblower protection, even five years after its adoption. So, again, it could be a better result. I had higher expectations, but this may reflect a lack of political will to adopt it properly.

Jacobsen: Shifting to Ukraine, what unique challenges do whistleblowers face, particularly under the updated legislation passed before the full-scale war with Russia?

Kalitenko: Before the war with Russia, we updated the law on whistleblower protection. Unfortunately, some provisions of this law had gaps that still needed to be addressed.

One such gap, for example, is that only corruption whistleblowers are protected in Ukraine. This does not align with the EU directive, which provides a broader definition of whistleblowers. Whistleblowers reporting on human rights violations, transport safety, food safety, or medical equipment safety should be protected, not just those reporting corruption. But currently, the law only protects people who report corruption, and this issue needs to be fixed.

Another issue is that some forms of protection exist only on paper. For example, the law provides for psychological assistance and support for whistleblowers. However, this exists only in theory, as no proper system has been established to offer real psychological support. Another issue involves the unified portal for whistleblowers and their reports.

This portal was created last year as a user-friendly platform, a one-stop window for whistleblowers to report potential wrongdoing. However, we have found that it lacks sufficient anonymity and confidentiality measures to protect whistleblowers in line with international best practices. This is another area that needs improvement, and the portal is currently administered by Ukraine’s National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP). We have submitted recommendations on what needs to be fixed in the portal and are working with them to address these issues.

There are other concerns as well. For instance, whistleblowers who disclose state secrets are not protected, nor are those who expose minor corruption.

The law also covers whistleblowers and their close relatives, but it does not protect those who assist whistleblowers. According to the EU directive, such individuals should be covered as well. Of course, we also have recommendations from the OECD and other international organizations. Still, some significant issues remain with whistleblower protection in Ukraine.

Jacobsen: During the “They Would Not Be Silent” campaign, you sought to reshape public attitudes toward corruption and whistleblowers. What were some of the most challenging obstacles you encountered in running that campaign?

Kalitenko: We launched that campaign in 2015. It was needed because of the post-Soviet attitude toward whistleblowers. People often referred to whistleblowers as “snitches,” implying that they were not good citizens because they exposed wrongdoing that should have been kept silent. So, we tried to change this perception with the help of donors, partners from advertising agencies, and companies like McDonald’s, KFC, and some cinema theatres that aired our video campaign.

We depicted the moral authorities of the Ukrainian nation. These figures are shown in our currency, the hryvnia, and the banknotes. These individuals are famous writers and moral figures studied in schools, teaching young people about values and what is right and wrong. The campaign showed these figures with their mouths closed by rubber bands, conveying that these moral authorities would not remain silent in the face of corruption. We wanted to create an association for average Ukrainians with these figures, showing that they, too, should not be silent when they witness corruption.

We launched this campaign when sociological data showed that only about 30% of Ukrainians were willing to report corruption. This was a very limited number, and we wanted to raise it, moving closer to Western societies, where 90-95% of people declare that they would report wrongdoing.

We consulted psychologists, who explained that it would likely take about 15 years to change such attitudes and perceptions about whistleblowers in society. This is a big issue, and it won’t change with just one or two campaigns, even if they are nationwide. So, we started this campaign and continued similar efforts in the following years.

I was proud of the results of these campaigns. We surveyed whether the average Ukrainian had seen our advertisements and what they thought about them. Of course, the war has accelerated the process, but according to the latest survey data, 81% of Ukrainians are now ready to become whistleblowers and report corruption.

Jacobsen: Campaigns like this often aim to shift public perceptions. With 81% of Ukrainians now expressing a willingness to act as whistleblowers, how has your work influenced this shift in attitudes toward anti-corruption efforts?

Kalitenko: We’ve had to combat certain perceptions among Ukrainians. For instance, in our later campaigns, we addressed the common belief that if a corrupt official steals money from the budget, many Ukrainians saw the state budget as an abstract concept, not something concrete or connected to their lives.

One of our campaigns aimed to show Ukrainians that they directly contribute to the state budget through their taxes. Even if they don’t realize it, they pay taxes when they go to the grocery store and buy food because we have a VAT (value-added tax). This was an important message, as many people didn’t understand the direct link between their actions and the state’s resources.

Some people also pay taxes when they refuel their cars, as there are additional state taxes on fuel. Taxes are also added to cigarettes and alcohol products, so it’s not just about income taxes. Together with our partners, we provided an online calculator that allowed people to enter the amount of money they spent and earned each month, such as their salary. It would show them how much tax they were paying to the state. We wanted to foster the perception that the state budget is not an abstract concept. When a corrupt official steals, they steal from us.

This was another successful campaign that I’m proud of because many Ukrainians didn’t see themselves as taxpayers, but they are. Through this and other campaigns, we also offered legal advice for everyday operations where people might encounter corruption, such as in the education system, hospitals, or state administrative licenses.

Public polling showed that even Ukrainian youth at the time were not motivated to defend their rights for various reasons. Some believed there was no point in protecting their violated rights; others didn’t know how to do so legally or didn’t trust the system, including the judicial system. Instead, they turned to corrupt schemes to get services from the state.

We wanted to show how misguided this behavior is. If you’ve already paid taxes and then paid a bribe for a service you should receive for free, you’re not being clever by gaming the system—you’re being foolish. You’ve paid for the service twice: once with your taxes and again with the bribe. That’s not intelligent behavior, and we aimed to change that mindset.

According to the latest data, since 2007, the readiness to protect rights among Ukrainians has been at its highest level, at around 52%. More than half of the population is willing to protect their rights. I see this as an essential element of living in a legal state—living according to the law and protecting your rights through legal means, not corruption.

Jacobsen: As Ukraine pursues closer ties with the EU, public pressure often drives governments to introduce or refine policies. Are any significant anti-corruption policies currently being proposed or implemented locally or nationally?

Kalitenko: Ukraine has adopted a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy, with concrete measures across different sectors to combat and prevent corruption. These anti-corruption policy documents have also received positive evaluations from our European partners.

The National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) is now monitoring the level of implementation of these anti-corruption documents. Recently, some changes were made to reflect the current conditions better. Still, these are solid, evidence-based strategic documents that address the challenges and problems we face today. With measures, indicators, responsible persons and institutions, and deadlines for implementation, these documents should serve as a vital tool for combating corruption. However, this is just one instrument. Another critical tool is asset declaration.

The unified registry of electronic asset declarations was reestablished last year on a public online platform. Now, officials have submitted millions of asset declarations into this system, visible to investigative journalists, civil society activists, or anyone interested in examining a local official’s declaration. This is a significant prevention tool, as these asset declarations cover a wide range of assets and can reveal inconsistencies or lies and cases of illicit enrichment, potential conflicts of interest, or assets acquired without proper justification.

The third instrument I would highlight is reestablishing the obligation for political parties in Ukraine to submit their financial reports for verification. These financial reports are also public, allowing anyone to see a political party’s donors and how it spends its money. This is another essential tool that was reestablished last year. Like the asset declaration registry, it had been closed to public access following the full-scale invasion but has now been reopened.

Additionally, I recommend the complete restoration of competitive processes in public procurement. We have a good tool called Prozorro, the electronic public procurement system, which investigative journalists use extensively to monitor for wrongdoing in this area. So, overall, despite the war with Russia, Ukraine has demonstrated significant progress in fighting corruption.

Our Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) has shown that countries fighting a war typically decline their scores as corruption increases under such circumstances. However, Ukraine gained an additional 3 points last year, one of the best results globally. The CPI covers nearly 200 countries and territories, and Ukraine has shown a remarkable upward trend. Over the past 10 years, we have gained 11 points, placing us among the top 15 countries in terms of improvement.

We have now reached a level comparable to other EU candidate states, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Turkey, Serbia, and North Macedonia. This means we are on par with those countries regarding perceived corruption and are ready to be a successful candidate for EU membership.

However, we still have significant potential to continue fighting corruption. The corruption scandals that have appeared in the media over the past few years indicate that our anti-corruption institutions—the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU), the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), and the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC)—are functioning well. These institutions were built from scratch and can still demonstrate effective results, even in wartime.

Jacobsen: Managing long-term projects like these involves ensuring volunteers deliver consistent results. How do you set performance expectations and maintain quality across such diverse efforts?

Kalitenko: We have setbacks, of course, but this should also be adequately reflected in the volunteers’ expectations when they submit their CVs for consideration to avoid future disappointments. Anti-corruption work is a marathon, not a sprint; our Corruption Perceptions Index clearly shows this. While we’ve gained points in some years, we’ve also lost points at times. For instance, we lost points when anti-corruption activists were attacked on the national and regional levels. There were setbacks due to delays in the formation of the High Anti-Corruption Court. Before it was established, cases investigated by NABU and SAPO were transferred to general courts, where they often collected dust because the judges did not prioritize them.

This caused a significant delay in demonstrating a solid track record in anti-corruption efforts. We also faced a considerable challenge in 2020 when the Constitutional Court made a scandalous decision almost to cancel the entire asset declaration system and limit the powers of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention, which is responsible for verifying such declarations. Though this was eventually reversed after a few months, over 100 cases investigated by the anti-corruption system were closed, and some officials were even acquitted in court.

The article on illicit enrichment was also canceled in the criminal code by the Constitutional Court. This hurt the anti-corruption fight, as cases of illicit enrichment involving officials were closed. So yes, we’ve had rollbacks on our anti-corruption path. Still, international partners and civil society have played a significant role in helping us move forward. Their conditionalities—such as those set by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or European partners for financial aid, grants, and credits—have been powerful levers.

However, Ukraine did not meet all of these conditionalities. I recall a case from about seven years ago when Ukraine lost nearly €600 million in aid because we failed to start properly verifying officials’ asset declarations. That was a sensitive issue for us. But together with our international partners, civil society has been able to advocate for anti-corruption measures and push for political will at the government level.

Jacobsen: International partners like Canada and the United States have offered varied support—financial aid from Canada and arms assistance from the U.S. Beyond monetary contributions, what forms of international help—be it expertise, personnel, or institutional collaboration—would be most impactful in strengthening Ukraine’s anti-corruption initiatives?

Kalitenko: International partners have contributed significantly to Ukrainian reforms, and it’s not just about sending cash. For example, they’ve helped by nominating internationally recognized experts to selection commissions for key positions within major institutions. This kind of support—expertise, and personnel—can be far more impactful than just financial aid, as it ensures that the right people are appointed to lead vital anti-corruption and reform efforts.

I could mention the NABU, SAPO, and other institutions, so one option for international partners is to nominate strong experts to select commissions for heads of Ukrainian institutions and as independent external auditors. For example, we’ve already seen an audit report on the efficiency of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP). This report, published last summer, was the first time any anti-corruption institution in Ukraine faced an external audit. Another audit will be conducted soon, and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) also began its audit last month, with the participation of international experts.

This involvement is crucial because it brings international expertise and best practices. For example, the NACP audit included an expert from the United States. These experts provide valuable recommendations based on their international experience, which is essential for our reforms and understanding the lessons learned. So, bringing in expertise is another critical role international partners can play.

Jacobsen: Zero tolerance for corruption is a bold and aspirational standard. Given the ongoing war, is this goal feasible now, or should it remain a long-term target? How do you balance the urgency of wartime anti-corruption measures with the ambition of zero tolerance?

Kalitenko: Ukrainian society has already demonstrated a strong zero-tolerance attitude toward corruption. It’s not just about people declaring their readiness to be whistleblowers—there’s a broader societal shift. Before the full-scale war, about one-third of the population justified corruption as a useful tool to solve problems or access services more quickly than others. But now, that mindset has changed significantly.

It’s not just about petty corruption, though it has its cost. Now, Ukrainians show much less tolerance for corruption overall, and this shift has created a more favorable political environment. People no longer justify corruption as they once did, which is a significant change. This zero-tolerance attitude is essential for the war effort and the long-term success of Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms.

After the Maidan Revolution, Ukraine announced that its number one goal was combating corruption. Of course, as I mentioned earlier, we’ve had setbacks along the way. Still, it’s impressive that reforms, including anti-corruption efforts, have continued even during the full-scale war. I expect the pace of reform to accelerate even more after the war.

We’ve already set reasonable standards for the region. For instance, our whistleblower protection and asset declaration systems set a high bar—not even all EU countries have the same level of asset declaration coverage as Ukraine or the same level of transparency in public procurement. It’s an optimistic sign that we’ve been able to build this anti-corruption infrastructure from scratch. I don’t think it’s accurate to say that Ukraine should follow the example of more prosperous countries. Our circumstances are unique, and some decisions we’ve made here are exclusive to our situation.

Of course, we should still follow international recommendations. But I’d argue that we’ve already exceeded specific EU standards in some areas, like public procurement. So, yes, we have some promising sectors where Ukraine could even set best practices for other countries. I’m optimistic about this.

We should continue to find and follow our path because our circumstances—especially during a full-scale war—are unique, and we must address them appropriately.

Jacobsen: A final question, turning briefly to Russia: Has the war led to increased corruption within Russia’s control areas, or has it prompted reforms or tighter controls?

Kalitenko: We haven’t researched this point in-depth, but I can tell you the facts from the Corruption Perceptions Index. According to the CPI, Russia’s score has decreased, meaning the perceived level of corruption has increased.

Jacobsen: Oleksandr, thank you so much for the opportunity to speak with you.

Kalitenko: Thank you for your questions and for the invitation to do this interview.