The scholarship on international relations encompasses a wide range of theoretical perspectives, each tested through diverse methodologies and yielding significant contributions to our understanding of global politics. Within this evolving body of work, several foundational concepts have emerged—some polysemic and contested, while others are widely accepted across various paradigms. One of the latter is the concept of the revisionist state, rooted primarily in the realist tradition and closely associated with analyses of power transitions.

At its core, the concept of a revisionist state centers on the motivations and objectives of political elites and national leadership. It refers to a state that expresses deep dissatisfaction with the current international order and the prevailing distribution of power.

In general terms, rising powers are most frequently associated with revisionist behavior. Such states may temporarily accommodate the existing logic of power balances—whether bipolar or multipolar—but do not relinquish their ultimate goal of leading the international system on their own terms. They are typically viewed as opportunistic, aggressive, and expansionist in nature. Rather than being classified along the traditional hawk-dove spectrum that defines many policymakers, decision-makers in revisionist states are often described as embittered and dissatisfied “jackals.” In recent literature and policy rhetoric, terms such as “nefarious” and “malign” have increasingly been employed to describe these actors.

In essence, a revisionist state seeks to fundamentally alter—or even overthrow—the established international system, reshaping its rules, norms, and institutions to engineer a new global distribution of power. Its ambitions are comprehensive and assertive, aiming to restructure the world order in a way that reflects its own strategic preferences. Of course, not all such ambitions are destined to succeed, nor are they uniformly executed.

In contrast, the so-called status quo state is generally one that helped create the existing order and remains invested in its preservation. Satisfied with the current allocation of power, such a state is seen as a responsible actor on the global stage. Its actions tend to reinforce the current institutional framework, one that has served its interests well and continues to offer strategic advantages.

For decades, mainstream international relations literature cast China as the paradigmatic revisionist state while portraying the United States as the prototypical status quo power. Yet a more neutral, evidence-based assessment complicates this binary. China’s behavior, when viewed closely, does not reveal absolute dissatisfaction with the global system, nor does it suggest a definitive intent to rewrite the rules that have enabled its rise. Conversely, the United States has not consistently demonstrated unwavering loyalty to the global order it once championed and helped construct after World War II.

Against this backdrop, the most notable development of Donald Trump’s second term—particularly as viewed from the Global South—is the extent to which the United States now exemplifies the characteristics of a revisionist state. But there is a significant twist: unlike most revisionist powers that gain strength and ascendancy before seeking to challenge the system, the United States is acting from a position of relative decline. Over the past quarter-century, it has experienced erosion in its economic standing, leadership, institutional coherence, and diplomatic credibility.

The prevailing sentiment within the ruling coalition is that the international system no longer reliably serves the interests of the United States. U.S. elites increasingly perceive allies, adversaries, and so-called vassals as having exploited American generosity and international engagement. What has emerged is not a renewed hegemonic ambition—traditionally characterized by a mix of persuasion and calibrated coercion—but rather an overt and force-driven strategy of domination. This strategy relies on threats, retaliation, and the coercion of both rivals and partners.

Washington now leverages punitive tariffs, mass deportations, grandiose territorial claims, and confrontational rhetoric as instruments of power. Trump’s return to office also marked an intensification of his administration’s disdain for multilateralism: withdrawing from international forums, dismantling global governance frameworks, and eroding the foundations of international law. For today’s White House, the very institutions and norms it once promoted are now seen as impediments to the project of “Making America Great Again.” Wrapped in nostalgia and often steeped in grievance, this agenda seeks to revive a long-gone golden era by force rather than through consensus.

Concurrently, the United States is reshaping its signature “soft power”—once rooted in both material and ideological dimensions. The material aspect historically included technical assistance and non-military aid programs offered around the globe, particularly in the Global South. The ideological component promoted the “American Way of Life,” grounded in liberal pluralism and democratic values, framed by the nation’s self-image as a “beacon of democracy.”

Today, both elements are undergoing radical redefinition. On the one hand, material assistance is being gutted or narrowly rechanneled toward nations seen as compliant with U.S. objectives. On the other, the promotion of democratic ideals has been replaced with the endorsement of a new reactionary international, with Donald Trump as its emblematic figure. This shift reflects broader domestic transformations—political, social, and institutional—pointing toward the consolidation of a plutocratic order.

By established criteria, a revisionist state is one that rejects the status quo, destabilizes the international order, and seeks to reengineer global power dynamics through aggressive, opportunistic, and often reckless means. By this definition, the United States has now crossed the threshold. It no longer merely questions the world order it once authored—it is actively attempting to dismantle it.