When Syrian armed rebels swiftly overtook Damascus, bringing an abrupt end to the Assad dynasty’s 53-year reign, China’s response was strikingly muted—marked more by indifference than alarm.

This reaction surprised few Middle East analysts. Beijing never fostered particularly warm relations with the Assad regime; its cooperation with Damascus had always been transactional. China was content to work with Assad when it served its interests—and it will just as readily engage with Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa or his potential successor as long as it serves Beijing’s interests. For Chinese President Xi Jinping, the identity of Syria’s ruler is not a matter of great concern. Yet one element of Ahmed al-Sharaa’s rise to power in Syria ought to concern Beijing more deeply: the role played by Turkey.

It is no secret that Turkey provided substantial support to the Syrian rebels, namely Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and Ahmed al-Sharaa’s success is widely seen as a manifestation of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s expansionist foreign policy. Erdoğan has long harbored ambitions of reviving Turkey’s former imperial stature, and in the current power vacuum, he may now view al-Sharaa as something of a modern-day viceroy in the Levant.

This raises a critical question: why would China view these developments with apprehension? To begin with, although bilateral trade between China and Turkey has grown, their diplomatic relationship remains lukewarm. Frictions persist, most notably over Turkey’s vocal criticism of China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims—allegations that Erdoğan has at times framed as a form of cultural genocide. While there have been attempts at rapprochement, most analysts remain skeptical about the prospects for meaningful progress.

More fundamentally, Turkey’s growing assertiveness is incompatible with China’s strategic vision for the Middle East. In a region characterized by shifting alliances and chronic instability, Ankara’s ambition to project influence threatens to recalibrate the existing balance of power—posing potential complications for both Arab states and external powers such as China. Turkey’s increasingly assertive foreign policy, underpinned by its territorial ambitions and economic expansionism, could strain the regional cohesion that China relies on to protect its interests.

China’s overarching goal is to preserve a stable, multipolar Middle East—a region where no single power can dominate or unilaterally shape outcomes. This stability is essential not only for safeguarding China’s access to energy resources but also for ensuring the success of the Belt and Road Initiative. A Turkish ascendancy would jeopardize this delicate balance. China’s long-standing strategy of diversifying its partnerships—such as maintaining oil purchases from both Saudi Arabia and Iran—demonstrates its desire to remain untethered to any one regional player.

If Turkey’s growing influence poses a challenge to China, what are the implications for the United States, the European Union, and other Western powers? At first glance, Turkey’s rise might seem like a welcome development for the West. As a NATO member and historically Western-aligned power, Ankara could be perceived as a counterweight to Iranian or Russian influence. However, the reality is more complicated. Western governments have grown increasingly wary of Erdoğan, citing concerns about democratic backsliding, Ankara’s support for Islamist movements—including jihadist factions—and escalating tensions with Kurdish forces in Syria and with Israel.

Both the West and China share a common interest in preventing any one state—be it Turkey, Iran, or Saudi Arabia—from becoming a hegemon in the Middle East. Both want the region to remain stable, to continue exporting oil and gas reliably, and to avoid disruptions to global energy markets. A Turkey emboldened by its gains in Syria, and eager to extend its reach, would threaten this fragile equilibrium. Moreover, Turkey’s behavior on the world stage has increasingly raised doubts about its reliability as a partner. Erdoğan has managed to alienate both Western capitals and Beijing through his combative and unpredictable diplomacy.

While China may not directly oppose Erdoğan’s ambitions, it is unlikely to stand idly by if Turkey seeks to further reshape the region. Yet direct confrontation seems equally improbable. China is more likely to counterbalance Turkish expansionism by deepening its relationships with regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran. Western powers are likely to follow a similar course, maintaining strong ties with the Gulf monarchies while possibly re-engaging with Iran to preserve regional equilibrium.

In this evolving geopolitical landscape, Syria may represent the outer limit of Turkey’s regional influence. That scenario would suit Beijing. Still, Turkey will remain a disruptive force—a persistent irritant in China’s otherwise calculated approach to the region. Ankara may not succeed in remaking the Middle East in its image, but it will not be easily dismissed either. As China continues to pursue its strategic and economic objectives in the region, it will have to contend with the fact that Turkey, for better or worse, is now an unavoidable factor in the equation.