If you’re like me, you’ve spent the past two years waiting for the Democratic Party to show up. Aside from a handful of rising figures, including New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani, Michigan Senate nominee Abdul El-Sayed, and Texas Senate nominee James Talarico, the party’s response to President Donald Trump and the economy has been abysmal.

During Joe Biden’s presidency, Republican pundits seemed to find a new reason to tear him down almost daily. Yet Democrats have struggled to mount anything approaching a similarly effective counteroffensive. Their messaging has been uninspired, their outreach inconsistent, and their ability to translate opposition into a coherent strategy for exercising power almost nonexistent.

Now, Trump has dug himself into a political hole so deep that it is increasingly difficult to imagine how his coalition climbs out. From the Iran war to the Epstein files, MAGA looks like a shadow of its former self. Republican candidates have reportedly begun distancing themselves from the president, removing photographs and endorsements that once served as political assets but now threaten to become liabilities. High gas prices, soaring living costs, foreign-policy failures, and unfulfilled campaign promises have made the Trump brand considerably harder to sell.

Democrats, meanwhile, are enjoying a remarkable reversal of fortune. Polls increasingly favor them, and the headlines grow more ominous for Republicans. On Polymarket, the prediction market, traders recently gave Democrats roughly a 65 percent chance of capturing the Senate and a staggering 92 percent chance of winning the House. Those probabilities are hardly guarantees, but they illustrate just how dramatically the political landscape has shifted. The more consequential question may no longer be whether Democrats can win in November, but what they intend to accomplish if they do.

It would be unfair to characterize Democrats as entirely catatonic. They have forced repeated Senate votes on Trump’s Iran war powers, most recently falling short by a 49–50 margin. But the administration has shown little inclination to change course. The war, launched without specific congressional authorization, has helped send fuel prices soaring while raising serious questions about international law, including the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. At this point, however, violations of legal and political norms seem to accumulate faster than anyone can meaningfully respond to them.

The last time Democrats possessed real leverage, they struggled to use it effectively. During last fall’s 43-day government shutdown, the longest in American history, Democrats fought over expiring Affordable Care Act subsidies. The standoff ended without securing their central demand, leaving them with the prospect of another vote rather than a guaranteed extension. The subsidies subsequently expired on January 1, driving up premiums for millions of Americans. Although the House eventually passed a three-year extension, the legislation remains stalled in the Senate.

The fight itself was worth having. The problem was how Democrats fought it. They entered a confrontation over a consequential issue without a sufficiently unified caucus, a clearly defined victory, or a credible exit strategy. Predictably, the result was political exhaustion without a commensurate policy achievement.

A newer generation of Democrats appears to understand this weakness and, in some cases, has begun charting a different course. Mamdani campaigned on a concise set of promises that voters could understand and, more importantly, measure. Within his first nine months in office, he has secured state support for universal childcare and a rent freeze for stabilized apartments. His administration has also pursued a pied-à-terre tax targeting luxury second homes and non-primary residences, although its implementation has encountered legal obstacles.

Mamdani has been less successful in his effort to make public buses free. But that failure illustrates another important distinction: the difference between making promises and possessing the authority to deliver them. The Metropolitan Transportation Authority, rather than the mayor, controls fares, and Mamdani has limited influence over its 23-member board. With New York’s governor and the MTA’s leadership resisting the proposal, he faces formidable institutional opposition. Still, voters know what he wants to accomplish, what he has achieved, and what stands in his way.

In Michigan, Abdul El-Sayed won the Democratic Senate nomination over an establishment rival despite approximately $70 million in outside spending against him. His campaign centered on Medicare for All, removing corporate money from politics, and making everyday life more affordable. He now holds a narrow advantage over Republican Mike Rogers.

What distinguishes these emerging Democrats is not necessarily a shared ideology but a different approach to politics. They offer specific promises, identify tangible goals, and invite voters to judge them by the results. That is a striking departure from the confusion surrounding the government shutdown, when Democratic leaders seemed unable to agree on what victory would actually look like.

Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer has become an embodiment of the party’s institutional paralysis. His willingness to concede ground on issues ranging from federal workplace protections to social safety-net funding has frustrated Democrats who want a more confrontational approach. His resistance to Trump’s agenda has often appeared tentative, particularly when it comes to administration nominees and the broader exercise of congressional power.

That dissatisfaction is no longer confined to activists or progressive commentators. Democratic figures including El-Sayed, Peggy Flanagan of Minnesota, Troy Jackson of Maine, and Juliana Stratton of Illinois have indicated that they would not support Schumer as Senate leader. Schumer, however, remains determined to retain his position, and no sitting Democratic senator has yet mounted a direct challenge.

Even if Democrats capture Congress, their ability to govern will remain sharply constrained. A Democratic House can pass legislation, but most bills still require 60 votes to overcome a Senate filibuster, followed by the president’s signature. Trump can veto legislation, and overriding that veto requires two-thirds majorities in both chambers. Democrats are unlikely to come anywhere close to those numbers.

Winning Congress, in other words, is not the same as controlling Washington. If Democrats want to make 2027 more than an extended exercise in political theater, they need to reconsider how they use the power available to them.

That begins with defining victory. House Democrats have established five affordability working groups focused on housing, healthcare, childcare, groceries, and gas and utilities. These are sensible priorities, but working groups are not governing strategies. Democrats need a concise set of demands, a clear explanation of what they hope to achieve, and a willingness to attach those priorities to must-pass spending legislation. Without specific objectives, even a favorable political environment can produce little beyond another round of frustrated expectations.

They also need to give congressional oversight a purpose. Every week seems to bring another investigation, another hearing, or another confrontation with an administration official. But what actually changes?

Robert F. Kennedy Jr. has faced scrutiny over his restructuring of the National Institutes of Health and changes to public-health policy, yet the Department of Health and Human Services has continued its reorganization. FBI Director Kash Patel has attracted criticism over changes to applicant background-vetting standards, allegations concerning his personal conduct, and questions about his use of taxpayer resources. Yet Patel remains in charge, with little evidence that the controversies have produced meaningful institutional consequences.

The pattern extends across Trump’s Cabinet. When the controversy becomes particularly damaging, as with Pam Bondi and the Epstein files, replacing one official with another does little to change the administration’s underlying approach. Personnel may change; the governing philosophy remains.

To be fair, this is not entirely a story of Democratic incompetence. It is also a story of institutional powerlessness. In the minority, Democrats do not control committee chairs, determine hearing schedules, or independently wield the subpoena authority that comes with a majority. The subpoena involving Bondi, for example, emerged from a Republican-led committee after pressure from Republican Representative Nancy Mace.

House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries has promised accountability while leaving open the possibility of impeachment, although Democrats remain divided over whether to pursue it. But accountability cannot consist solely of stern questions, viral exchanges, and declarations of outrage. Hearings should produce documents, legislative proposals, referrals, or other concrete institutional action. Otherwise, oversight becomes another form of political performance, generating headlines without changing behavior.

Finally, Democrats must confront their leadership problem. A party that cannot agree on who should lead it will struggle to survive the kind of sustained confrontation that produced last year’s 43-day shutdown. The growing rebellion against Schumer is more than a generational dispute. It is a test of whether the party’s establishment and its emerging faction can reconcile their differences sufficiently to challenge a common opponent.

After the election, Senate Democrats will have an opportunity to choose their leader. That decision alone will not resolve the party’s disagreements, nor will it guarantee a more effective opposition to Trump. But it will reveal whether Democrats understand the political moment confronting them.

For a party that has spent years promising to defend American institutions, winning an election should be the beginning of its responsibilities, not the culmination of them. Democrats may soon have the power to make Trump’s presidency considerably more difficult. Whether they can turn that power into something voters can recognize as progress is another matter entirely.