On the anniversary of October 7th, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis each carried out acts of terror against Israel. Despite a year of war, these three terror groups managed to strike at Israel’s heart simultaneously, forcing civilians in Tel Aviv to scramble for shelter.

After a year of relentless Israeli military strikes, it should not be possible for Hamas to reach central Israel whenever it wants. Hezbollah, whose leadership has been so decimated that it struggles to name a new leader, should not feel comfortable attacking Israeli civilians. And the Houthis, distracted by Israeli and American bombings, should not be able to fire ballistic missiles into Israel.

Despite all the talk of “deterrence,” it is clear that Israel’s strategy has not yet meaningfully altered the regional dynamic. Israeli decision-makers must realize that deterrence requires more than mere military superiority. Stopping the barrage of attacks from Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ means offering a better future to those under its proxy rule while making Iran itself face credible threats.

Israel’s deterrence must be built on the principle that those who attack Israel will be worse off than those who choose peace. This was the unspoken promise of Israel’s foreign policy in its early years: If any of Israel’s neighbors attacked, they would be defeated. But if they allowed Israel to live in peace, Israel would “do its share in a common effort for the advancement of the entire Middle East.”

It was this form of deterrence that led Egypt and Jordan to sign peace agreements with Israel. Both nations realized they would gain more by ceasing hostilities with Israel than by perpetually warring with the Jewish state. A similar form of deterrence convinced the Gulf states to normalize relations with Israel, as they came to understand that Israel wasn’t going anywhere and saw the economic benefits of working with it instead of against it.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has even used this logic in his recent address to the people of Iran, where he offered them a vision of peace, prosperity, and collaboration—dependent on their government halting its attacks against Israel.

Yet, for reasons that remain unclear, Israeli leadership has not extended similar offers to the Palestinians or the Lebanese. If Israel truly aims to end the threats posed by these groups, Netanyahu should immediately deliver an address outlining how abandoning terror can improve the lives of Palestinians and Lebanese alike. For Palestinians, Israel could offer a vision of future self-determination, made credible by immediate good faith measures. This might include steps such as cracking down on settler violence in the West Bank or increasing resources for Palestinians in East Jerusalem. For Lebanon, Israel could extend the prospect of economic benefits that come from normalizing relations.

Critics may argue that such moves would be tantamount to “rewarding terrorism,” but that is a fundamental misunderstanding. The terrorists responsible for the October 7th atrocities don’t want to see Palestinians and Israelis building bonds. They hate the idea of these two peoples living peacefully side by side. Hezbollah leaders, who have orchestrated attacks on Israel for decades, do not want to see a thriving cross-border economy between Lebanon and Israel. They dread the possibility of Israeli innovation and collaboration reaching Beirut and Tripoli.

For them, peace is not a reward—it’s an abomination.

Nevertheless, this vision of peace is only part of the broader solution. As appealing as peace may be, it will remain out of reach as long as Iran’s regime has the freedom to destabilize governments and target civilians. This brings us to the second element of deterrence: a credible threat against Iran.

Over the past year, it has become evident that Israel’s ability to defend itself preemptively is closely tied to America’s willingness to tolerate it. While the United States has generally supported Israel’s right to defend itself after being attacked, it is also highly concerned about escalation. What happens, for instance, when the U.S. president publicly opposes strikes on Iranian nuclear sites? Despite all of Israel’s military might, it knows it cannot afford to jeopardize its relationship with the United States permanently. Iran, fully aware of this, is emboldened by Israel’s apparent restraint.

To change this dynamic, Israel needs a network of regional allies who share its interest in curbing Iran’s influence. By forming a local coalition, Israel and its anti-Iranian partners can take smaller, yet consistent steps to check Iran’s growing power. This would alleviate American fears of escalation while simultaneously creating new, credible threats against Iran.

A key component of this strategy is to expedite negotiations with Saudi Arabia. Saudi officials have made it clear that normalization with Israel is contingent upon progress on a viable plan for Palestinian statehood. Agreeing to such a plan would advance Israel’s vision for a peaceful Middle East. By strengthening ties with the leader of the Arab world and offering Palestinians a better future, Israel could unite the region in its struggle against the Islamic Republic.

Ending the year-long war that has plagued Israel will require restoring its deterrence throughout the region. To do so, Israel must offer the Palestinians and Lebanese incentives to reject their Iranian-backed governments while simultaneously applying significant pressure on Iran. Only then will Israel stand a chance of achieving lasting peace.