More than 6,000 delegates from 150 countries gathered in Doha for the 23rd Doha Forum. Over two days of panels, closed-door meetings, and informal conversations, one conclusion emerged with striking clarity: the Gulf is no longer content to function as a supporting actor in global affairs. It is positioning itself as a genuine third pole in the international economic and political order—and doing so with remarkable speed, confidence, and strategic intent.

At a moment defined by the relative decline of American hegemony, Europe’s inward turn, and the accelerating rise of the Global South, the Middle East is actively redefining its place on the world stage. The central question is no longer whether the region seeks transformation, but whether its ambitions can outpace its enduring security vulnerabilities—and whether grand visions can be translated into durable, long-term realities.

A Strategic Investment in Soft Power

Founded in 2020, the Doha Forum represents the continuation—and refinement—of Qatar’s long-term soft-power strategy. Unlike the World Cup, which delivered a short, intense burst of global attention, the forum is designed as a sustained exercise in institutional influence-building. Qatar’s leadership appears acutely aware that infrastructure projects and capital deployment alone are insufficient. Lasting international influence comes from shaping discourse, convening elites, and embedding oneself in the networks that quietly govern global decision-making.

By annually assembling heads of state, senior diplomats, think-tank scholars, and business leaders to debate Middle Eastern geopolitics, Global South development, climate change, and artificial intelligence ethics, Qatar is constructing a platform that extends well beyond symbolism. It is cultivating a new model of influence rooted in convening power and agenda-setting rather than coercion.

This “spend big, achieve big” logic has spread quickly across the Gulf, with each oil-producing state pursuing its own variation. Saudi Arabia has leaned heavily into global sports and entertainment diplomacy, signing Cristiano Ronaldo for a reported hundreds of millions of euros and formally bidding to host the 2034 World Cup. The result is a vertically integrated sports ecosystem that spans elite leagues, international tournaments, and tourism infrastructure.

The United Arab Emirates has charted a different course. By offering permissive regulatory environments and favorable residency policies, it has attracted a cohort of high-profile—and often controversial—technology figures facing scrutiny elsewhere. From Binance founder Changpeng Zhao to Telegram’s Pavel Durov, entrepreneurs under Western regulatory pressure have found new footholds in the Emirates. The payoff is not merely capital inflows, but a distinctive position within the global tech ecosystem.

The economic returns are increasingly tangible. In 2024, the UAE attracted more than 1,000 greenfield investment projects, a 36 percent year-on-year increase. Saudi Arabia projects 150 million annual tourist arrivals by 2030, with tourism expected to contribute roughly 10 percent of GDP. Yet these figures capture only part of a deeper transformation. The Gulf states are evolving from energy exporters into hubs for global capital flows, platforms for international dialogue, and laboratories for emerging industries. They are no longer seeking a place within the existing international order; they are instead attempting to reshape it.

The September Shadow: Underestimated Security Risks

That ambition, however, exists alongside profound vulnerability. Israel’s September airstrike on Doha cast a long shadow over the forum. Despite Qatar’s deployment of advanced American-made Patriot and THAAD air-defense systems, incoming missiles were not intercepted. Militarily, the incident was limited. Symbolically, it was devastating. The strike punctured the carefully cultivated image of the Gulf as an island of predictability and security, forcing investors and policymakers alike to reassess the region’s risk profile.

Conversations with European and Asian investors during the forum revealed a subtle but consequential shift. Asset managers overseeing multi-billion-dollar portfolios—once bullish on Qatari and Gulf investments—now speak more cautiously.

A “wait and see” posture has replaced earlier confidence. The concern is blunt: if even Doha cannot guarantee security, then long-term investments across the region carry geopolitical risks that no financial model can fully hedge.

This dilemma extends far beyond Qatar. Houthi attacks on Israel and Israeli retaliation have rendered the Red Sea shipping corridor increasingly unstable. Saudi Arabia’s flagship Red Sea developments, including NEOM and its luxury resort projects, depend on predictable logistics and secure maritime routes. Each missile launch and each counterstrike serve as a reminder that the Gulf’s economic aspirations rest on an exceptionally fragile security equilibrium.

The region’s core challenge is not open war, but a chronic “peace deficit.” Persistent low-intensity conflicts and unpredictable crises have locked the Middle East into a state of strategic limbo.

Gaza continues to burn. Sudan’s civil war grinds on. Yemen remains unresolved. Syria’s future is still uncertain. The Iran question looms largest of all. A collapse driven by sanctions and internal pressure could unleash regional chaos; survival, meanwhile, may embolden Tehran to further expand its proxy networks. Either outcome poses existential risks for Gulf states. Capital, technology, and ambition are abundant. Credible security guarantees are not—and that is precisely what money cannot buy.

From Petrodollars to Compute Dollars

Yet if security anxieties dominated private conversations, the public sessions at the Doha Forum showcased a strikingly different narrative: the Gulf’s determination to reinvent itself economically. If the past half-century was defined by petrodollars, the future being envisioned revolves around what might be called “compute dollars.” This is not incremental diversification, but a strategic reorientation toward artificial intelligence, data infrastructure, and green energy.

Saudi Arabia’s pivot is the most dramatic. Riyadh is assembling what it describes as the world’s largest AI investment program, projected to contribute $135 billion to the economy by 2030—roughly 12.4 percent of GDP. New AI research centers are already operating, attracting global firms and academic talent. In parallel, the kingdom plans to invest more than 700 billion riyals in the green economy, aiming to reach 50 percent renewable energy generation by the end of the decade.

The ambition is nothing less than a transformation from the world’s largest oil exporter into a dual hub of artificial intelligence and renewable power.

The UAE’s approach is more agile but no less ambitious. By passing the world’s first comprehensive Digital Assets Law, it has positioned Dubai as a global center for cryptocurrency and blockchain innovation. Massive investments in data centers and supercomputing infrastructure aim to turn the country into a digital bridge between East and West. As one Emirati official put it privately, the goal is not merely to host tech companies, but to become indispensable to the global computing network itself.

Qatar, for its part, is positioning itself as both a regional computing hub and a digital diplomacy platform—an extension of its role as mediator and convener, now translated into the digital domain.

Behind these efforts lies a shared strategic vision: to establish the Gulf as the world’s third economic pole, alongside the United States and Northeast Asia. This ambition rests on four structural advantages: sovereign wealth funds exceeding $4.5 trillion; young populations with expanding labor markets; growing domestic demand in digital and clean-energy sectors; and a geographic position linking Asia, Europe, and Africa. With Europe constrained by internal divisions and sluggish growth, Gulf leaders see a rare historical opening.

The Doha Forum is a manifestation of that belief—a bid to create a Middle Eastern analogue to Davos. The region can no longer be understood solely through the lenses of oil and conflict. Its future belongs to those fluent in history and technology, geopolitics and code, diplomacy and computation. This is not merely an accumulation of expertise, but a shift in strategic imagination.

Promise and Peril

The Middle East is changing faster than many outsiders recognize. Yet responding to that change requires a sober assessment of its limits. The region’s “peace deficit” remains the most immediate threat to its ambitions, shaping investment decisions and undermining long-term planning. Iran, Yemen, Gaza, Syria—these are not peripheral challenges but structural constraints.

There is also a deeper question about the Gulf’s development model itself. Can sustainable knowledge economies be built primarily through capital deployment rather than institutional evolution? Can imported talent and purchased technologies take root in societies still navigating complex political transitions? Can global human capital be attracted—and retained—under restrictive political systems?

The Gulf states’ ambitions are real, their investments vast, and their progress undeniable. But the leap from resource dependence to innovation leadership, from geopolitical clients to autonomous centers of power, demands more than money and vision. It requires durable security arrangements, resilient institutions, indigenous innovation ecosystems, and careful navigation of intensifying great-power competition.

The Middle East’s future is not foreordained. It will hinge on whether the region can resolve its security dilemmas, translate investment into sustainable growth, and build partnerships that extend beyond transactional convenience. The Doha Forum made one thing unmistakable: the Gulf is betting boldly on its future. Whether that wager succeeds will shape not only the region’s trajectory, but the contours of the global order now coming into view.