President Donald Trump claimed that Israeli and U.S. airstrikes had “completely and totally obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program, hailing the moment as a strategic turning point and encouraging dissidents to “Make Iran Great Again” through regime change. But in the days that followed, both statements began to look less like bold declarations and more like wishful thinking. And frankly, that may be for the best.

Iran may not be as weak as it appears. Its nuclear ambitions may not be extinguished. And paradoxically, a nuclear-capable Iran might not destabilize the region—but instead contribute to a more stable Middle East.

The Future of Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions

In the immediate aftermath of U.S. airstrikes on three Iranian nuclear facilities, the Trump administration engaged in victory laps, offering a reductive message: that the nuclear threat had been neutralized. But this is far from certain. In fact, both U.S. intelligence and assessments from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) suggest that the strikes may have set Iran’s nuclear program back by mere months—not years.

The precise scope of the damage remains unclear. But even more pressing is a deeper question: should the destruction of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure be viewed as a net positive?

Iran’s push toward nuclear capability is often dismissed as irrational or reckless. Yet from Tehran’s perspective, it is neither. It is a calculated act of deterrence—one rooted not in fanaticism but in strategic logic, dating back to the era of the Shah. As political scientist Kenneth Waltz once argued, nuclear powers act in their own self-interest. Despite Tehran’s incendiary rhetoric toward Israel, the regime is highly unlikely to engage in suicidal nuclear aggression.

As with Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions in the 1990s, Iran sees a nuclear arsenal not as a tool for first strike, but as a guarantor of survival—particularly in the face of Israel’s nuclear monopoly and the existential threat it represents to the Islamic Republic. The Middle East remains the only region in the world where a single state possesses a nuclear arsenal. This is not incidental—it is the result of Israeli strategy—and it contributes to the region’s volatility rather than reducing it.

Disarmament may be the ideal, but it’s not a realistic near-term solution. The more feasible path to regional stability lies in parity. The nuclear dynamic between India and Pakistan, for instance, while fraught, has established a form of balance. Their status as adversaries has been tempered by mutual deterrence, as shown in their most recent military standoff. The same logic could apply to Iran.

If Iran is barred from nuclear weapons, would the international community support another Middle Eastern country joining the club—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE? Could any of them accept a rival’s nuclear status? And would a condition for membership be alignment with the Abraham Accords? These are questions without easy answers. But what is certain is that the region lacks a credible nuclear counterweight—and that absence itself is a source of instability.

Tehran’s Strategic Options

Despite the recent airstrikes, Iran still has choices. The first—and perhaps most likely—is to double down on its nuclear ambitions. Reports suggest Iran retains more than 400 kilograms of enriched uranium, enough for multiple warheads, though the precise location of these stockpiles remains unknown. And given the breadth of nuclear expertise in the country, there may be little the U.S. or Israel can do to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear breakout if that’s the path it chooses.

A second possibility is a pivot toward a collaborative nuclear initiative with China or Russia, akin to the Bushehr reactor project completed with Russian assistance. Such an arrangement would offer diplomatic insulation while simultaneously raising the cost of Western intervention. An attack on a site with Chinese or Russian stakes would carry grave international consequences.

The third, and perhaps most constructive path, is a return to a JCPOA-style agreement. Under such a framework, Iran could agree to cap enrichment at 5 percent, transfer enriched uranium to Russia for secure storage, and engage in joint civilian reactor development with Russian technical assistance. This approach would not only constrain Iran’s nuclear capability but also encourage regional buy-in over time.

This deal could include a U.S.-backed non-aggression pact between Iran and Israel, alongside enforcement mechanisms that ensure automatic diplomatic consequences for any violations—whether by regional enrichment efforts, treaty abrogation, or a unilateral U.S. withdrawal. Crucially, the agreement could also trigger the automatic return of Iran’s stockpile in the event of breach.

The Mirage of Regime Change

Amid the chaos, a separate narrative has taken shape: that the strikes might catalyze regime change. Both Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have openly called on the Iranian people to rise up. Their rhetoric was underscored by Israel’s symbolic bombing of the gates of Evin Prison—a facility infamous for housing political prisoners—and a state media blitz urging mass revolt.

But this approach is naïve, and the unintended consequences could prove far more dangerous than any gains.

Iran is not a simple autocracy held together by a single strongman. It is a complex and fragile power-sharing system that balances the clerical establishment, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and an emerging moderate-reformist camp, now symbolized by President Masoud Pezeshkian. Removing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei would not necessarily open the door to democracy. More plausibly, it could create a vacuum in which the IRGC asserts dominance, unchecked by the religious elite.

Iran has long mastered the art of strategic ambiguity and calibrated retaliation. It has responded to provocations—whether attacks on its territory or those targeting its allies in Iraq and Lebanon—through limited, symbolic actions. These moves satisfy the IRGC’s hardliners while avoiding full-blown conflict with Israel or the United States.

But the most recent U.S. strikes may have shifted the calculus. If Washington has now demonstrated that it is willing to go all in, then what incentive does Khamenei have to continue playing the long game? If the regime believes its own survival is under direct threat, restraint may fall by the wayside—and a more aggressive response could follow.

Iran’s retaliatory strike in Qatar made this point plain. Even with advanced warning and limited force, Iran demonstrated its capacity to rattle the Gulf. No U.S. personnel were injured, but the message landed: Tehran can bring disruption to Doha or Dubai at will. Do Washington or Tel Aviv truly benefit from provoking a state with that kind of reach?

Strategic Miscalculation or Opportunity?

What initially appeared as a major U.S. strategic victory may ultimately be a costly error. Iran is not crumbling—it is adapting. And if pushed too far, it may accelerate toward the very outcome the strikes were intended to forestall: full nuclear capability, pursued outside the purview of international oversight.

In that light, perhaps the Obama-era JCPOA deserves a reevaluation. It may not have been perfect, but it offered a verifiable framework that slowed Iran’s progress, created space for diplomacy, and kept the nuclear issue from spinning out of control.

A lasting peace in the Middle East won’t come from airstrikes or the fantasy of regime collapse. It will require a sober engagement with the regime as it is, not as policymakers might wish it to be.

The unresolved question of Palestinian statehood still looms large. If Trump is serious about crafting a historic legacy, he would be better served leading efforts toward a durable peace anchored in strength, multilateralism, and a regional security architecture that includes the U.S., Europe, Russia, and China. Such a model could stabilize not only the Middle East but also serve as a blueprint for equilibrium in a multipolar world. The approach could be replicated in Eurasia and beyond.

If diplomacy can be salvaged—rooted in mutual deterrence, regional cooperation, and real enforcement—this crisis may yet evolve into something more constructive: not an escalation toward war, but a shift toward a more sustainable, realistic peace.

For all the ordinance dropped, Iran is still standing. Bruised, yes—but by no means broken.