Russia is expanding its geopolitical influence in the Arctic and Southeast Asia to counter Western dominance and strengthen its global strategic position.

Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s visit to Malaysia on July 27 marks a strategic extension of Moscow’s broader ambitions in the region. Malaysia, with its central role in ASEAN and its existing affiliations, provides Russia with a key opportunity to expand its economic and defense influence, especially as Malaysia prepares to chair the ASEAN Summit next year.

Historically, Malaysia and Russia have enjoyed strong ties, particularly in defense and space ventures during the 2000s. These past connections now serve as a foundation for rebuilding and enhancing bilateral relations after a decade in which Western and Chinese influences have dominated. For Malaysia, which is seeking to diversify its economic and defense partnerships, the timing is ideal. The nation’s interest in joining BRICS further aligns with Russia’s goals, offering Moscow a chance to deepen its regional leverage.

Russia’s focus on Southeast Asia is driven by the region’s strategic significance. It presents a counterbalance to U.S. influence and complements Beijing’s objectives. As the U.S. increases its presence, the region’s impact on Russia’s economic and defense interests becomes more pronounced. Russia’s development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) is part of this strategy, potentially redirecting trade routes and enhancing Moscow’s economic footprint in the region.

With limited close partnerships in Southeast Asia—primarily with Vietnam and India—Russia is keen to expand its influence through BRICS and closer engagement with ASEAN. Malaysia is viewed as a critical player in maintaining ASEAN’s centrality, which could, in turn, limit U.S. expansion in the region. Beyond its historical partnership with Vietnam, particularly in security and defense, Moscow seeks to strengthen ties with other regional players and bolster its relationship with ASEAN as a whole.

Lavrov praised Malaysia’s balanced stance on the Ukraine conflict during his visit, underscoring the importance Moscow places on the region in countering the influence of AUKUS, the Quad, and potentially NATO. With the possibility of future conflicts emerging in the region, Russia aims to assert itself as a key player, offering a narrative distinct from that of the U.S. and, to some extent, China. Russia wants to be seen as a vital force for economic and resource security—including energy and food—as well as a reliable defense partner, despite the ongoing Ukrainian crisis.

Europe has traditionally been Russia’s primary strategic focus, with Moscow’s quest for security, great-power status, and equal footing with major European powers shaping its policies. NATO’s eastward expansion dealt a significant blow to Russia’s ambitions in Europe, reinforcing Moscow’s belief that NATO remains fixated on encircling it.

The Arctic is Moscow’s next geopolitical frontier

Beyond Europe, Russia recognizes that the next geopolitical frontiers lie in the Arctic and Indo-Pacific regions. Moscow’s investments in Arctic energy projects are not only part of a broader global strategy but also vital for sustaining its defense capabilities against NATO. The exploitation of Arctic resources, which accelerated after the Soviet era, has been central to Russia’s economic recovery, with oil and gas playing a pivotal role since the early 2000s.

The Kremlin’s Arctic ambitions were spotlighted in 2006 when Russia sought to establish itself as an “energy superpower” and justify its inclusion in the G8. With rising temperatures making Arctic resources more accessible, Moscow sees a steady revenue stream that can support its agenda in Ukraine and counter deeper U.S.-led incursions.

This Arctic strategy also allows Russia to diversify its energy exports by linking its Arctic resources to Asian markets, thereby reducing its reliance on Europe and Ukraine as a conduit. The Arctic navigation routes to Asia offer Moscow a strategic lifeline, particularly in sustaining its military efforts in Ukraine.

Russia’s Arctic potential, once limited by harsh conditions, has now emerged as a critical opportunity. The Arctic Strategy 2035 highlights Moscow’s intent to capitalize on this potential. The militarization of the Arctic is inevitable, given the economic rewards and the strategic military foothold it offers. The development of the NSR along Russia’s Arctic coastline is key to this plan, providing an alternative to the Suez Canal and the Malacca Straits, which could lessen the dominance of these traditional routes. This development not only strengthens Moscow’s strategic position but also promises significant benefits for Beijing, reinvigorating its stalled Belt and Road Initiative.

Connecting the Russian Arctic to Asian markets further diminishes Moscow’s reliance on Europe and opens up new avenues in the rapidly growing markets of South and Southeast Asia. This geostrategic gem will be heavily defended, with a focus on securing territories around the Kola Peninsula and enhancing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities against U.S. and NATO forces.

The Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command is poised to ensure that these strategic maneuvers provide robust options for defending Russia’s interests. Melting ice and improved mobility offer new strike capabilities and enhanced deterrence in the Kola Peninsula. However, this also invites countermeasures from NATO, particularly as Russian military installations near the Baltic states become vulnerable to NATO’s long-range precision weapons.

Moscow’s long-term resilience

Russia’s expansive plains, devoid of natural barriers, coupled with persistent NATO and U.S. pressure from the West and the constraints on its northern flank, have left the Kremlin feeling cornered. This geopolitical entrapment has driven Moscow’s search for strategic warm-water ports and openings for both economic and military power projection. China and Central Asia remain valuable allies, bolstered by Beijing’s “no limits” partnership. However, historical tensions may eventually limit the future potential of these relationships.

For now, shared survival and strategic needs underpin Russia’s ties with China. Beijing serves as a natural buffer on Russia’s southern flank and helps Moscow maintain its grip on Central Asia, preventing Western influence from encroaching on this critical region.

In the long run, the setbacks in Ukraine may not significantly alter the global balance of power. It would be premature to assume that Russia’s military capabilities and strategic influence are permanently diminished. The 2008 war in Georgia, despite its challenges, spurred a military overhaul that led to Russia’s more effective actions in the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the intervention in Syria.

As the 21st century unfolds, Moscow recognizes the need to adapt to a declining West and a rising China. This evolving global landscape will introduce new dynamics in the long-standing competition between major powers, with Russia seeking to maintain its influence amidst these shifts.