The Pakistani Army is running out of viable options in Balochistan.

Recent attacks by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) have delivered a seismic blow to Pakistan. The province of Balochistan was rocked as separatist insurgents targeted police stations, railway lines, highways, and security forces’ camps, resulting in significant casualties among both civilians and security personnel. These assaults mark the most widespread and intense operations by ethnic militants in years, continuing a decades-long insurgency aimed at seceding from Pakistan. Balochistan, a resource-rich southwestern province, is a focal point for major China-led projects, including a strategic port and a gold and copper mine.

The timing of these attacks is significant, coinciding with the anniversary of the death of Akbar Bugti, a Baloch nationalist leader killed by Pakistani security forces in 2006. Bugti, a former governor and chief minister of Balochistan, joined the separatist movement in 2005 and was killed in a military operation near his hometown of Dera Bugti. His death has become a rallying point for Baloch insurgents, who annually escalate their attacks on Pakistani security forces during this period. However, this year’s attacks were unprecedented in scale and intensity, extending beyond security forces to target migrants from Punjab, Pakistan’s most prosperous and politically dominant province. The message from the separatists is clear: outsiders are not welcome in Balochistan.

In response, Pakistan’s military, which effectively dictates the nation’s key policies, has vowed to launch military operations in Balochistan. However, this course of action poses significant challenges for the Pakistani Army, challenges that may render such operations a nightmare.

Balochistan’s vast and sparsely populated terrain is a formidable obstacle. The region’s geography favors insurgents, who can easily launch guerrilla attacks and then disappear into the expansive landscape. Providing foolproof security across such a large area is nearly impossible for the government. Tracking down guerrilla fighters in Pakistan’s largest province by area is a near-impossible endeavor.

The situation is further complicated by Balochistan’s poorly guarded porous borders with Iran and Afghanistan. This porousness facilitates the cross-border movement of both insurgents and supplies. Compounding the problem, Pakistan’s strained relations with its neighbors prevent the coordination of joint strategies to curb insurgent movement across these borders.

A large-scale mobilization of forces would be required to monitor and dominate Balochistan effectively. However, Pakistan’s military resources are stretched thin. The army is already heavily engaged on multiple fronts. Forces cannot be spared from the Line of Control (LOC) with India, and the growing tensions with the Afghan Taliban mean that troops cannot be redirected from the Durand Line. Additionally, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, formerly known as North West Frontier Province, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan has been heavily engaging Pakistani security forces, further straining military resources. The General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi finds itself hard-pressed to increase troop levels in Balochistan.

Meanwhile, Baloch armed groups have significantly increased their capabilities. The Baloch Liberation Army, the largest Baloch insurgent group, has grown into a formidable force, boasting an estimated 3,500 to 4,000 fighters. Over the years, the BLA has enhanced its communication capabilities and weaponry. The resilience and adaptability of these insurgents have enabled them to counter various state counterinsurgency methods effectively. On the ground, these groups are capable of inflicting significant damage on the Pakistani Army through guerrilla tactics such as ambushes, IED blasts, sniper fire, and suicide attacks.

Despite Balochistan’s vast natural wealth, much of its population lives below the poverty line, fostering deep resentment towards the Pakistani state. A sizable portion of the Baloch population views the Pakistani establishment as exploitative, treating Balochistan as a colony to be looted. This strong anti-Pakistan sentiment makes it exceedingly difficult for the Army to gather credible intelligence from the local population. Without reliable ground information, any military operation is likely doomed to fail.

Islamabad has consistently sought to consolidate power and maintain control over Balochistan through its security forces, often at the expense of traditional and local structures. This approach has only served to weaken the state further while empowering hardliners within the insurgency. Launching military operations under the guise of a crackdown on insurgency may not only be ineffective but could also ignite an even fiercer phase of conflict. At the core of the ethno-nationalist armed insurgency lies a deep-rooted sense of oppression among the Baloch people. While the Pakistani establishment often blames foreign intelligence agencies for fueling these insurgencies, the reality is that the forceful occupation and exploitation of Balochistan’s natural resources have only strengthened the call for Baloch nationalism.

It remains to be seen whether the generals in GHQ Rawalpindi will reconsider their strategy. Still, one thing is clear: the Pakistani Army is running out of viable options in Balochistan.