Russia’s expanding military presence in Libya raises the possibility that tactics tested in the Sahel could soon threaten Europe’s southern flank.

In September, the Spanish newspaper El Mundo published a report that unsettled Madrid, Paris, and Rome. According to the paper, the CIA had warned all three governments of a possible Russian operation: Gerbera attack drones launched from shipping containers aboard ordinary merchant vessels in the Mediterranean. Each drone has a wingspan of 2.5 meters and a range of roughly 600 kilometers, and can be launched by catapult. Spain, France, or Italy could be a target.

European officials responded cautiously. Italy’s defense minister, Guido Crosetto, urged the public not to panic, even as he acknowledged that Russia remains a threat. Washington never officially confirmed the reported warning.

I read the story with a powerful sense of déjà vu. In the Sahel, it also began with assurances that there was no need to exaggerate. First, we were told that Russia had sent only instructors to Mali. Then, that they were merely protecting the government. Today, Russian drones and aircraft bomb villages alongside Mali’s army, while Russian mercenaries help suppress mutinies in other countries’ capitals. Europe now stands roughly where we stood five years ago. That is precisely why it should look closely at what happened to us.

The Africa Corps, which succeeded Wagner in Mali, answers directly to Russia’s Ministry of Defense. What began as a supposedly private venture has become an instrument of the Russian state, and the Sahel is where Moscow has been putting it through its paces.

Consider the evidence. According to figures from ACLED cited by Human Rights Watch on October 19, the Malian army and the Africa Corps conducted 49 airstrikes between April and August 2026, killing 89 civilians, twice the number recorded a year earlier. Human Rights Watch notes that the large attack drones described by witnesses are possessed in Mali only by the military and Russian forces. African Arguments, citing Bellingcat, has reported that the Africa Corps likely brought Shahed-type loitering munitions into the country as well.

In October, the army entered Kidal after rebels withdrew without a fight, attributing their retreat to Russian air power. And when elements of Niger’s military mutinied in Niamey in August, the junta turned to Russian forces, which helped put down the revolt.

The significance lies not only in the scale of these operations but in the capabilities they cultivate: drone warfare, logistical control, protection of allied regimes, and information operations. Fuel convoys bound for Bamako now move under Russian escort. These methods can be transferred from one region to another. The question is where Moscow might use them next.

Libya offers an answer. Over the past 18 months, Russia has been building a logistical and military bridge between the Sahel and the Mediterranean.

In June, U.S. geospatial intelligence publicly reported that Moscow was planning, financing, and constructing infrastructure at six Libyan air bases: Al-Jufra, Al-Khadim, Al-Qardabiya, Brak al-Shati, Tamanhint, and Maaten al-Sarra. Some already accommodate MiG-29 fighter jets, air defenses, and drones. At least 1,800 Russian personnel are reportedly stationed in the country.

In September, two Russian cargo ships arrived in Tobruk under escort from a large landing ship. The same vessels had been photographed in Baltiysk a month earlier. Libyan sources told the Nova news agency that their cargo included air-defense systems, electronic-warfare equipment, and ammunition, with some of the equipment flown onward to Mali within two days. In October, forces loyal to Khalifa Haftar displayed a dozen Belarusian Mirotvorets jet-powered attack drones.

That bridge can carry traffic in both directions. For now, much of the equipment is moving south, toward the Sahel. But analysts at the Washington Institute warn that a foothold in Libya would give Russia a base for projecting power toward NATO’s southern flank. In a conflict, it could constrain the alliance’s freedom of action at sea and in the air. More important, they argue, Moscow is creating “options for asymmetric escalation” that it can exploit when circumstances suit it.

Now reconsider the warning reported by El Mundo. Four elements deserve attention.

First are the drones themselves. A plan to launch Gerberas from merchant ships would not require bases on European soil. It would require access to ports through which containers can move and stretches of sea where cargo inspections are limited. Tobruk already receives sanctioned vessels under military escort. European officials have also observed that unexplained drone sightings off their coasts sometimes coincide with the passage of ships linked to Russia’s “shadow fleet.”

Second is the selection of possible targets. Sources cited by the Spanish newspaper pointed to one common feature: Spain, France, and Italy are all due to hold elections in 2027. On September 19, the pro-Russian Telegram channel Rybar published a map proposing that Algeria receive Geran-5 drones capable of striking French aircraft factories, military installations, and nuclear power plants. That is not an official Kremlin declaration. It does, however, offer a glimpse of the scenarios circulating in pro-Russian military circles.

Third is migration. The Haftar family, among Moscow’s closest regional partners, controls stretches of coastline from which migrant boats depart for Crete and Lampedusa. Last year, its authorities expelled an EU delegation from Benghazi, including a European commissioner. This October, Brussels allocated another €25 million to eastern Libya for migration control. Europe, in effect, is paying for stability to authorities operating beside Russian military facilities.

Finally, there are Europe’s defensive vulnerabilities. NATO’s southern flank remains comparatively exposed, while Italy has deployed a SAMP/T air-defense battery to Estonia. Some allies have pressed for greater attention to Russian mercenaries in Libya during the alliance’s new defense-planning cycle, but no concrete decision has followed.

Skeptics will point out that the CIA has not publicly confirmed the reported warning, and that a drone launched from Libya could not necessarily reach Sicily, roughly 700 kilometers away. Both objections matter. Yet no one announced a Russian takeover of the Sahel, either. First came the airfields, then the depots, then the “instructors,” and finally the bombs. We have already traveled that road to its end. Europe may only be approaching the beginning.