Pavlo Demchuk is a Senior Legal Advisor at Transparency International Ukraine, where he specializes in criminal law, asset recovery, and the design and oversight of anti-corruption institutions. A graduate of Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, Demchuk defended his PhD in March 2024 with a dissertation examining legality as a core component of the rule-of-law principle in criminal justice. Prior to joining Transparency International Ukraine, he served as a judge’s assistant at the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC), giving him firsthand exposure to the procedural mechanics—and vulnerabilities—of Ukraine’s anti-corruption system.

Demchuk is a frequent legal analyst and columnist, writing for Transparency International Ukraine and Ukrainska Pravda on topics ranging from HACC jurisprudence and plea agreements to statutes of limitations and reform of the Asset Recovery and Management Agency (ARMA). His work has helped shape legislative debates over asset recovery, management, and confiscation, while consistently emphasizing the importance of due-process safeguards and institutional independence—particularly for NABU and SAPO.

In this interview, Demchuk outlines what effective ARMA reform requires in practice rather than on paper: merit-based leadership selection insulated by international oversight, independent external audits, competitive appointment of asset managers, and a more transparent Unified Register of Seized Assets. He also examines how recent legislative reversals have partially restored anti-corruption institutions’ autonomy, where risks to independence remain, and why deterrence ultimately depends not on headline convictions, but on real confiscation, enforceable sanctions, and procedural credibility across the system.

This interview has been lightly edited for clarity and length.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Under the new ARMA reform law, which implementation steps will determine whether the reform delivers tangible results in 2025–26 rather than remaining a formal or symbolic success?

Pavlo Demchuk: The new ARMA reform law covers three key areas that should ensure the agency’s success.

First, these are updated procedures for selecting the ARMA head. International experts are now involved in the selection commission, which should protect the process from political influence and ensure the selection of the most competent candidate. This is critically important, as leadership determines the agency’s strategic direction and its capacity to manage seized assets effectively.

Second, the law introduces a mechanism for independent external audits of ARMA’s activities. This will allow for an objective assessment of the agency’s effectiveness, identification of systemic problems, and development of recommendations for their elimination. Regular audits should ensure ARMA’s accountability.

Third, the law establishes new procedures for selecting managers of seized assets. This should improve the quality of asset management and the preservation of asset value until confiscation. Transparent, competitive selection of managers minimizes corruption risks and ensures a professional approach to asset management.

In addition, the law significantly expands the scope of information published in the Unified Register of Seized Assets. This strengthens public oversight and allows ARMA to analyze its own performance better, identify problem areas, and make informed management decisions.

An important innovation is the introduction of an asset identification stage prior to transfer to ARMA. This means that a detailed assessment of the asset will be conducted first, including its characteristics, value, legal and financial encumbrances, and ownership structure. Such preliminary work allows ARMA officials to thoroughly assess the information and provide prosecutors with qualified advice on whether transferring a specific asset into management is appropriate. This increases effectiveness, as not all seized assets require active management, and some may be problematic in terms of preserving value.

Jacobsen: As asset recovery accelerates, what safeguards are most critical to preserving asset value and protecting due process while still enabling timely confiscation?

Demchuk: To effectively preserve asset value while ensuring due process and accelerating ultimate recovery, several key safeguards are required.

The first safeguard is comprehensive asset identification at the initial stage. It is necessary to establish full information about the asset, including financial obligations such as loans or mortgages, legal encumbrances such as court disputes or third-party rights, and the asset’s composition. For example, an enterprise may include real estate, equipment, and intellectual property. In Ukraine, this will be facilitated by newly introduced asset identification procedures, which have not yet begun operating. Without such detailed information, it is impossible to make sound decisions about asset management, and the risk of devaluation increases.

The second safeguard is the rapid and high-quality appointment of asset managers by ARMA. Delays in appointing managers can result in physical deterioration of property, loss of market value, or theft. Under recent legislative changes, clear deadlines for transferring assets to ARMA have been established for the first time. This should eliminate situations where assets remain unmanaged for years. The new rules governing asset management will take effect in January 2026, as bylaws and technical infrastructure are currently under development.

The third safeguard is the timely consideration of criminal cases by courts. The longer the proceedings last, the lower the chances of effective confiscation. Statutes of limitations may expire, resulting in release from criminal liability and automatic return of property. Prolonged proceedings also allow defendants to engage in procedural manipulation while assets lose value. Courts must therefore consider such cases within reasonable timeframes, consistent with both national interests and fair-trial standards.

🇺🇦🇪🇺TI Ukraine and CSOs presented the second Shadow Report under Chapters 23 and 24 of the European Commission’s Report on Ukraine’s Progress under the 2024 EU Enlargement Package.

📌TI Ukraine experts provided 143 recommendations and identified three key problem areas:… pic.twitter.com/Y91Xue4UTc

— Transparency International Ukraine (@TransparencyUA) October 22, 2025

Jacobsen: Law No. 4555-IX has now entered into force, albeit partially corrected. From an institutional-design perspective, what risks to prosecutorial and investigative independence does it still pose?

Demchuk: Most of the negative provisions of Law No. 4555-IX were repealed by Law No. 4560-IX of July 31, 2025. This corrective law eliminated the most dangerous risks for NABU and SAPO.

First, NABU’s exclusive jurisdiction was restored. Under the original version of Law No. 4555-IX, other agencies could interfere in investigations within NABU’s competence. Now, other agencies may investigate NABU cases only under exceptional circumstances of martial law and only by decision of the SAPO head or the Prosecutor General, which is an important safeguard of independence.

Second, the powers of the Office of the Prosecutor General were limited. The Prosecutor General can no longer directly interfere in NABU investigations or demand case materials, bypassing SAPO. NABU detectives are accountable exclusively to SAPO prosecutors, ensuring specialization and independence in investigating high-level corruption.

Third, SAPO’s autonomy was restored. The SAPO head now independently manages the prosecutor’s office without interference from the Prosecutor General or deputies. This is fundamental, as SAPO was created as a specialized, independent body for prosecuting top-level corruption.

Fourth, SAPO’s procedural powers were reinstated. The SAPO head again has authority to approve extensions of investigation periods, notify top officials of suspicion, and authorize urgent searches in exceptional cases. These powers are necessary for prompt and effective investigations.

Fifth, the “single-window” mechanism for closing cases was abolished. The Prosecutor General can no longer unilaterally close cases against top officials while bypassing SAPO, a provision that previously posed clear risks of political interference.

However, Law No. 4560-IX corrected only part of the damage. Law No. 4555-IX also abolished competitive appointment procedures for positions in the Office of the Prosecutor General and regional prosecutor’s offices, creating risks of politicization. To fully remedy the harm, these competitive procedures must be restored to ensure professionalism and independence.

Jacobsen: NABU’s first independent audit identified a broad set of legislative and internal priorities. Which reforms should be sequenced first to ensure momentum rather than fragmentation?

Demchuk: NABU’s first independent audit identified a wide range of problems and issued recommendations both to parliament and directly to the Bureau. These two tracks should be pursued in parallel.

Legislative recommendations include ensuring NABU’s autonomous wiretapping capacity independent of the SSU, establishing additional safeguards for independent forensic expertise, repealing the “Lozovyi amendments” on automatic case closures, clarifying procedures for transferring cases when jurisdiction issues arise, and introducing disciplinary liability for officials who deliberately violate NABU’s jurisdiction.

For internal reforms, the audit emphasized four areas: strengthening whistleblower protection by removing identifying data where legally permissible; improving information security through official mobile devices or secure personal-device policies; establishing objective verification procedures for statistical reporting; and, most importantly, developing and implementing a comprehensive strategic plan with measurable goals. This strategic plan should be accompanied by a strategic human-resources framework to guide recruitment, development, and retention.

In my view, legislative and internal reforms can proceed simultaneously. Among internal reforms, however, the development of a comprehensive strategic plan should be prioritized, as it provides the foundation for all other changes.

Jacobsen: Drawing on HACC practice, what elements of plea agreements actually matter for deterrence—and where does the current system still fall short?

Demchuk: Ensuring deterrence does not always require actual imprisonment. Conditional sentences can have a strong preventive effect, but only if several conditions are met.

First, effective monitoring of compliance with probation conditions is essential. If violations result in real imprisonment, this creates a meaningful deterrent. In Ukraine, however, the probation system has not yet reached a level where consistent monitoring can be guaranteed.

Second, convicted individuals must be deprived of the ability to continue engaging in corruption. This requires mandatory disqualification from public service, local government, and state enterprises. Individuals convicted of corruption should not retain access to public funds or authority.

Third, special confiscation of criminal assets must be applied. If illegally acquired property is retained, conditional sentencing appears as a form of buying impunity. Confiscation must be real, not merely formal.

Currently, several problems persist. Criminal-record periods following conditional sentences may be unjustifiably short, allowing convicted individuals to quickly return to public office. Special confiscation is applied inconsistently, often due to insufficient prosecutorial work or unclear legislative provisions. Transparency in sentence execution is also lacking, making it difficult for the public to assess whether confiscation and disqualification have actually occurred.

Jacobsen: Statutes of limitations continue to enable high-profile corruption cases to collapse. What specific legal rewrite would prevent de facto automatic closures without violating reasonable-time guarantees?

Demchuk: Automatic case closures typically refer to proceedings closed due to expired pre-trial investigation deadlines under the “Lozovyi amendments.” In such cases, proceedings are closed automatically at the preparatory hearing stage if indictments are submitted late.

Closures based on statutes of limitations are different. They require a court decision and the consent of the accused. If consent is withheld, the case proceeds but without punishment.

To reduce closures in corruption cases, the law must reflect the objective complexity of investigating economic crimes. These cases often require international legal assistance, complex forensic examinations, and the reconstruction of multi-layered corruption schemes. These processes take time, while statutes of limitations continue to run.

Reform should therefore include new grounds for suspending limitation periods, such as time spent awaiting international assistance or conducting forensic examinations. The expiration point should also shift from appellate proceedings to first-instance consideration, eliminating incentives for procedural delay. At the same time, reforms must respect constitutional guarantees of reasonable-time adjudication.

Jacobsen: Ukraine has debated imposing a two-month cap on pre-trial property seizure. What judicial-oversight model better balances property rights with effective confiscation in complex corruption cases?

Demchuk: The debate surrounding the introduction of a two-month limit on pre-trial property seizure reflects a deeper systemic problem—namely, the insufficient effectiveness of existing judicial oversight mechanisms and the inconsistent execution of court decisions. In reality, abuses related to unjustified or prolonged seizure of property would be significantly reduced if two core elements functioned properly.

First, courts must meaningfully exercise their judicial oversight role. Under current law, judges are required to consider motions for property seizure and assess their necessity and proportionality. In practice, however, such motions are sometimes approved in a formalistic manner, without thorough verification of whether seizure is genuinely required or proportionate to the investigative needs of the case.

Second, pre-trial investigation bodies must actually comply with court decisions lifting property seizures. At present, this does not always occur. There are documented cases in which investigative authorities continue to retain property despite a court order lifting the seizure, effectively ignoring judicial decisions and undermining legal safeguards.

Because of these persistent failures, legislative initiatives periodically emerge that attempt to address the problem through rigid, mechanical solutions—most notably, by imposing strict time limits on the duration of seizures. The logic behind these proposals is straightforward: if law-enforcement bodies abuse seizure powers, the law should sharply limit how long property can remain under seizure. However, such “brute-force” approaches create new risks, as they fail to account for the objective complexity of certain investigations.

This is particularly true for complex corruption cases, which often require international legal assistance, lengthy forensic examinations, and detailed reconstruction of financial flows through offshore structures. Artificially short deadlines may not lead to better protection of rights, but to the collapse of legitimate cases and ineffective confiscation.

A judicial-oversight model that truly balances property rights with effective confiscation should therefore rely not on mechanical time limits, but on demanding, substantive judicial scrutiny at every stage of the process. Courts must function as genuine arbiters, rigorously assessing the necessity and proportionality of each restriction on property rights. At the same time, real accountability must exist so that neither investigators nor judges can abuse seizure mechanisms with impunity.

Jacobsen: Finally, where should the line be drawn between confidentiality and publicity during the asset-seizure and transfer process—and how should that balance shift as cases move forward?

Demchuk: The balance between publicity and confidentiality is dynamic and stage-dependent. At early investigative stages, confidentiality is essential to prevent asset concealment. Information on asset searches is part of pre-trial secrecy and cannot be disclosed without authorization.

After seizure—and especially after transfer to ARMA—publicity becomes paramount. The expanded Unified Register of Seized Assets represents an important step toward accountability. Its effectiveness, however, will depend on technical quality, accuracy, and accessibility.

Jacobsen: Thank you for the opportunity and your time, Pavlo.