Pavlo Horiachev is a Ukrainian UAV and UGV instructor, engineer, and defence-technology analyst with Dignitas, working at the forefront of one of the most consequential military transformations of the 21st century. Through Victory Robots and other training initiatives, he helps prepare Ukrainian soldiers for a battlefield increasingly defined by drones, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence, and rapid technological adaptation. Drawing on three decades of experience in software engineering, data analytics, telecommunications, banking, and systems architecture, Horiachev combines deep technical expertise with frontline wartime realities, advising innovation teams and training operators in the practical challenges of modern combat.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen interviews Pavlo Horiachev about Ukraine’s expanding drone warfare capabilities, the prospect of inflicting 50,000 Russian casualties per month through unmanned systems, and the lessons NATO must learn from a conflict that has transformed military doctrine. Horiachev argues that technological superiority alone is insufficient; success depends on experienced operators, specialized trainers, constant adaptation, and the ability to translate battlefield lessons into institutional knowledge. As Ukraine continues to innovate under fire, he contends that Western allies should develop dedicated drone units and train alongside Ukrainian specialists to absorb hard-won expertise earned at enormous cost on the modern battlefield.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Ukrainian and allied estimates suggest that Russia is currently suffering roughly 30,000 to 35,000 killed or seriously wounded troops each month. Drones are now believed to account for the overwhelming majority of battlefield casualties, with some estimates placing their role as high as 95 percent.

Ukrainian military planners have at times discussed the possibility of increasing that figure to 50,000 Russian losses per month through expanded drone operations. From your perspective as someone working closely with unmanned systems, how realistic is that target under current battlefield conditions, and what capabilities would Ukraine need to develop to make it achievable over the long term?

Pavlo Horiachev: Yes, it is realistic. It is realistic if we make our drones work at longer distances. It is very hard to find targets if they do not exist near you.

First of all, we have to create the capacity to kill or incapacitate 50,000 occupiers. Every unit, in every direction, has to increase its capacity, maybe two times more than what we have now.

If the enemy starts a large offensive against a unit, then we need much greater drone capacity. A large offensive means a huge number of soldiers. So we need to expand our drone capabilities significantly. In that case, if enough targets attack us, we can reach 50,000.

Of course, if the Russians stop their offensive, it would be hard to find enough targets. In this case, we need to use more middle and deep strikes to reach these digits.

And yes, we are always finding more effective ways to strike more targets. So, yes, we are working on it, and it is realistic. We can build the capacity to achieve these results.

Jacobsen: During a recent NATO exercise involving Ukrainian participation, reports suggested that Ukrainian drone tactics rendered multiple battalions combat-ineffective, prompting one commander to remark, “We’re fucked.” The episode reinforced a growing belief among Western military leaders that Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped modern warfare through rapid innovation, battlefield adaptation, and large-scale drone deployment.

As NATO and other potential security partnerships reassess their defence strategies, what lessons should they be drawing from Ukraine’s experience? More specifically, how should future alliances incorporate Ukrainian expertise into military training, procurement, doctrine, and counter-drone defence planning?

Horiachev: Yes, that is a good question. First of all, it is not only about procurement. In my experience, this is very hard to prepare for. First, it is about experience at the unit level. Ukrainians have a huge experience. It is not only about drones.

For now, we have thousands of drones of many different models. But first of all, it is about the people who use these drones, how they use them, and how they think and plan. You can buy very good drones, and they still may not work in a particular environment. Pilots we train can use a wide range of drone models and choose the right one for the right environment to perform a successful mission.

The main thing is your crew’s experience. And this experience cannot be gained only through theoretical exercises.

You do not need to train your entire army to that level in peacetime. The hardest and longest part is to train trainers. When we train pilots, it takes three to six months to become good specialists in drone warfare. But when we train trainers, it takes at least a year to understand whether someone will become a good trainer. And when you have enough trainers, you can scale experience pretty fast.

So armies do not need to train their entire forces in deep drone tactics at once. It is enough to have a specialized unit, for example, 500 people, maybe 1,000, who are always training. They should, for example, train every day with Ukrainians to share this experience. Then you will have a trained unit capable of using modern drones.

It is very expensive to buy drones for all the army units, especially the best drones. But this unit, consisting of 500 people, maybe 1,000, should always be using the latest types of drones and the best types of drones. They should always be training in how to use them. They should always train in tactics and have a lot of training with Ukrainian teams, for example.

After that, this unit can train the entire army in case of a large invasion or another major threat.

Yes, Ukraine can share its experience, and we would be glad to do so with partners. Experience itself is always based on mistakes and successes. So you can gain experience by making your own mistakes or by learning and training previously.

But in war, every mistake can be your last action, so you cannot make too many mistakes yourself. That’s why I suggest learning from Ukraine. All our experience has been paid for in blood and by the deaths of our soldiers. Yes, we collect all this experience, analyze it, prepare training, and then conduct training. It’s like traffic laws: they are paid for with blood, and children study before coming onto the road or starting to drive. And sending your soldiers to the modern battlefield without proper training is like sending your children to play football on a highway, but much more dangerous.

Yes, we would be glad to share this experience with our partners, because our enemy is sharing their experience right now. North Koreans have been fighting on the battlefield against us. So our common enemies have this experience, whereas our partners are not sufficiently trained.

We can see this in situations involving Shahed-type threats, including in the Gulf, where states are still adapting to mass drone and missile attacks. They are not ready enough. So, yes, Ukraine can share this experience with units from Canada, the United States, Germany, and other partner countries. We believe we will be stronger together with our partners, because it seems our enemies do not plan to stop, and one day we will fight together against them. So I prefer to fight alongside trained teams rather than lose people because they didn’t have time for training.

In all those countries, we can conduct training with our partners. For example, we can do it somewhere in Europe. It would be a great idea to establish these trainings at training centers in Europe, where we can share experience with our partners.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for your time today. I appreciate it.