Ukraine has demonstrated something that would have seemed improbable just a few years ago: a country does not necessarily need a conventional navy to impose prohibitive costs on an adversary at sea.

By combining the persistent use of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) with intelligence support and coastal strike capabilities, Kyiv compelled the Russian Black Sea Fleet to disperse. Surface ships were pushed away from critical naval bases, and vessels once used for coercion became liabilities—large, exposed targets in a contested maritime environment. The implications of that shift extend well beyond the Black Sea.

In a Taiwan contingency, the United States would confront a navy far more capable than Russia’s. Yet the underlying logic remains strikingly similar. In the opening phase of such a conflict, the side able to generate dispersed, survivable, and renewable anti-ship missile salvos would likely set the tempo of the campaign. If Ukraine has shown that a weaker state can neutralize elements of a naval fleet through maritime drones, the United States must ask a more difficult question: what would happen if the U.S. Navy deployed a large number of attritable, missile-equipped medium unmanned surface vessels (MUSVs), particularly in the critical first week of a Taiwan conflict?

The most useful benchmark for this question comes from a CSIS report. In its baseline scenario, U.S., Japanese, and Taiwanese forces succeed in repelling a Chinese invasion, but at considerable cost: roughly 382 aircraft and 43 naval vessels are lost over approximately 14 days. In a more optimistic scenario, the campaign is compressed to seven days, with losses reduced to 290 aircraft and 24 ships. The strategic takeaway is not merely whether China can be defeated, but how quickly the invasion force can be dismantled before losses on the allied side mount to unsustainable levels.

It is at precisely this juncture that missile-equipped MUSVs could matter. Their purpose is not to replace destroyers, submarines, or tactical aircraft. Rather, their value lies in expanding the number of distributed shooters, increasing anti-ship salvo density, and shifting risk away from crewed platforms. In a Taiwan scenario, that shift could produce four distinct operational effects.

First, MUSVs could add meaningful anti-ship missile mass during the decisive opening window—roughly the first seven to ten days. The CSIS analysis makes clear that the fastest path to victory lies in destroying the Chinese amphibious fleet before it can establish a durable beachhead. As distributed launch platforms, attritable MUSVs could serve as supplementary magazines, increasing the volume of fire and allowing maritime strike power to be projected forward without exposing U.S. Navy personnel to the same degree of risk.

Second, MUSVs could ease, at least partially, the burden placed on tactical airpower. The CSIS report underscores a sobering reality: many allied aircraft are destroyed on the ground, including at bases such as Kadena in Japan, rather than in aerial combat. If missile-equipped MUSVs can assume a portion of the maritime strike mission, the need to mass aircraft for repeated anti-ship sorties may be reduced. This would not eliminate the vulnerability of forward air bases, but it could lower the density of high-value assets exposed to early strikes.

Third, MUSVs could strengthen the resilience of the kill web. A Taiwan conflict would not hinge on a single, uninterrupted kill chain; instead, success would depend on the ability to generate continuous salvos despite jamming, disruption, and attrition. A diversified MUSV force—including shooter, ISR-support, decoy, and communications relay variants—could help preserve targeting continuity even as parts of the network degrade. Their contribution would therefore extend beyond missile capacity, reinforcing the persistence and adaptability of maritime strike operations.

Fourth, MUSVs could compress the duration of the war itself. The difference between CSIS’s baseline and optimistic scenarios illustrates how even modest reductions in campaign length can yield significant benefits. Shortening the conflict from 14 days to around 10 could reduce allied aircraft losses by roughly 50 and ship losses by 10 to 11. If the decisive phase were reduced further—to nine days, for example—the savings could approach 60 to 70 aircraft and approximately 14 vessels. These are not precise forecasts, but they point to the scale of potential impact.

The next question is one of force size. What matters most is not the number of platforms per se, but how many additional effective anti-ship missiles those platforms can deliver in the opening phase of the war. A conservative estimate suggests that a force of 80 to 120 missile-equipped MUSVs—significantly larger than current U.S. Navy plans for the Indo-Pacific by 2030—would be required to achieve meaningful operational impact. Below that threshold, their contribution may remain largely tactical. Above it, particularly when integrated with ISR and decoy variants, they could function as a theater-level lever capable of influencing campaign duration.

None of this suggests that large-scale MUSV deployment is a panacea. Three conditions, at a minimum, would need to be met. First, command-and-control systems must be sufficiently mature to connect distributed shooters with reliable targeting data. Second, MUSVs must be capable of rapid reloading and redeployment; otherwise, their initial salvo risks becoming a one-off event rather than part of a sustained campaign. Third, platform autonomy and reliability must be proven in contested environments. Even systems designed to be attritable must demonstrate enough robustness to function under the stresses of both development and combat.

The broader lesson from Ukraine is often misinterpreted. The point is not that inexpensive drones will replace traditional naval forces. Rather, attritable maritime systems—when deployed at scale, effectively networked, and aligned with operational objectives—can reshape the character of naval warfare. Ukraine did not destroy the Black Sea Fleet in a decisive engagement. Instead, it gradually rendered Russian naval operations more dangerous, less predictable, and increasingly inefficient.

That same logic could apply in a Taiwan contingency. Attritable, missile-equipped MUSVs would not win the war on their own. But if they accelerate the destruction of an invasion fleet, increase maritime-based strike capacity during the decisive early phase, and reduce the exposure of manned platforms, they could materially improve the outcome. From the perspective outlined in the CSIS report, even a modest reduction in the length of the conflict could preserve dozens of aircraft and multiple warships. That effect alone makes the MUSV concept difficult to ignore.

Ukraine has shown that a state without a traditional navy can force a stronger opponent to retreat at sea. The sharper lesson for the United States is this: the side that can generate distributed, attritable missile mass quickly—and sustain it—may be the side that wins before the costs become overwhelming.