The tragedy of Sudan’s ongoing war, now entering its third year, is most painfully measured in human suffering: tens of thousands have been killed, and more than 13 million people have been displaced. The International Rescue Committee has described the situation as “the biggest humanitarian crisis ever recorded.” But if that level of devastation feels too remote or politically complex to galvanize global action, then perhaps the growing risk to one of the world’s most crucial shipping routes—the Red Sea—will succeed in focusing international resolve on the urgent need for peace in Sudan.

The Red Sea, which connects the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal, is not just a vital maritime corridor—it is a region of immense economic and military consequence. Every major global power considers it strategically indispensable, and this is reflected in the proliferation of military and intelligence installations that surround it. With 12 percent of global trade transiting its waters, any disruption quickly becomes a chokepoint with far-reaching effects on global supply chains. For that reason alone, the competition among states to maintain a foothold in the region remains fierce.

As Ayman Imtiaz has pointed out, recent years have seen the Red Sea become increasingly volatile. Iranian-backed Houthi rebels have repeatedly attacked commercial and military vessels, turning the waters into a stage for proxy confrontations. Sudan is now emerging as another key arena in this escalating contest for influence. Not content with supporting the Houthis, Iran has become deeply embedded in Sudan’s civil war by backing the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). According to reporting from Bloomberg based on a U.S. State Department Sudan Observatory report, Tehran has supplied the SAF with Mohajer-6 drones, small arms, and other munitions.

Yet Iran’s involvement goes beyond material support. According to policy analyst Salah Hassan Jumaa, the SAF’s ties with the Muslim Brotherhood have drawn the Sudanese military even deeper into Tehran’s orbit. The Brotherhood’s longstanding influence within the SAF has enabled Iran to formalize a strategic alliance, tightening its grip on Sudan and, by extension, the Red Sea. This alignment significantly boosts Iran’s leverage in the region—both militarily and ideologically.

Meanwhile, jihadist groups are taking full advantage of Sudan’s instability to reassert their presence along this strategically vital corridor. The Islamist Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, aligned with the SAF, was conspicuously active during the capture of the Presidential Palace in Khartoum. Its leader, Al-Musbah Abu Zaid, is reportedly linked to Mukhtar Badri, a figure known for his longstanding ties to global terrorism networks. As early as October 2022—six months before the current war erupted—Al Qaeda figure Abu Hudhayfah al-Sudan issued a call to Sudanese youth, proclaiming: “Sudan’s moment has come; chaos is our chance to sow the seeds of jihad.”

Reuters, citing interviews with military and intelligence officials as well as Islamist figures, has detailed the extent to which Sudan could again become a haven for international jihadist activity. The country once offered sanctuary to Osama bin Laden, and a resurgence of militant Islamism amid state collapse could deepen the country’s crisis. In the early months of the conflict, Reuters documented the death of an Islamist fighter named Mohammed al-Fadl, who had been fighting alongside the SAF—an early indication of the ideological alliances at play.

Iran’s ambitions to secure a formal military presence at Port Sudan are well documented. In February, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssif traveled to Tehran for high-level meetings with Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian of the Supreme National Security Council, Speaker of Parliament Mohammad-Bagher Qalibaf, and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. During the visit, Iran publicly reaffirmed its support for the SAF. While Tehran has not yet secured an official base in Port Sudan, it has already begun using the port as a transit hub in its regional weapons network, supplying the SAF with the same drones it furnishes to the Houthis in Yemen.

The international community would do well to treat Sudan’s war—and the related destabilization of the Red Sea—as a matter of urgent priority. The convergence of Iranian statecraft and jihadist militancy, both operating with the support of the SAF, raises the real possibility that rivals to the West could turn the Red Sea into an economic pressure point. If the staggering civilian death toll and the displacement of millions fail to mobilize global action, perhaps the threat to commercial shipping lanes—and the economic fallout that could follow—will compel international leaders to act.