
A Century Later, China Might Want Outer Manchuria Back
Russia and China, historical rivals, have in recent decades formed a strategic understanding, largely driven by shared concern over American unipolar dominance. Yet despite their rhetoric of a “no limits” partnership, that relationship has begun to show unmistakable signs of strain—especially as Russia’s international standing continues to deteriorate.
For the Chinese Communist Party, one of its primary long-term objectives is to overcome what it calls the “century of humiliation,” a historical arc in which China lost key territories to Western and imperial powers. To complete this symbolic reversal, Beijing would likely need to address the lingering territorial loss of Outer Manchuria, still held by Russia.
Russia’s Seizure of Outer Manchuria
In the 19th century, the Russian Empire expanded rapidly eastward, exploiting the weakened condition in Central Asia, Mongolia, and the Qing Dynasty’s China. Between 1858 and 1860, during a time of deep internal conflict in China and mounting external threats, Russia seized upon the British-led Opium Wars as a distraction to claim strategic territory in Manchuria.
By threatening further military aggression, Russia forced the Qing Dynasty to cede Outer Manchuria through the Treaty of Aigun in 1858 and the Convention of Peking in 1860. Moscow wasted no time in colonizing the area, founding the port city of Vladivostok, which would later become a critical base for the Russian Pacific Fleet. The region passed through several iterations of Russian statehood—from the empire to the Soviet Union to the current Russian Federation—yet it has remained under Moscow’s control since.

The Recalibration of Sino-Russian Relations
During the Sino-Soviet split, the United States capitalized on the discord between the two communist powers. Through the “Kissinger Doctrine,” Washington pivoted toward Beijing, building a pragmatic alliance against Moscow. That shift coincided with a period of Cold War volatility and controversial U.S. complicity in events such as the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and the atrocities during the Bangladeshi liberation war.
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, the post-Soviet Russian Federation and a newly assertive China began to realign once more. Despite having relatively stable ties with the United States, both nations grew increasingly interested in presenting a united front against U.S. influence.
Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping—two men drawn to centralized power and historical grievance—their countries have adopted more openly confrontational foreign policies. They have also rekindled imperial rhetoric, with land claims and regional ambitions that have unsettled neighbors and accelerated regional defense coalitions.
From Eastern Europe to East Asia, countries have turned to the United States as a counterweight to perceived Russian and Chinese aggression. The result has been a gradual tightening of strategic and military partnerships across these regions. Meanwhile, Beijing and Moscow continue to offer each other diplomatic platitudes and limited military coordination, even as their alliance begins to fray.
Cracks in the “No Limits” Partnership
With the United States distracted by prolonged interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria—and weakened by the global financial crisis—Russia and China moved quickly to expand their spheres of influence. Russia’s intervention in Syria reshaped the conflict, and its aggressive moves into Georgia and Ukraine were met with limited Western resistance.
China, for its part, overtook the United States as a primary trading partner in many parts of the world and dramatically expanded its presence in the South China Sea. It also began laying the groundwork for a potential military conflict over Taiwan. Still, the balance between Moscow and Beijing has grown increasingly asymmetrical.
Russia’s prolonged war in Ukraine has depleted its military and economic resources, further isolating it diplomatically. China has taken full advantage of this power vacuum, expanding its reach into Central Asia—a region where Russia had maintained dominance for over two centuries.
In Africa, Russia’s opaque resource-grabbing campaigns via the Wagner Group are drawing global scrutiny. Though Moscow has succeeded in propping up a handful of military juntas, these operations have been marked by serious setbacks, including battlefield defeats by Islamist militants. At the same time, China has been steadily gaining ground, offering economic development deals and arms exports that further reduce Russia’s influence on the continent.
Under the weight of tightening Western sanctions, even Chinese financial institutions are now scaling back dealings with Russian individuals and entities. This added financial pressure illustrates the extent to which Moscow has become economically dependent on Beijing—transforming what was once a partnership of equals into a relationship in which Russia plays the subordinate role.
Beijing’s Long Game: Outer Manchuria
Beijing’s overarching ambition is twofold: to replace the United States as the world’s leading power and to symbolically reverse the historical narrative of national humiliation. Taiwan represents a core piece of that ambition. Officially regarded by Beijing as a breakaway province, Taiwan remains under the protection of American military guarantees, making its reunification a risky undertaking.
But beyond Taiwan lies another strategic target: Outer Manchuria. Long seen as unjustly taken by imperial Russia, the region remains rich in natural resources and strategically positioned. Its reclamation would not only fulfill a historical grievance but also serve Beijing’s growing economic and geopolitical needs.
As Russia’s position continues to erode under the weight of war, debt, and diplomatic isolation, China is uniquely positioned to press its advantage. The Kremlin is already reliant on Beijing to offload discounted oil and gas and to serve as a critical diplomatic partner. In exchange for continued economic and political support, China could quietly lay the groundwork for territorial concessions.
Taiwan’s current president recently remarked that if China seeks to reclaim lost lands, perhaps it should start with Outer Manchuria—territory forcibly taken by Russia. The comment, while pointed, echoes a broader geopolitical possibility.
If Moscow’s war in Ukraine persists into its second decade and Russia grows more desperate, China could increasingly use its leverage to extract territorial access or influence in the Russian Far East. A gradual encroachment could take shape—not necessarily through open conflict, but via mounting pressure in the form of debt obligations, economic dependency, and strategic vulnerability.
Should Moscow resist such pressure, it might soon find itself unable to do so. With its military exhausted and its economy frayed, Russia may not be in a position to deny Beijing’s demands. The specter of conflict with a relatively intact and modern Chinese military could become a looming threat.
More than 160 years ago, Russia leveraged China’s weakness to seize Outer Manchuria. Today, that dynamic may be reversing. As Beijing grows bolder and Moscow more dependent, the possibility of China reclaiming what it considers ancestral land can no longer be dismissed as improbable.