Since December 2025, Iran has been gripped by a wave of popular uprisings triggered by the rapid collapse of the national currency and a sharp spike in inflation. What began as localized economic protests has hardened into sustained nationwide unrest. According to some estimates, thousands have been killed, the majority of them demonstrators, as security forces attempt to contain what increasingly resembles a systemic challenge to the Islamic Republic itself.

What distinguishes this moment from earlier cycles of unrest is not only its persistence but also its social composition. The backbone of the protests has emerged from the bazaar—merchants, traders, and small-business owners who for decades formed a conservative social base of the Islamic regime. Their defection is politically consequential. These groups are among the hardest hit by inflation, currency depreciation, and trade disruptions, and their open participation undermines one of the regime’s longest-standing pillars of legitimacy.

The regime’s vulnerability is compounded by pressures beyond Iran’s borders. The weakening of the so-called Axis of Resistance, alongside heightened tensions with the United States and Israel, has intensified elite anxiety in Tehran. The possibility of Western or Israeli military action—particularly targeting Iran’s ballistic missile infrastructure and nuclear development—hangs over the unrest. Yet Iran’s adversaries may not stop at degrading these programs alone. In elite discourse, there is growing concern that external actors could see internal disorder as an opportunity to dismantle the Islamic Republic itself.

Taken together, these internal and external pressures suggest that Iran may not return to its pre-2025 political equilibrium. Even if the protests subside, the regime that emerges is unlikely to resemble the one that preceded them. The question, then, is not whether Iran is heading toward transformation, but who will shape it—and which elite coalition will prevail in the uncertain “day after.”

Iran’s contemporary ruling class can be broadly divided into three elite groupings: the clergy, the security and military establishment, and the technocratic class. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, political power has oscillated among shifting alliances within this triangle. The clerical–military alignment that dominated during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency later gave way to a more clerical–technocratic partnership under Hassan Rouhani. Each configuration reflected changing priorities rather than ideological consensus.

The current unrest appears to be eroding the position of the clergy more directly than in previous protest waves. Chants of “death to the Islamic Republic” and “death to the dictator” have become commonplace, with demonstrators explicitly targeting Ali Khamenei. This rhetoric signals not merely economic frustration but an outright rejection of clerical authority as the organizing principle of the state.

Iran’s military elites are themselves divided. On one side stand the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij militia—forces institutionally and ideologically bound to the Islamic regime. On the other is the regular army, or artesh, which has historically maintained loyalty to the Iranian state rather than to a specific political theology. Though the artesh wields less power than the IRGC, its stance could prove decisive. Whether it chooses repression, neutrality, or defection may determine the fate of the protests.

For now, the IRGC and Basij remain the regime’s primary instruments of suppression. Their loyalty to the clerical system is reinforced by vast economic interests accumulated over decades. A successful overthrow of the Islamic Republic would almost certainly dismantle this economic empire and expose senior commanders to prosecution or retaliation. For that reason, the prospect of a rupture between the IRGC and the clergy remains remote, despite occasional speculation to the contrary.

The technocratic camp occupies a weaker position. Long sidelined by both clerical authority and military power, technocrats have borne much of the blame for Iran’s economic failures. Yet they have also been among the few elite voices advocating restraint. Figures such as Masoud Pezeshkian have publicly called for an end to violence against civilians and urged dialogue with protest leaders. In the current climate, technocrats are widely viewed as the most conciliatory faction within the elite structure, though their capacity to act independently remains limited.

Outside Iran’s ruling institutions stands Reza Pahlavi, the son of the shah overthrown in 1979. His calls for resistance have coincided with surges in protest activity, and his name is increasingly invoked in public discourse. Yet the extent of his support among Iran’s entrenched elites is unclear. Whether clerical, military, or technocratic actors would accept the restoration of a monarchical system remains deeply uncertain.

From within Iran’s elite landscape, two plausible post-protest alignments emerge. The first is the continuation of the IRGC–clergy alliance, which would likely prevail if the protests are decisively crushed. Such an outcome would harden the regime’s authoritarian character, intensify repression, and trigger a sweeping purge designed to prevent any recurrence of mass mobilization.

The second possibility is an alliance between the regular army and technocratic elites, arising from a weakening or displacement of clerical and IRGC dominance. In its early stages, this coalition might rely on a form of military-led governance to stabilize the state. Crucially, however, it would likely abandon the Islamist foundations of the current system in favor of a more explicitly nationalist framework.

Iran’s protests have not yet determined their outcome. But they have already exposed the fragility of the regime’s internal bargains. Whatever emerges in their wake will not simply restore the status quo. It will redefine the balance of power in Tehran—and, with it, the future trajectory of the Iranian state.