Somalia is riven by conflict between its federal government in Mogadishu and the breakaway administrations of Somaliland and Puntland. Layered onto this already volatile landscape are persistent attacks by the militant group al-Shabaab, while piracy continues to plague the country’s coastline. The economic outlook is scarcely more encouraging. Somalia remains among the world’s poorest and most fragile states, relying heavily on agriculture, livestock, remittances from its diaspora, and international assistance.

Yet despite its fragility, Somalia occupies one of the world’s most strategically valuable locations. Situated at the Horn of Africa, its coastline stretches along the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean, and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, placing it astride some of the busiest maritime trade routes leading toward the Suez Canal. This geography has long attracted the attention of the Gulf states, which, particularly since 2015, have sought to advance competing regional ambitions, transforming Somalia into a stage for their geopolitical rivalry.

Those rivalries became increasingly visible during the diplomatic crisis that erupted in June 2017 between Qatar and the quartet of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt. The Somali government, then led by President Mohammed Abdullahi, maintained close relations with Doha and confiscated $9 million carried aboard an Emirati aircraft at Mogadishu airport. Abu Dhabi responded by suspending its support for Somalia, particularly military assistance. The fallout weakened Somali institutions at a moment when the country was still recovering from one of the worst famines in its history.

The dispute resurfaced following Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December 2025, a move that directly challenged Mogadishu’s claims to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political stability. The decision was condemned across the Arab League. The UAE, however, which had normalized relations with Israel by joining the Abraham Accords in 2021, stood alone among member states in declining to voice its opposition. The episode further strained relations between Mogadishu and Abu Dhabi, which continues to maintain close ties with Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital and largest city.

Tensions deepened after Riyadh alleged that Abu Dhabi had helped Aidrus Al Zubaidi, the deposed leader of Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council (STC), flee Yemen through the port of Berbera in Somaliland before taking refuge in the UAE. Somali authorities were reportedly neither informed nor consulted, fueling accusations that their sovereignty had been disregarded. Mogadishu responded by banning Emirati military and cargo aircraft from its airspace, arguing that the UAE had violated Somali territorial authority.

The dispute culminated in January 2026 when Somalia formally terminated its security and defense cooperation agreements with the UAE.

The decision reflected Mogadishu’s growing conviction that Abu Dhabi had acted in ways fundamentally incompatible with Somalia’s sovereignty and national integrity. Emirati investments in Bosaso, Puntland, and the port infrastructure at Berbera subsequently came to an end, depriving the UAE of an important logistical corridor. According to reports by Middle East Eye, that corridor had been used to move arms and personnel supporting Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Yet the episode also exposed the limits of Mogadishu’s authority. Leaders in Puntland and Somaliland opposed the decision, underscoring the persistent tensions within Somalia’s federal system.

The vacuum left by the UAE was quickly filled by Saudi Arabia, with which Somalia has steadily deepened its relationship. That shift became particularly evident during the opening of the World Defense Show in Riyadh this February, where the two countries signed an agreement to strengthen military cooperation. Saudi Arabia was not alone. Somalia also concluded a defense pact with Qatar in January, further reinforcing its ties with Doha.

These agreements reflect the broader strategic ambitions of both Riyadh and Doha. Each seeks greater influence over the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea through closer cooperation with Mogadishu, particularly in the realm of maritime security. In doing so, they are capitalizing on the declining leverage of other regional players, most notably the UAE, while reaffirming their support for Somalia’s territorial integrity.

Although Saudi Arabia and Qatar share similar objectives, they pursue them through different means. Doha has concentrated on expanding its influence in Mogadishu through diplomatic engagement, humanitarian assistance, military cooperation, and infrastructure investment. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, has focused on trade and economic integration, particularly by strengthening livestock imports from Somalia while positioning itself as a guarantor of stability and commercial leadership throughout the Red Sea corridor.

Despite these differences, both Riyadh and Doha have deliberately concentrated their engagement on Somalia’s central government. That approach stands in marked contrast to the UAE’s strategy, which largely bypassed Mogadishu in favor of forging direct partnerships with Puntland and Somaliland. By cultivating close relationships with those federal entities, Abu Dhabi created a counterweight to the central government while securing greater influence over maritime commerce and regional security.

Economic and defense agreements enabled the UAE to strengthen its position along the trade routes linking the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea, while also supporting counterterrorism efforts. Those objectives explain its investments in the port of Berbera, the airport at Bosaso, and the establishment of a military base in Hargeisa. Although formal ties with Mogadishu have since collapsed, Abu Dhabi continues to pursue this strategy. Most recently, the French newspaper Le Monde reported that the UAE is constructing a military facility at Berbera airport intended for use by itself, the United States, and Israel.

Yemen, Somalia’s neighbor across the Gulf of Aden, sits at the center of this increasingly complex geopolitical equation. After serving as the backdrop to Saudi-Emirati tensions late last year, it has assumed even greater strategic importance following Israel’s relationship with Somaliland. That partnership has reportedly enabled Israel to establish an intelligence presence in Somaliland, while plans have also emerged for a naval facility intended to help counter Houthi attacks on Israeli shipping in the Red Sea.

Those developments have drawn sharp warnings from the Houthis. On June 25, Seyed Abdulmalik Al Houthi, leader of the movement, declared: “We will not stand idly by in the face of any Israeli enemy deployment on Somali soil, and we will take the initiative at any moment to strike any of their activities there with all available means.”

The statement illustrates how Somalia has become increasingly entangled in a broader regional confrontation that extends well beyond its own borders. What began as competition among Gulf powers for influence over strategic ports and shipping lanes is now intersecting with the conflict between Israel and the Houthis, adding yet another layer of instability to an already fragile region.

Recent developments suggest that the balance of power across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea is undergoing a significant realignment. As Gulf states recalibrate their strategies and competing regional interests continue to collide, Somalia’s strategic geography has become both its greatest asset and its greatest liability. Its long-term stability will depend not only on healing the country’s internal political divisions but also on its ability to navigate an increasingly crowded geopolitical contest in which outside powers continue to view Somalia less as an independent actor than as a prize to be won.