Israelis and Palestinians Seem to Only Embrace Insanity
If there is one thing that Israelis and Palestinians agree on and religiously adhere to, it’s Albert Einstein’s definition of insanity as “doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results.”
Israelis have long believed that overwhelming military force, collective punishment, denial of rights, rejection of identity, humiliation, and a devastating Egyptian-supported 15-year-long blockade of the Gaza Strip would persuade Palestinians to surrender their national aspirations, accept a rewriting of history, and settle for Israeli control in exchange for economic opportunity.
Israeli officials hailed the decision by Hamas, the Islamists who control the Gaza Strip, not to become militarily involved in this month’s fight with Islamic Jihad, a militant Palestinian organization based in the strip, as evidence that the government’s strategy was working.
However, there is little reason to assume that Hamas has suddenly changed its leopard spots and surrendered the principle of armed struggle. On the contrary, it is more likely that Hamas wants to decide on the timing rather than let Islamic Jihad or Israel drag it into a conflict at a moment that suits their agendas.
The Israeli military said this week that it had sealed an attack tunnel that Hamas had dug from northern Gaza into Israel. It noted that an underground defensive barrier Israel completed in December had blocked the tunnel.
Even so, Israeli officials believe that Hamas’ refusal to join the fray constitutes proof that Israel’s strategy is working.
“What is happening now between Israel and Hamas is a de facto (ceasefire). It is a system of big sticks and sweet carrots. Hamas is receiving what it never got from Israel before and delivering the goods to residents. They understand the price they are paying, but realize the alternative is worse,” a senior Israeli military source told Al-Monitor.
With the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) estimating youth unemployment at 75 percent, Israel is expected to incentivize Hamas by allowing thousands of Gazans to return to work in Israel.
Israel is also considering increasing the number of Gazan work permits from 14,000 to 20,000. Furthermore, Israel may allow Gazans vetted by security to travel abroad on flights from an airport in southern Israel.
Defense Minister Benny Gantz argued in recent days that “for the past year, Israel has had a clear policy. On the one hand, a heavy hand against all violations of sovereignty and offensive and defensive efforts to prevent (attacks) on all fronts. On the other hand, a responsible civil and humanitarian policy strengthening moderate forces over terrorist organizations.”
It’s a strategy built on Israeli scholar Micah Goodman’s notion of “shrinking the conflict.”
Goodman argued in a 2019 New York Times op-ed that this “wouldn’t solve or end the conflict…It would contain it, it would lessen it. It would broaden the Palestinians’ freedom of movement, their freedom to develop, and their freedom to prosper — all without an Israeli military withdrawal, and therefore no security dangers for Israeli civilians.”
Perhaps most importantly, Goodman suggested that shrinking the conflict “would mitigate the risk of a deterioration into a one-state reality” in which Israeli Jews would likely no longer be a majority.
Goodman’s notion constitutes an acknowledgment that Israeli policy has not worked, even if Hamas appears to have become more selective in picking its fights.
The experience of the Palestinian Authority that has been rendered powerless because of Israel’s refusal to push for a definitive resolution of the conflict and the Authority’s mismanagement, corruption, and rivalry with Hamas, is likely to serve as a red line for the Islamists. They will want to ensure political, not just economic benefits.
Moreover, more than seven decades since the establishment of the State of Israel, Palestinians continue to cling to their national identity and aspirations. Yet, many implicitly acknowledge that ordinary Palestinians pay the price for violence that is not getting them any closer to a solution.
“At the end of the day, the ones who lose are the people. Rockets fired into Israel don’t change anything. All they do is ensure that more civilians and children are killed. We have rights, but we have to find another way of securing them,” said a West Bank resident.
Israel’s dilemma is that its future as a Jewish state and democracy may today be as threatened as it was in the early years when Arab armies were determined to wipe it off the map.
Today’s decreasing options for a solution to the century-old conflict constitute the most serious existential threat facing Israel rather than Palestinian violence, despite the wounding earlier this week of eight people when a Palestinian gunman attacked a bus in East Jerusalem.
To be sure, Israeli officials have linked the Gaza operation to stepped-up Israeli efforts at countering Iran, widely viewed as the greatest threat to the existence of a Jewish state.
Israel’s increased focus on Iran comes at a time when the revival of the 2015 nuclear agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program hangs in the balance.
Islamic Jihad maintains close ties to the Islamic republic. Ziyad al-Nakhalah, the group’s top leader, was in Tehran meeting Iranian officials when Israel began its three-day operation against Gaza on August 5.
“Islamic Jihad has an open tab in Iran…Islamic Jihad in Gaza is a violent Iranian proxy,” Benny Gantz said. He asserted that the group received tens of millions of dollars a year from Iran.
Journalist Ben Caspit noted that the assault on Islamic Jihad “was Israel’s first military operation against Gaza terrorist groups since 2009 from which it emerged with a sense of strategic victory” by “keeping Hamas out of the fighting, cutting Islamic Jihad down to size to contain its threat, and restoring its deterrence. On the other hand, metaphorically, the [Israel Defense Forces] as the neighborhood bully took on the weakest kid on the bloc.”
With or without Iranian support, Palestinians have fared no better than Israelis by adhering to Einstein’s definition of insanity.
Palestinian violence in the 1970s and 1980s served its purpose by putting the Palestinian issue on the world’s agenda. However, it has since contributed to taking it off the agenda of some Arab states like the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain who have since established diplomatic relations with Israel and downgraded the issue’s importance to others like Saudi Arabia. Add to that, the United States has all but given up on pursuing peace between Palestinians and Israelis.
Palestinian Islamists continue to cling to the principle of armed resistance that primarily targets civilians in the illusion that violence will again succeed or in the hope that violence will keep Palestinians in the international public eye.
Meanwhile, despite making concessions such as recognizing Israel’s existence and abandoning the notion of armed struggle, moderates have failed to halt Israeli settlements and achieve a modicum of independence.
Moderation also has not prevented the hardening of Israeli public opinion and marginalization of the country’s dovish left.
Israel’s attack on Gaza in a bid to deal a fatal blow to Islamic Jihad, a group that rejects a negotiated resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, a coalition of armed groups on the West Bank, serves as the latest affirmation of Einstein’s definition.
The attack and the Palestinian response have done little more than widen the gap between Israelis and Palestinians, entrenching self-serving positions at a time of Israeli election maneuvering and mounting Palestinian frustration and lack of confidence in leadership.
The international community, as does the Palestinian Authority that administers parts of the West Bank, cling to the notion of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in areas conquered by the Israelis during the Six-Day War in 1967 even if the presence of 670,000 Israeli settlers in 152 settlements in the territory as well as East Jerusalem makes partition extremely difficult, if not impossible.
In the final analysis, the de facto removal of the two-state option as a viable solution, turns solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by opting for one state for both Palestinians and Jews into an existential threat to Israeli democracy if both groups do not enjoy equal rights or to the Jewish nature of the state if they do.
In theory, the only other option would be a three-way solution involving some sort of federation, including Israelis, Palestinians, and Jordanians. But that may not go down well with Jordanians and could potentially aggravate the demographic threat to Israel.
In sum, failure to implement a two-state solution when possible may have made a solution to the conflict more intractable and perpetuated cycles of violence that undermine Israel’s social fabric and democracy.
“If there is one thing completely missing from the public agenda in Israel, it is the long-term view. Israel does not look ahead, not even by half a generation…There is not a single Israeli, not one, who knows where his country is headed,” noted controversial Israeli columnist Gideon Levy.
Levy could have said the same about Palestinians who know what they want, have no idea how to get there, and, true to Albert Einstein, stick to strategies that, at best, are unproductive and, at worst, counterproductive.