President Trump’s interest in acquiring Greenland reflects a kind of strategic foresight that is increasingly rare—and increasingly necessary—as the world enters a new era of great-power competition.

The Arctic is no longer a peripheral frontier. It is fast becoming the next major theater of geopolitical rivalry, and Greenland stands at its center as the region’s most strategically valuable territory. Both Russia and China understand this reality and are moving with urgency to secure long-term advantages there.

Rich in rare-earth minerals, Greenland is the strategic high ground of the Arctic: a vast, frozen island fortress offering unparalleled advantages for scientific research, military basing, and intelligence operations. Its location also places it astride the northern missile corridor into the United States, making it indispensable to any credible homeland-defense strategy.

Russia’s Arctic ambitions already pose a direct challenge to U.S. security interests. Moscow maintains the world’s only fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers and has systematically reopened Soviet-era military installations across its Arctic territories. Its polar icebreaker fleet—the largest on Earth—is central to exploiting and securing the Northern Sea Route, a rapidly emerging commercial and military corridor that could reshape global shipping and naval power projection.

China’s ambitions in the Arctic are more recent but no less consequential. In 2018, Beijing declared itself a “Near Arctic State,” despite having no geographic connection to the region. Since then, it has begun constructing its own fleet of polar icebreakers and advancing plans for a so-called “Polar Silk Road.” In Greenland, Chinese firms have attempted to purchase abandoned naval bases, finance airport construction, and secure mining rights for rare-earth minerals essential to advanced technologies.

Moscow and Beijing have now formalized years of cooperation by signing sweeping agreements to jointly develop the Northern Sea Route. Their Arctic partnership reflects a shared strategic horizon. Unlike Western democracies constrained by election cycles, they plan for permanent geopolitical advantage. Greenland, in this context, is a prize worth substantial risk.

Absent a U.S.-controlled Greenland, Americans could one day wake up to find critical rare-earth mines owned by Chinese companies and strategic Arctic shipping routes dominated by a Russian icebreaker fleet—some 45 vessels strong, including eight nuclear-powered ships. Layer onto that the growing threat of advanced Russian and Chinese ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles, and the strategic implications become difficult to ignore.

As an American territory, Greenland would open a new frontier for economic investment and opportunity. From sustainable fishing and responsible mining to high-tech research and tourism, the island’s economic potential for its roughly 56,000 residents is vast and largely untapped.

U.S. ownership would also create a rare win-win-win scenario grounded in strategic realism. Denmark would be relieved of the substantial financial burden it currently subsidizes. The United States would invest billions in infrastructure, defense, and economic development. And Greenlanders would gain greater security along with meaningful economic and financial opportunities. NATO, moreover, could remain a central part of Greenland’s defense framework.

If Greenlanders choose to remain under Danish sovereignty, that decision must be respected. But they should also be presented with a clear and credible alternative—one that reflects the shifting realities of global power.

Should they opt for the security, prosperity, and long-term opportunity afforded by closer association with the United States, Washington should be prepared to offer an attractive and flexible arrangement. A territorial designation similar to Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, or the U.S. Virgin Islands—a former Danish colony—could serve as one model.

Another option would be a Compact of Free Association with the United States. This framework already exists and has proven workable elsewhere. Under such an arrangement, Greenland’s cultural and linguistic autonomy could be preserved while benefiting from an American security umbrella.

President Trump’s instincts on Greenland are strategically sound. His vision of shared security and prosperity opens the door to a serious and overdue geopolitical discussion. A U.S.–Danish–Greenlandic working group has reportedly been established to explore what may be possible—an encouraging first step.

This would not be the first time the United States has sought to acquire Greenland. Efforts were made in 1867, 1910, and again in 1946. Now, as then, diplomacy must do what diplomacy does best: identify a negotiated solution that advances shared economic interests and vital security concerns.

Beijing and Moscow, for their part, will be watching closely.