U.S. recognition of Somaliland could reshape the Horn of Africa’s geopolitics, intensify U.S.-China rivalry, and validate Somaliland’s democratic aspirations.

“I would hate to see the Red Sea bottled up on both ends by people who might not necessarily be or remain our friends.” These prophetic words, by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1959, echoed the strategic calculus of a Cold War world.

Three years later, Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie dissolved Eritrea’s federal status and annexed the region with little international pushback. In many ways, Eisenhower’s endorsement of Ethiopia’s move was less about Ethiopia itself and more about containing Soviet influence in a region of critical global importance. Fast-forward to today, the parallels to Somaliland’s bid for recognition are striking.

Should President Trump have moved to recognize Somaliland during his second term, his rationale would likely echo Eisenhower’s: securing strategic asset in the volatile but geopolitically critical Gulf of Aden/Horn of Africa region. The Port of Berbera, one of Africa’s most significant natural harbors, offers immense military and economic potential. Trump, however, was not alone in exploring Somaliland’s recognition. U.S. Congressman Scott Perry recently introduced a bill for formal U.S. recognition, signaling an interest in the issue in the legislative branch. If the United States leads the charge, other nations may follow, altering the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.

A Fragile Balance in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa has always been a geopolitical chessboard, its stakes magnified by the rivalry between the United States and China. Beijing already operates a military base in Djibouti, a stone’s throw from Somaliland. U.S. recognition of Somaliland would almost certainly intensify this competition, potentially prompting China to establish a counterweight elsewhere in the region—perhaps in Eritrea, where relations with Beijing are already warm. Such moves could harken back to the Cold War when Eritrea hosted U.S. defense installations before falling under Ethiopian control.

Somaliland’s quest for recognition is rooted in its history. The Somali Republic, formed in 1960 from the merger of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland, collapsed in 1991 amid civil war. Somaliland declared independence, building a functioning democracy and maintaining relative stability while Somalia descended into chaos. Despite its accomplishments, Somaliland has spent over three decades as an unrecognized state, its aspirations stymied by international reluctance to redraw colonial-era boundaries.

States crave recognition as humans crave oxygen. Yet Somaliland’s resilience without it is a marvel of international relations. Unlike its neighbors—Somalia, Djibouti, and Ethiopia—Somaliland scores higher on democracy indices, according to Freedom House. Its peaceful elections and functioning institutions make it an outlier in a region marked by authoritarianism and conflict.

What Recognition Could Mean for the Region

Ethiopia would be among the first to benefit if the U.S. recognizes Somaliland. Landlocked since Eritrea’s independence, Ethiopia has long sought access to the sea. The Port of Berbera could serve as a lifeline, provided Ethiopia overcomes opposition from Somalia and the African Union. A memorandum of understanding between Somaliland and Ethiopia hints at this possibility despite Ethiopia’s diplomatic tightrope with China, Turkey, and Somalia.

China’s calculus would also shift. Somaliland’s existing ties with Taiwan—already a thorn in Beijing’s side—could deepen with U.S. recognition, complicating China’s diplomacy in the Horn of Africa. A formal Somaliland-Taiwan alliance could embolden other states to challenge China’s One-China policy, further entangling the region in great power competition.

The United Arab Emirates, a long-time supporter of Somaliland’s independence, would likely emerge as another winner, bolstering its strategic influence in the Red Sea. Meanwhile, Turkey and Egypt could face diplomatic fallout. Turkey’s attempts to mediate between Somalia and Somaliland might falter, and Egypt’s broader strategy to undermine Ethiopia—particularly over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam—would require recalibration.

The Global Stakes

Somaliland is at the intersection of history and strategy. Its proximity to major shipping routes and oil reserves makes it a prize in any geopolitical contest. The United States’ recognition would not only validate Somaliland’s democratic experiment but also reshape the Horn of Africa’s alliances and rivalries.

For Washington, recognizing Somaliland would signal a renewed commitment to countering Chinese influence in Africa. It would open a Pandora’s box of opportunities and challenges for the region, forcing states to reassess their alliances and priorities. And for Somaliland itself, recognition would mean achieving a dream deferred for over three decades: the right to exist as a sovereign state in the eyes of the world.

As Eisenhower’s words remind us, the stakes in the Red Sea are never just local. Should Somaliland gain recognition, its story will become part of a broader narrative about the evolving balance of power in one of the world’s most contested regions.