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Pictured: Dr. Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh's interim leader. (Vanderbilt University)

Muhammad Yunus faces significant geopolitical and diplomatic challenges in resolving the Rohingya refugee crisis, with little support from Myanmar’s rebel groups, ASEAN, China, or India.

Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh’s interim leader, has vowed to sustain his country’s support for Rohingya refugees, a commitment that is both humanitarian and politically fraught. Since the Burmese military’s brutal crackdown in 2017, the influx of Rohingya refugees has been a persistent challenge for Bangladesh, one that Yunus cannot afford to overlook. His interim government remains committed to resolving the crisis, while many in the Rohingya community place hope in Yunus’s global stature to break the deadlock. However, a profoundly uncertain question is whether Myanmar’s ongoing civil war, the influence of ASEAN, or the broader Indo-Pacific geopolitics will align to help Yunus.

One of the most significant obstacles facing Bangladesh is how to engage with the myriad of non-state actors involved in Myanmar’s civil war. The conflict, which has intensified in recent months, pits the ruling junta against a host of ethnic armed groups, with the Arakan Army emerging as a particularly influential force. The Arakan Army now controls large swaths of Rakhine State, which borders Bangladesh, making it a critical player in any discussion about repatriating Rohingya refugees.

Bangladesh recognizes the need to engage with the Arakan Army. Foreign Advisor Touhid Hossain recently suggested that negotiations with the rebel group could open the door to repatriation efforts. However, the prospects are bleak. In a recent interview with Tanbirul Miraj Ripon, an investigative journalist who has covered the Rohingya issue for outlets like ABC, AFP, and The Economist, Ripon expressed doubt about such a strategy. He noted that as a non-state actor, the Arakan Army is unlikely to engage diplomatically with Bangladesh. “Due to the psychological distance between a state and a non-state actor, resolution of the predicament will not be possible,” he explained. “Just like the junta forces, ethnic militias such as the Arakan Army are hostile towards the Rohingyas.”

Indeed, the Arakan Army’s actions speak to this animosity. Last August, over 8,000 Rohingya refugees fled to Bangladesh to escape Arakan Army persecution, underscoring the group’s entrenched opposition to Rohingya presence. Much like the junta, ethnic militias often brand the Rohingyas as “aliens” or “Bangladeshi intruders,” given their linguistic, religious, and ethnic differences.

Yunus has also set his sights on Bangladesh’s possible entry into ASEAN. He hopes this strategic move will strengthen diplomatic ties with Southeast Asia and potentially facilitate the Rohingya repatriation process. In a meeting with Malaysian officials, Yunus called for Malaysian support in Bangladesh’s ASEAN membership bid. Diversifying Bangladesh’s diplomatic relationships is part of Yunus’s broader strategy to resolve the refugee crisis.

However, the likelihood of Bangladesh joining ASEAN — or receiving meaningful support from Southeast Asian nations — seems slim. ASEAN adheres rigidly to a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of its member states, a stance that complicates any potential involvement in Myanmar’s internal conflicts. Ripon, the journalist, is similarly skeptical about the effectiveness of this approach, suggesting that ASEAN’s focus on economic rather than political issues limits the chances of its members stepping up to resolve the Rohingya crisis.

Beyond ASEAN, Yunus has pointed to China and India as potential allies in the repatriation effort. Yet, the geopolitical realities of the region suggest that both nations are more likely to prioritize their strategic interests over Bangladesh’s humanitarian concerns. China, for example, maintains a complex relationship with Myanmar, supporting both the junta and, paradoxically, some of the ethnic insurgent groups that oppose it.

China’s interests in Myanmar are strategic. The country seeks a foothold in the Bay of Bengal to solidify its influence in the Indian Ocean and to advance projects like the Kunming-Kyaukphyu Railway, which promises to expedite the transportation of energy resources. But given its vested interests, China is unlikely to pressure Myanmar to alter its stance on the Rohingyas. As long as both the junta and the insurgents maintain their aggressive positions, China has little incentive to advocate for a resolution favorable to Bangladesh.

India, for its part, has its own geopolitical calculations. Although it remains locked in a regional rivalry with China, India has broadly adopted a neutral stance on the Rohingya issue. Like China, India supports the junta primarily to safeguard its infrastructure projects in Myanmar, such as the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, which aims to enhance connectivity to India’s landlocked northeastern states. However, the fierce fighting between the junta and the China-backed insurgents has jeopardized the project, placing India in a precarious position.

In light of these geopolitical complexities, it is unlikely that Muhammad Yunus and his interim government will find a swift resolution to the Rohingya crisis. Engaging with non-state actors like the Arakan Army presents significant challenges, while ASEAN’s non-interference principle limits its potential role. Moreover, both China and India are more focused on their strategic objectives in Myanmar than on addressing the plight of the Rohingyas. Given these obstacles, the road to a permanent solution remains uncertain and fraught with diplomatic hurdles.

Ashiq Iqbal Jishad is pursuing a Bachelor's degree in Education from the University of Dhaka. His research interests include defense, immigration, Transatlantic relations, Eurasia, the European Union, and NATO.