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U.S.-led Naval exercises in 2020.

RIMPAC highlights intensified military collaborations and strategic alliances among global powers to counter emerging geopolitical threats in the Indo-Pacific region.

Efforts to expand influence and strengthen alliances through friendshoring are intensifying, mirrored in a series of strategic maneuvers amid volatile power and security dynamics.

The U.S. Pacific Fleet started hosting the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) earlier this month, the world’s largest international maritime exercise, in Hawaii. This event, which runs until August, brings together the armed forces of 29 countries for five weeks of training. This year’s goal is to strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific, with over 25,000 personnel participating. Established in 1971 by Australia, Canada, and the U.S., this year’s RIMPAC drills include the militaries of South Korea, Japan, India, and various nations in Southeast and South Asia, Latin America, and Europe.

Military leaders highlight RIMPAC’s role in enhancing interoperability capacities and readiness to address both traditional and non-traditional threats, fostering deeper trust and understanding among participating nations. This exercise aligns with Washington’s strategic interests in defense and political friendshoring. The U.S. has continued to advance multilateral interregional partnerships, established new defense agreements, and developed its military capacity across the Indo-Pacific. These moves promote Beijing’s responses, where it has increased its military exercises around Taiwan and repeatedly clashed with the Philippines in the South China Sea.

Russia has also joined the fray to deepen its presence and influence in the region. In the past two months, President Vladimir Putin made high-profile visits to China, North Korea, and Vietnam, seeking support and validation for the war in Ukraine and expanding economic and trade fallback. This will provide resilience and guardrails for greater economic, political, and military cooperation.

RIMPAC’s comprehensive training encompasses land, air, and sea combat. The exercise includes amphibious landings, urban combat training, anti-submarine warfare, ship sinking exercises, and cyber and space operations. It emphasizes a “robust and complex tactical phase, comprehensive humanitarian and disaster relief operations, and integrated multi-domain warfare.”

Washington aims to send a clear message to both foes and allies alike. Just days before RIMPAC, the U.S. conducted strategic bombing drills, sent a nuclear-power aircraft carrier to the Korean Peninsula, and carried out fighting drills around Taiwan and the South China Sea with its allies. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stressed that the Asia-Pacific was at the heart of U.S. security strategy, arguing in the Shangri-La Dialogue that “The United States can be secure only if Asia is secure.” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg echoed this sentiment, stating, “What happens in Europe matters for Asia, and what happens in Asia matters for us.”

RIMPAC exercises in 2016
RIMPAC exercises in 2016.

The RIMPAC exercise is a clear indication of the interests and wariness of all participating players, who are preparing for all possibilities on the table, facing a potential future conflict or war in a fast-changing power equation and power intent in the region. China participated in RIMPAC in 2014 and 2016 but was disinvited in 2018 and remains excluded this year. Meanwhile, Vietnam and South Korea have announced deeper partnerships in the semiconductor and artificial intelligence sectors this month. Both countries needed a new economic transition change. South Korea has been a critical economic and investment partner in these new economic changes.

In the area of semiconductors, Vietnam sees this as the next critical economic transformation and has been eager to join the global bandwagon, especially in targeting the right developing partner that can offer the expertise and experience to build the industry from scratch. China is seen as less important or strategic, based on geopolitical realities and the fact that China lacks the know-how and experience in the first stage of semiconductor development. Vietnam does not want to be at the dictate of China, which could harm its geopolitical interests.

Vietnam offers a high-quality young population segment that can fuel capable human capital in this industry and its AI development. South Korea will also want to leverage this. Seoul can gain higher returns by expanding its soft power presence and serving as a vital new economic sector partnership for Vietnam. This will also complement Seoul’s efforts to target the region in its overall diversification effort and its intent to put a check on China.

Vietnam is eyeing Seoul’s extensive edge and upper hand in providing the needed technological and hard asset know-how to create a new quid pro quo mechanism. Seoul is also eyeing Vietnam’s strategic advantage in its economic potential, internal consumption, market offering, new potential demographics, and its prized geographical advantage in the Mekong region and neighboring China. South Korea has been a big source of tourism for Hanoi. The new critical economic sectors’ push for economic transformation in AI and semiconductors is seen as another effort to provide a high-value partnership based on these new sectors.

This gives Seoul a new fallback option for strengthening its semiconductor industry by having a new base in the region. Given its proximity to China, this also gives Seoul a new economic friendshoring effort to catch up with its defense friendshoring efforts as seen in its quest to deepen ties with Japan and the U.S. for its security needs.

Vietnam provides a new economic and defense partnership in this aspect. Providing semiconductor training and joint development creates new trust and a spillover impact for Seoul to continue deepening ties with Hanoi, keeping China in mind.

Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Retno L.P. Marsudi, visited Malaysia early this month to pursue a new quest for combined positive returns. Retno and Jakarta aim to set an early phase of engagement for the incoming Prabowo and establish new trust settings. Key issues will revolve around domestic and international issues, including the protection of workers’ rights and welfare, and the involvement of Malaysian institutions and companies in Indonesia’s new economic transition.

While there exists past and existing wariness and fear of one another’s geopolitical interests, hard power, and security hesitancy, both nations will want to build a new front of economic and trade potential, consolidating joint resources. Both face similar threats and challenges in traditional and non-traditional settings. They will want to present a more united front in leveraging common threat settings and consolidating joint responses, particularly with pooling resources and policy similarities in commodities, palm oil, and external foreign policies.

Both leaders, as representatives of Muslim nations, will want to play a bigger role in the Middle East and West Asia conundrum. They have expressed agreements to send peacekeeping troops. While there is a deeper sense of rivalry in attracting key investments in areas like artificial intelligence, semiconductors, digital and green economy, electric vehicles, and digital infrastructure, Prabowo will also want to leverage Malaysia’s upcoming potential in economic and geopolitical power, especially with Malaysia being the ASEAN chair next year.

Prabowo recognizes Malaysia’s indispensability in complementing his vision for Indonesia. He will want to reduce any potential rivalries and disputes, seeking active cooperation and trust-building by jointly utilizing each other’s strengths as the way forward.

Jakarta will want to rely on Kuala Lumpur to complement, support, legitimize, and justify its stance of non-alignment in the region. With Malaysia’s inclusion, Jakarta will strengthen its leverage without overly pivoting to either side. Malaysia serves as a fallback for Jakarta’s new push for economic friendshoring. The spillover impact from a developed Malaysia, as a base for supply chain and key technologies from both China and the U.S., is significant.

Indonesia remains cognizant of its importance in the radar of Beijing, Washington, and Canberra, and needs a soft landing in its regional approach to maintain peace equilibrium. Jakarta, under Prabowo, will also want to ensure a stable and peaceful South China Sea. Malaysia’s approach is similar to this intent, aiming to project this stability at both regional and extra-regional levels, and preventing Manila from stirring deeper regional power kegs and security dilemmas.

A new wave of power rivalry has long taken shape, and recent momentum only adds urgency. Regional powers and extra-regional players are reinforcing their presence and trust networks, preparing for potential future conflicts while striving to maintain peace and stability in a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape.

Collins Chong Yew Keat has been serving in University of Malaya for more than 9 years. His areas of focus include strategic and security studies, America’s foreign policy and power projection, regional conflicts and power parity analysis and has published various publications on numerous platforms including books and chapter articles. He is also a regular contributor in providing op-eds and analytical articles for both the local and international media on various contemporary global issues and regional affairs since 2007.