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Trump’s much-hyped Shenzhen summit gave Putin legitimacy and Xi prestige but produced little beyond diplomatic theater and empty promises.

On November 19, on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shenzhen, the leaders of the United States, China, and Russia met together for the first time. President Donald Trump proclaimed the gathering “bigger than Yalta” and rated its success a twelve out of ten.

Ninety minutes later, the three emerged with a “joint declaration on peace” reaffirming that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” promising dialogue on nuclear risks, and warning international courts against abusing their jurisdiction.

Conspicuously absent were commitments on Ukraine, Iran, or a treaty limiting nuclear arsenals.

The outcome was predictable. Shenzhen produced little substance, confirming my longstanding argument that such a summit was unlikely to succeed.

Three leaders arrived with competing agendas.

Trump came politically weakened by the Democrats’ midterm victories. Neither Moscow nor Beijing had much incentive to negotiate major concessions with an administration whose domestic influence was eroding. Vladimir Putin came seeking recognition, eager to demonstrate that Russia remained a great power. Xi Jinping saw an opportunity to showcase China’s growing global influence.

Underlying their ambitions was a principle I have explored in my books on foreign policy: states have no permanent enemies, only enduring national interests, and those interests evolve. At Shenzhen, they simply did not converge.

Trump wanted progress on nuclear arms control and the war with Iran. Since his first term, he has advocated a trilateral nuclear agreement involving Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. The need is genuine. New START, the last remaining nuclear arms treaty between the United States and Russia, expired in February, leaving the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals without legally binding limits.

Putin’s objective was simpler. For a leader isolated by Western sanctions and entangled in a costly war in Ukraine, a photograph alongside the American and Chinese presidents carries considerable political value. Domestically, it reinforces Russia’s great-power status. Internationally, it undermines efforts to isolate Moscow.

Xi had his own calculations. By hosting the American and Russian presidents in Shenzhen, a showcase of China’s technological achievements, he demonstrated Beijing’s increasingly central role in global diplomacy.

Three agendas, one table, and remarkably little common ground.

China’s position on nuclear arms control explains the summit’s first failure. Beijing has consistently resisted trilateral negotiations, arguing that its arsenal remains substantially smaller than those of the United States and Russia. China is expanding its nuclear capabilities and has little interest in accepting restrictions that would institutionalize its strategic inferiority.

Yet the rhetoric suggested otherwise. Trump spoke about reducing nuclear weapons, acknowledging that it is “not an easy thing to do—give them up.” Xi went further, declaring that nuclear weapons should ultimately be prohibited and destroyed. He also proposed regular high-level exchanges and a crisis communication mechanism.

The scale of the problem underscores the stakes.

At the beginning of 2026, Russia possessed an estimated 5,420 nuclear warheads, the United States approximately 5,042, and China roughly 620. Washington and Moscow together accounted for about 86 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons. Both continue modernizing their arsenals, while China is expanding its capabilities faster than any other nuclear power.

The financial burden is staggering. In 2025, the nine nuclear-armed states collectively spent a record $118.8 billion on nuclear weapons. The United States accounted for $69.2 billion, exceeding the combined spending of every other nuclear power. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that maintaining and modernizing American nuclear forces will cost $946 billion between 2025 and 2034.

Much of this expenditure is unnecessary.

By the mid-1980s, the United States and Soviet Union possessed approximately 70,000 nuclear warheads between them, enough to destroy each other many times over. Arms control agreements reduced those arsenals by more than four-fifths without eliminating either country’s nuclear deterrent. Yet Washington and Moscow still possess more than 5,000 warheads each. How many times must an adversary be destroyed to establish credible deterrence?

Nuclear deterrence also constrains direct warfare between nuclear-armed states. Neither Russia nor the United States could launch a devastating nuclear attack against the other without risking its own destruction. A similar calculation shapes relations between Washington and Beijing.

Moreover, excessive nuclear spending diverts resources from development, education, health care, and poverty reduction. The dangers confronting the three powers are largely dangers they create for one another, and therefore dangers they can reduce through negotiation.

The answer is not expanding nuclear arsenals or an expensive missile defense system such as Trump’s proposed Golden Dome, which risks encouraging Russia and China to develop additional missiles and countermeasures. The rational alternative is arms control.

This was Shenzhen’s most consequential failure. A nuclear agreement could have transformed the meeting from political theater into a diplomatic breakthrough. No reasonable observer expected a comprehensive treaty in ninety minutes. But the leaders could at least have instructed their ministers to begin negotiating a framework for future arms control.

Even that modest commitment proved elusive. Instead, the declaration promised only “dialogue” on nuclear risks, without a timetable or meeting date.

Russia’s position explains the second failure.

Trump and Putin met separately for nearly an hour, with Ukraine reportedly dominating their conversation. Yet the declaration made no reference to the war.

The disagreements remain formidable. Russia demands that Ukraine surrender the four regions Moscow claimed to annex in 2022, abandon its NATO aspirations, and accept restrictions on its armed forces. Ukraine insists on a ceasefire before a political settlement, refuses to relinquish territory Russia has not captured, and demands Western security guarantees.

Ninety minutes of diplomacy cannot resolve differences of that magnitude.

However, one provision suited Moscow: the warning that the International Criminal Court and similar institutions “must not abuse their jurisdiction.” The language came more than three years after the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Putin over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children.

Putin secured international recognition and language challenging judicial authority without conceding anything meaningful on Ukraine.

Why would he have offered more?

Democrats had won control of both houses of Congress in the midterm elections, positioning themselves to take power in January. The result weakened Trump’s political leverage.

A president facing an incoming opposition-controlled Congress cannot easily deliver what Moscow wants most. Major American sanctions against Russia are embedded in legislation, making them hard to remove. Nor can Trump guarantee that an agreement concerning Ukraine would survive beyond his presidency.

In my assessment, Moscow and Beijing have concluded that more consequential negotiations may be possible with Trump’s successor. Their incentive is to wait.

The same applies to Iran. Trump argued that the three powers should cooperate to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet neither Russia nor China had a compelling reason to rescue Washington from a conflict they opposed.

Equally revealing was who was excluded from the summit.

The European Union, whose members have invested heavily in Ukraine’s defense, had no representation. Neither did Ukraine itself.

President Volodymyr Zelensky had warned that Shenzhen might become another Yalta, where great powers negotiated spheres of influence over smaller countries. Such an outcome appeared closer to Putin’s ambition than to the summit’s achievements.

Europe’s frustration was understandable, but its leaders should examine their own shortcomings.

As I argued in my book on European Union foreign policy, the EU is not a sovereign state. It is an extraordinary economic power without a unified military or a single authoritative voice in international affairs. Its foreign policy remains constrained by the competing priorities of twenty-seven member states.

An international actor that cannot decide who speaks on its behalf should hardly be surprised when others conduct diplomacy without it.

On one point, moreover, Trump has a legitimate argument: Ukraine’s European neighbors within NATO should assume a greater share of the burden for its defense. Russia poses a more immediate geographical threat to Europe than to the United States.

Nevertheless, the fact that the three leaders met has value.

Trump has often been criticized, with justification, for conducting foreign policy through personal relationships rather than institutional planning. But he is correct that leaders should engage directly with countries whose governments they oppose.

Their reaffirmation that nuclear war cannot be won echoes the principle Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev articulated in 1985. A functioning crisis communication mechanism among Washington, Moscow, and Beijing could help prevent catastrophic miscalculations in the Taiwan Strait, Europe, or the Persian Gulf.

These possibilities should not be dismissed, although they fall short of what the world needs.

Summits rarely create agreements. More often, they ratify understandings developed through earlier negotiations. The great diplomatic settlements of the past, from Vienna to Yalta and Helsinki, emerged from preparation by professional diplomats who understood their adversaries’ interests.

Shenzhen lacked that foundation. The meeting was organized in roughly two months and announced only five days beforehand. It was conducted by an American president whose State Department has been weakened and whose political standing had deteriorated following an electoral defeat.

In my book on American foreign policy, I argued that the erosion of U.S. influence owes as much to failures of political leadership and strategic judgment as to the growing strength of rival powers. Shenzhen offered another illustration.

China arrived with a strategy. Russia arrived with a purpose. The United States arrived with a slogan.

The lesson is not that great-power diplomacy is futile. It is that diplomacy requires clearly defined interests, realistic expectations, sustained preparation, and an understanding of what adversaries will accept.

Shenzhen failed because those conditions were absent.

Trump was politically weakened, giving Moscow and Beijing little reason to make concessions. Putin came seeking recognition and received it. Xi came to demonstrate China’s international stature and succeeded. Each obtained much of what he wanted, except Trump, who came seeking an agreement.

Until Washington rediscovers the distinction between diplomatic spectacle and diplomatic strategy, great-power summits will continue producing photographs, declarations, and remarkably little else.

Sohail Mahmood is an independent political analyst focused on global politics, U.S. foreign policy, governance, and the politics of South and West Asia.

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