Decentralisation is essential for a stable and inclusive post-war Syria, as centralized governance risks repeating past repression and deepening ethnic and sectarian divides.

The Conference on Kurdish Unity and Common Stance recently concluded in Qamishli, northeast Syria. More than 400 delegates from across the country participated, with the goal of fostering Kurdish political cohesion and articulating shared positions on Syria’s future. The conference’s final communiqué, issued in the presence of United States officials, called for the next Syrian constitution to guarantee Kurdish national rights in a post-Assad era. Most notably, it emphasized transforming Syria into a decentralized democratic state. Yet, Syria’s interim government hastily and dismissively rejected the proposal, offering little substantive engagement.

In its response, Syria’s government repudiated the call for decentralization. It condemned recent statements from Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) leaders advocating for a federal arrangement, asserting that such positions contradicted existing agreements. Syria’s Islamist factions echoed the government’s rejection, arguing that Kurdish demands for decentralization threatened national unity. These reactions reflect a continued commitment by Damascus to centralized governance, similar in form and function to the repressive system that existed under former President Bashar al-Assad—arguably the most authoritarian in the Arab world, surpassed only by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

After thirteen years of devastating conflict, Syria today remains deeply fractured. While economic interdependence still connects parts of the country, and many Syrians remain deeply attached to national unity, the nation’s social fabric has unraveled. Even after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the new interim government made little effort to restore the confidence of Syria’s minority communities. In March, Alawite civilians, primarily concentrated in Syria’s coastal areas, were targeted by militias allied with the current government, resulting in the deaths of more than 1,600 people.

Now, another minority—the Druze—is facing increasing pressure from forces loyal to Damascus. Clashes between pro-government fighters and Druze gunmen have led to more than a dozen deaths in a Damascus suburb. In response to the violence, Druze groups have seized control of Suwayda province and barred interim government forces from entering. The same resistance has emerged in Druze-populated districts surrounding Damascus, including Jaramana, Sahnaya, and Jdeidat Artouz. This profound sense of insecurity among Syria’s minority populations makes any effort to rebuild a unified state under centralized authority implausible and potentially destabilizing.

Ironically, interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa remains convinced that centralisation is the key to holding the country together and preventing further fragmentation. By concentrating power in the hands of a strong central government, he hopes to retain control over Syria’s security apparatus, political landscape, and economic reconstruction. His strategy, however, reflects the exact centralized blueprint he employed in Idlib—an approach that may have worked in a relatively homogenous province but cannot be replicated on a national scale.

Syria is far too diverse and too deeply scarred by war for such a model to succeed. The conflict has devastated every essential component of the nation: its population, civil institutions, infrastructure, cultural heritage, and economy. Before the war, Syria was a middle-income country sustained by agriculture, industry, oil production, trade, and tourism. It boasted respectable health care and education systems. A return to a highly centralised government now risks reproducing the same patterns of repression and exclusion that ignited the conflict in the first place—potentially leading to renewed instability, institutional gridlock, or even the resurgence of violence.

One thing is certain: Syria can no longer function as a monolithic nation-state. Whether the country adopts a decentralised system, federalism, or a looser confederation must be a decision by Syrians. However, such a determination will require extensive negotiation and compromise. There is a historical precedent for decentralization. In 2011, the Assad regime issued Decree 107, also known as the “Local Administration Law,” as part of a package of political reforms in response to the growing civil uprising. This law aimed to devolve political and administrative responsibilities to local governing bodies. Yet its implementation remained vague and largely theoretical. Nevertheless, Decree 107 could serve as a valuable point of departure in crafting a new governance framework that reflects the realities of contemporary Syria.

Syria is a multiethnic country composed of Sunni Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians, Armenians, Turkomans, Alawites, Yazidis, and others. Power must be shared to maintain national cohesion and prevent further bloodshed—delegated meaningfully to local communities. In other multiethnic countries such as Nigeria and India, decentralised governance has helped preserve national unity despite profound internal differences. Syria’s future must be shaped around a political model that recognizes the rights of all its constituent communities and ensures that every group has an active role in the governance of the state.

Jwan Shekaki of NPA Syria in Qamishli and Hozan Zubair, a Syrian journalist from Al-Hasakah now based in Erbil, Kurdistan, contributed to this article.