On May 24, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan welcomed Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa to Istanbul in a high-stakes diplomatic encounter that hinted at a thaw in Turkey-Syria relations.

The meeting followed the U.S. and EU decisions to lift sanctions on Syria—a move Erdoğan praised as a long-overdue gesture toward rebuilding a nation shattered by 14 years of civil war. Joining the leaders were the foreign and defense ministers from both countries, along with Turkey’s intelligence chief, in discussions that cut to the core of regional security: the role of Syrian Kurdish YPG forces in a future Syrian state and Ankara’s enduring concerns over Kurdish militancy.

Turkey’s involvement in Syria has been nothing short of transformative. Having backed opposition forces—including Sharaa’s own Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—in toppling Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Ankara has emerged as a central actor in shaping the post-Assad order.

As Russia and Iran’s grip weakens, Turkey has deftly maneuvered into the resulting power vacuum, even as it balances fraught relations with the U.S.-aligned Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), whose YPG backbone Ankara sees as inseparable from the PKK, a designated terrorist organization. The recent lifting of sanctions—largely due to pressure from Turkey and Saudi Arabia—reflects a shifting regional calculus, one that sees Turkey as pivotal to Syria’s future security and reconstruction.

Yet the path forward is anything but smooth. Sectarian violence has surged, particularly targeting Syria’s Alawite minority, with over 1,000 deaths reported in March alone. These flare-ups raise troubling questions about Sharaa’s ability—or willingness—to bridge Syria’s entrenched divides.

Kurdish aspirations for autonomy, staunchly opposed by both Ankara and Sharaa, further complicate prospects for national reconciliation. Israeli airstrikes targeting Iranian positions in Syria continue unabated, adding yet another layer of volatility, even as UAE-brokered backchannel talks between Syria and Israel attempt to stem the escalation. Meanwhile, unrest at home—including widespread protests over the jailing of Istanbul’s mayor, Ekrem İmamoğlu—could weaken Erdoğan’s political capital and blunt his foreign policy ambitions.

Erdoğan’s foreign policy is increasingly driven by a neo-Ottoman ambition—an attempt to reassert Turkish influence across the Middle East and former imperial peripheries. This vision is manifest in Turkey’s entrenched military presence in northern Syria, its discussions around establishing airbases in central Syria, and its efforts to train a new Syrian army.

These moves serve multiple purposes: containing Kurdish influence, securing Turkish borders, and asserting Ankara’s strategic relevance as Russia and Iran retreat. Backing Sharaa—a former jihadist leader turned political operator—may be a pragmatic gamble by Erdoğan to mold Syria’s trajectory while safeguarding domestic security priorities.

Still, Turkey’s approach is fraught with consequences. Its support for Sunni Islamist factions has drawn fire from Syrian Kurds and Alawites alike, and has unsettled regional actors such as Russia, which has voiced concerns about “ethnic cleansing” by extremist militias. Erdoğan’s alliance with Sharaa also complicates relations with Israel, which views any empowered Islamist figurehead in Damascus as a potential threat and has lobbied Washington to maintain pressure on Syria. On the home front, Erdoğan’s crackdown on dissent and economic malaise may constrain his ability to sustain assertive foreign adventures.

Beyond Syria, the region remains a pressure cooker. The Gaza conflict, Iran’s nuclear brinkmanship, and Houthi provocations in Yemen continue to undercut stability. For the United States, the challenge lies in balancing its commitments: maintaining security guarantees to Israel, countering Iran’s regional ambitions, and engaging with pragmatic Gulf powers like Saudi Arabia and the UAE—each recalibrating their stance on Syria’s new leadership.

As a NATO ally with significant on-the-ground leverage in Syria, Turkey is too important to ignore. But Erdoğan’s autocratic tendencies and his regional ambitions demand a calibrated response. The United States should pursue deeper diplomatic engagement with Ankara—not to enable its every move, but to shape outcomes conducive to long-term regional stability. This includes urging Turkey to rein in sectarian violence perpetrated by its Syrian proxies, particularly against vulnerable groups like the Alawites and Kurds. High-level dialogues, such as those involving U.S. Ambassador Tom Barrack, must prioritize shared goals—counterterrorism, reconstruction, and de-escalation—while addressing Turkish anxieties about the YPG in ways that don’t come at the expense of Syrian unity.

At the same time, Washington must use its influence within NATO to quietly pressure Ankara on domestic issues, particularly the erosion of democratic norms. The jailing of figures like İmamoğlu cannot be divorced from the broader narrative of Turkish authoritarianism. Discreet but firm diplomacy—rather than public condemnation—could persuade Erdoğan to moderate internal policies that threaten both Turkey’s legitimacy and its utility as a regional partner.

The lifting of U.S. and EU sanctions on Syria opens the door to reconstruction, but aid must come with strings attached. The U.S., alongside Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the EU, should channel resources through transparent, multilateral frameworks that prioritize governance reform and equitable development—guarding against the re-entrenchment of Islamist or sectarian elites.

Equally vital is Syria’s reintegration into regional bodies, like the Arab League. While Sharaa and Erdoğan currently reject any federal model for Kurdish autonomy, the U.S. should push for a decentralized framework—one that offers limited self-governance to Kurdish regions within a unified Syria. Dialogue, not repression, is the only viable path toward durable peace.

On the security front, the U.S. should actively support UAE-led Syria-Israel negotiations, encouraging reciprocal de-escalation: Syrian guarantees to keep Iranian militias at bay in return for a reduction in Israeli airstrikes. Simultaneously, Washington and its Gulf partners must explore economic tools and diplomatic channels to diminish Iran’s disruptive regional influence—avoiding military confrontation that could undo fragile progress in Syria.

None of this is without risk. Erdoğan’s domestic vulnerabilities could prompt reckless foreign policy maneuvers intended to stoke nationalism and deflect criticism. Sharaa’s jihadist pedigree casts doubt on his commitment to inclusive governance. And while Moscow and Tehran may be retrenching, they are far from absent—still capable of upending efforts to recalibrate Syria’s future.

Nevertheless, the current geopolitical window offers the U.S. a chance to influence the trajectory of the Middle East. With Turkey playing a central role, Washington must embrace a strategy that is pragmatic but principled—leveraging Ankara’s influence while insisting on accountability. If the U.S. can balance diplomacy, deterrence, and development, it stands a chance not just to manage Syria’s fragile transition, but to reset the regional order on more stable ground.